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An important insight from the current accounting literature is that the quality of accounting 
information is predominantly determined by economic incentives provided to managers and not by 
accounting standards per se.  While, in the light of recent accounting scandals, the need for quality of 
financial reporting cannot be underestimated, the concept of accounting quality is hard to define or to study 
comprehensively.  Nevertheless, it is convenient to think of reporting quality from a user’s viewpoint.  
Specifically, as long as the properties of accounting information satisfy the needs of a firm’s stakeholders 
the information can be considered of good quality.  Many gaps still exist in the literature that examines how 
economic demands and incentives of economic agents shape the properties of accounting information.  
Much can be learned by isolating stakeholders’ demands and managerial incentives for high quality 
financial reports.  While each of the studies in the later chapters is somewhat differently themed, they are 
unified around the idea that a full understanding of incentives  generates powerful insights about the 
behavior of economic agents and how it shapes the properties of accounting information. 
In Chapter 2, I focus on how contracting demands from public debt market motivate managers to 
adopt timely reporting policies with respect to the recognition of economic losses.  While the general 
economic mechanism through which debt contracting affects accounting information is well documented, 
still little research exists on how the microeconomic factors influence the properties of accounting 
information.  The incentives for timely loss recognition arise in public debt market because bondholders 
need to be protected from managers behaving opportunistically and expropriating bondholders’ wealth as a 
firm approaches financial difficulties.  To achieve this, debt contracts include accounting-based covenants 
limiting managerial control over a distressed firm.  However, as distress is detected by assessing the 
accounting performance, covenants will protect bondholders only to the extent that manager’s discretion to 
postpone the recognition of economic losses into earnings is limited.   
It follows from this argument that covenants are more valuable in constraining managerial 
opportunism if the accounting system generates timely signals of a firm’s economic health.  Thus, the 
efficiency of the debt contracting technology can be improved if firms choosing to rely on protective 
covenants adopt a set of accounting policies improving timely loss recognition ex ante.  Consistent with this 
conjecture, I find evidence that the reliance on covenants in lending agreements is positively associated  
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with the demand for timely loss recognition.  The analysis reveals that firms with more covenants in their 
debt contracts are considerably more timely in their recognition of economic losses.  This documented link 
suggests that the use of covenants increases the demand for timely loss recognition.  This helps us to 
understand how a particular set of stakeholders, namely public bondholders, create incentives for firm 
management to improve a particular dimension of reporting quality.  One has to keep in mind, however, 
that managers are self-interested and it may be hard to align their incentives with stakeholders’ needs.  This 
is investigated next.   
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I use the agency theory of overvalued equity (Jensen, 2005) to 
understand why some managers fail to recognize and record economic losses in their financial statements.  
One of the predictions of the theory is that once a firm becomes substantially overvalued, perhaps because 
adverse information is withheld from the market, firm’s managers have strong incentives to manipulate 
their reported performance.  Such incentives arise because overvalued firms cannot sustain high 
performance expectations dictated by the market participants and this leads to a severe conflict of interest 
between management and stakeholders.   
Earnings management in overvalued firms is likely to be forged via accruals and therefore the 
agency theory has important implications for the accrual anomaly (a predictable relation between current 
accruals and future returns) documented by Sloan (1996).  Since overvalued firms aggressively manage 
accruals upwards following a period of overvaluation, a sample of high accrual firms is over-represented 
with overvalued companies.   However, since overvaluation and superior reported performance cannot last 
indefinitely, negative abnormal returns are subsequently realized, on average, for the high accrual portfolio 
companies.  The analysis is important because previously the accrual anomaly was attributed to functional 
fixation of investors, suggestive of inherently poor quality of accrual reporting.   However, this chapter 
suggests that investors do not simply fixate on accruals but are being purposefully misled by management.   
The analysis in the third chapter highlights an important problem when the manager’s reporting 
incentives are not aligned with those of the firm’s stakeholders.  To discipline the management a strong 
corporate governance system must be in place.  A central attribute of the corporate governance system, 
which helps to align reporting incentives, is the transparency of corporate disclosure.  Enhanced 
transparency places stricter constraints on a manager’s ability to hide the consequences of their 
unsuccessful efforts from outside investors.  This mitigates information asymmetry problems, which gives 
rise to information risk and, in turn, reduces the cost of capital.   
Chapter 4 of the thesis investigates the role of transparency of financial reporting in reducing the 
cost of debt capital.  While prior research has established an inverse association between transparency and 
the cost of debt, the analysis here focuses on establishing a causal link and exploits both cross-sectional and 
time series variation in transparency proxies.  The chapter also discusses methodological difficulties in 
establishing causality.  A stronger than previously thought causal link between dimensions of corporate 
disclosure quality and cost of debt is documented.   This chapter generates additional insights about how 
incentives that shape reporting quality arise in capital markets.   
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Chapter 5 of my thesis is mainly methodological.  Measures of the cost of equity capital employed 
in the empirical literature to examine the impact of corporate governance on a firm’s cost of capital are 
subject to substantial measurement difficulties, which jeopardize causal inferences.  In this chapter, I 
identify a substantial downward bias in traditional measures of the implied cost of equity capital, which 
arises due to uncertainty about the future expected returns.  As expected returns are stochastic, the 
traditional valuation models based on accounting information (such as the residual income model) do not 
apply to securities valuation.  I develop a simple way to generalize the traditional valuation models and I 
then invert the derived valuation model to compute the implied cost of equity.  The analysis explains why a 
number of prior studies find implied equity premia to be substantially lower than those historically realized.  
In addition, uncertainty about the future expected returns differs across firms resulting in an important 
omitted factor in extant empirical research.    
The thesis links economic incentives facing managers and problems of corporate governance with 
the properties of accounting information.  The focus is on timely loss recognition, earnings management 
and transparency all of which have received a lot of attention in the literature.  The findings aim at 
advancing our understanding of the role of accounting information in the economy and its impact on 
contracting, valuation and the cost of capital.       4 
Chapter 2  
Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism: 
Complements or Substitutes? 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
I examine whether firms with more covenants in their public debt contracts recognize economic 
losses in earnings in a more timely fashion.  Covenants are designed to limit a manager’s ability to take 
actions leading to bondholder wealth expropriation when a firm approaches financial distress.  In particular, 
covenants are designed to protect bondholders from management opportunistically making unwarranted 
distributions to shareholders or non-optimal investments (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Myers, 1977, Smith 
and Warner, 1979).  However, because covenants typically become binding when accounting performance 
deteriorates below a pre-specified threshold, they protect bondholders only to the extent that a manager’s 
discretion to postpone the recognition of economic losses in earnings is limited. 
  The literature recognizes that accounting information is useful in contracting and that the demands 
of contracting parties shape its properties (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  Specifically, debt contracting 
creates demand for timely loss recognition, an important property of accounting information also referred to 
as conditional conservatism (Watts, 2003a, Holthausen and Watts, 2001, Ball, Robin, and Sadka, 2005).  It 
is more difficult for outsiders to monitor and control a manager’s actions in firms that rely on public rather 
than private debt.  As a result, the conflicts of interest between bondholders and management are more 
severe for public firms.  To mitigate the presence of such conflicts, that is, to limit managerial ability to 
expropriate bondholder wealth, policies adopted by the accounting system recognize economic losses in 
earnings more promptly (Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000, Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). 
While the general mechanism through which debt contracting affects accounting information is 
well understood, relatively little research exists on how the microeconomic foundations of debt contracting 
influence the properties of accounting information (e.g., Sloan, 2001, Guay and Verrecchia, 2006).  In this 
paper I focus on the role of timely loss recognition in debt contracts, and more specifically on the direct link 
between debt covenants and the degree of conditional conservatism in annual reports (Guay and Verrecchia,  
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2006).
1  Following Basu (1997), I measure timely loss recognition via a piecewise linear regression of 
earnings on positive returns (as a proxy for good news) and negative returns (as a proxy for bad news). 
Two opposing views on how the demand for timely loss recognition is resolved in practice exist in 
the literature.  The first view maintains that the timely recognition of losses facilitates the early transfer of 
decision rights from shareholders to bondholders as a firm approaches financial difficulties and thus 
reduces the likelihood of bondholder wealth expropriation (Watts, 2003a, Ball and Shivakumar, 2005, Ball, 
Robin, and Sadka, 2005).  This view is also consistent with Levine and Hughes (2005), who argue that 
covenants are more valuable when losses are recognized in a timely manner because this allows for more 
effectve bonding against ex post sub-optimal actions.  Conservative recognition of news induces early 
truth-telling about future cash flows and allows a company with lower default risk to signal its type.  
Without timely accounting signals about a firm’s economic health, the efficiency of protective covenants in 
curbing the agency costs of debt is lower, i.e., timely loss recognition complements and reinforces the 
effectiveness of covenants.  As a result, debtholders wishing to reduce the potential for losses include 
covenants in contracts and insist on more conservative recognition of economic losses in debtor’s accounts.  
This implies that covenants and accounting conservatism should be positively associated.   
The second view holds that while firms can meet the demand for timely loss recognition by 
adopting conservative accounting policies, bondholders can alternatively adjust GAAP-based accounting 
information to fit contract-specific needs for conservatism (Guay and Verrecchia, 2006).  In other words, 
firms can substitute the adoption of conservative accounting policies within GAAP with pre-specified 
modifications to accounting numbers within a contract (Beatty, Weber, and Yu, 2006).  If making contract-
specific modifications is indeed more cost effective, then no association between covenants and timely loss 
recognition should be observed.  By testing these alternative predictions, I provide evidence that 
distinguishes between the complementarity and substitution views on conditional conservatism and 
accounting-based covenants.  
  I use the Mergent Fixed Investment Securities Database to retrieve information about covenant 
stipulations in public debt contracts.  Covenant information is available for a large cross-section of debt 
issues by industrial companies.  The data allow me to construct five indices of debt contract restrictiveness. 
These indices measure: (1) the overall restrictiveness of the contract, (2) restrictions on new investments, 
(3) restrictions on the distribution of funds to shareholders, (4) restrictions on future financing, and finally, 
(5) the transfer of control to bondholders when default becomes probable.  Since most of the covenants 
depend on accounting information, these indices are used to proxy for the extent to which a contract is 
linked to accounting information. 
  The findings suggest that firms with more covenants in their debt contracts are considerably more 
timely in their economic loss recognition.  Indeed, companies with the most restrictive debt contracts, as 
                                                   
1 From a debt contracting perspective, there is less demand for timeliness in gain recognition (e.g., Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005, Guay and Verrecchia, 2006). 
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judged by the overall restrictiveness index, are about twice as timely in recognizing economic losses as are 
firms with the least restrictive contracts.  The results are similar when I separately examine each of the four 
indices of restrictiveness.  Furthermore, the correlation between the rank of contract restrictiveness and the 
estimates of timely loss recognition is as high as 0.71 for the overall restrictiveness index, 0.78 for the 
investment restrictions index, 0.70 for the payout restrictions index, and 0.66 for financing restrictions.  The 
results are somewhat weaker for the transfer of control covenant index. Overall, the results are consistent 
with the use of covenants increasing the demand for more timely loss recognition. 
In a related study, Beatty, Weber, and Yu (2006) examine how conservative modifications  of 
accounting information specified in debt covenants are related to conditional conservatism.  They find that 
conservative net worth covenant modifications do not fully meet lenders’ demand for conservative 
reporting: the modifications are further complemented by within-GAAP choice of timelier loss recognition.  
This study differs from that of Beatty et al. in that I consider how the inclusion of debt covenants relates to 
conservative accounting practices, whereas Beatty et al. (2006) study conservative modifications of net 
worth covenants conditional on their presence in a debt contract.  Their evidence is consistent with my 
findings.  In another related study, Begley and Chamberlain (2005) do not find evidence that unconditional 
conservatism (one of the dimensions of accounting quality they consider) benefits debt contracting.  This 
result is consistent with Ball and Shivakumar (2005), who argue that unconditional conservatism is of lower 
value for debt contracting.  Finally, a number of studies examine how conservatism affects the cost of debt 
capital and the degree of information asymmetry between bondholders and the firm (Ahmed et al., 2003, 
Zhang, 2005, Moerman, 2005).   
While these findings are important for our understanding of accounting conservatism, the exact 
mechanism through which the benefits of timely loss recognition are captured has not yet been investigated 
empirically.  A widely held view is that a substantial part of the improvement in contract efficiency (due to 
a higher degree of conditional conservatism) is realized via the use of covenants that are included in 
indentures (Watts, 2003, Ball and Shivakumar, 2005, Ball, Robin, and Sadka, 2005).  However, a direct 
link between timely loss recognition and debt contract design has yet to be established.  
This study’s main contributions to the literature are twofold.  First, I shed light on the role of accounting 
choice and information properties in debt contract design.
2  Prior research focuses on firms’ incentives to make 
ex post accounting choices that decrease the likelihood of costly covenant violation.  While some studies 
find evidence that accounting choices are made to avoid covenant violations, others are inconclusive (see 
Fields, Lys, and Vincent, 2001 for a review and discussion).  One reason for these relatively weak findings 
is that debt providers anticipate managerial incentives to make opportunistic accounting choices and thus 
restrict the set of acceptable accounting practices (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990, 1986).  I examine how 
accounting that limits managerial choices ex post relates to the design of debt contracts ex ante.  The 
                                                   
2 Debt contract design in the context of accounting also has received attention in Begley (1994), Bharath, Sunder, and 
Sunder (2006), Begley and Chamberlain (2005), Begley and Feltham (1999), Beatty, Ramesh, and Weber (2002), 
Beatty and Weber (2003), Press and Weinthrop (1990), and Sweeney (1994), among others. 
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analysis suggests that timely loss recognition can reduce the agency costs of debt via the use of protective 
covenants.  
  The second contribution of this study relates to the empirical literature on the demand for financial 
reporting quality (Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2001, Ball and Shivakumar 2005, Ball, Robin, and Sadka 2005).  
Although it has been recognized that debt contracting is causally linked to conditional conservatism (Watts, 
2003a, Holthausen and Watts, 2001), empirical evidence remains limited to cross-country and cross-market 
examinations.  More work is needed to investigate whether, while holding constant the properties of 
accounting information at the macro level, a firm’s debt contracts influence its accounting choices.  The 
analysis in this study suggests that firm-level debt contracts put specific demands on the properties of 
accounting information. 
  The next section reviews the related literature and describes the empirical predictions.  Section III 
develops the hypothesis and Section IV outlines the research method used in the paper.  In Section V I 
describe the data sources and variable definitions.  Section VI reports the empirical findings, and finally, in 
Section VII, I discuss limitations and conclude the study. 
2.2.  Background and Related Literature 
The literature argues that debt markets create demand for conservative accounting. Evidence at the 
aggregate level strongly supports this argument (Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 2000, Ball, Robin, and Sadka, 
2006, Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).  At the firm level, conservatism has been shown to improve contracting 
efficiency via reductions in both the cost of debt (Ahmed et al., 2002, Zhang, 2005) and the degree of 
information asymmetry (Moerman, 2006).  In this section, I first discuss the role of debt covenants when 
companies approach financial distress.  Subsequently, I discuss the role of timely loss recognition in light of 
positive accounting theory and argue that in order for covenants to be an effective contracting device, it is 
necessary to have timely loss recognition policies in place.  Consistent with the evidence in Beatty et al. 
(2006), who find that the demand for conservatism is not entirely met via conservative contract 
modifications, the discussion assumes that it is costly to substitute within-GAAP conditional conservatism 
for a comprehensive set of adjustments to accounting numbers in a contract.  
2.2.1. Role of debt covenants 
When a firm approaches financial distress, bondholders become more vulnerable to wealth 
expropriation by managers or shareholders (Bodie and Taggert, 1978, Smith, Smithson, and Wilford, 1989, 
Nash, Netter, and Poulsen, 2003).  For instance, debt overhang (Myers, 1977), asset substitution (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), and claim dilution (e.g., Nash et al., 2003) are well known conflict-of-interest 
problems that become elevated in financially-troubled firms.
3,4 Covenant restrictions reduce the ability of 
                                                   
3 Debt overhang, for example, is associated with a project requiring a sequence of investments. After the initial 
investments are sunk, managers do not internalize the losses that accrue to the debtholders if late investments are not  
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managers or owners to take actions in key areas such as investments, dividend payouts, and financing that 
would benefit managers/owners at the expense of bondholders.  For instance, covenants limiting 
distributions of dividends to shareholders effectively force levered firms to invest and therefore alleviate 
debt overhang associated with the potential unwillingness of managers to undertake positive net present 
value projects.  Covenants that restrict a firm’s asset sales, mergers and acquisitions, or lines of business 
reduce the likelihood of asset substitution, that is, they represent obstacles for management to over-invest in 
risky projects after obtaining debt financing.  Finally, covenants that place restrictions on leases and sales-
and-lease back transactions as well as negative pledge covenants reduce claim dilution when firms issue 
additional debt (possibly of higher priority), diluting the value of current bondholder claims due to a higher 
probability of default.  
2.2.2. What determines the degree of restrictiveness? 
Because covenants that protect bondholders do not detect distress perfectly, they can become 
binding while the firm is still financially healthy.  As a result, covenants potentially decrease a manager’s 
ability to make decisions that benefit the firm.  Managers may have to forsake good investment projects 
because they are not allowed to obtain additional financing, for instance, or they may not distribute excess 
cash to shareholders because of the payout restrictions.  Moreover, the costs of technical default and 
renegotiation are significant (Beneish and Press, 1993, 1995).  The trade-off between the costs and benefits 
of covenants therefore plays a key role in the design of debt contracts (Smith and Warner, 1976, Begley, 
1994, Nash et al., 2003). 
Existing evidence is generally consistent with the trade-off view on the use of covenant restrictions.  
On the one hand, covenants are used frequently when agency costs are expected to be high.  Thus, default 
risk, managerial entrenchment, corporate governance, and firm size are all associated with the use of 
covenants (Malitz, 1986, Begley, 1994, Begley and Feltham, 1999, Chava, Kumar, and Warga, 2005).  
Covenants also help reduce the cost of debt capital, presumably due to reduced agency costs of debt 
(Chava, Kumar, and Warga, 2005, Bradley and Roberts, 2005, Reisel, 2005, Goyal, 2005).   
On the other hand, firms forgo covenant use when the costs of restricting managerial discretion are 
high.  Thus, firms with growth opportunities (Nash, Netter, and Poulsen, 2003, Reisel, 2005, Chava, 
Kumar, and Warga, 2005, Khan and Yermack, 1998) or firms in volatile environments (Anderson, 1999) 
impose fewer debt covenants.
5  Breadley and Roberts (2005) find that while high-growth companies restrict 
the use of obtained funds, in line with the trade-off view they avoid constraints limiting their ability to raise 
additional funds.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
made and the project lapses.  This is more likely to happen in financial distress.  More generally, debt overhang 
reduces incentives to invest and exert effort.  
 
4 Asset substitution is an over-investment problem that arises when shareholders substitute riskier assets from the 
firms’ existing assets and expropriate value from the debtholders. 
 
5 However, a number of studies suggest that high-growth, volatile firms may be perceived as more risky and thus that 
these firms include covenant constraints in their debt contracts (Nash, Netter, and Warga, 2005).  
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Next I discuss the role of timely loss recognition in contracts that include protective covenants.  
Timely loss recognition enhances the efficiency of covenant use in two ways, namely, (1) by facilitating 
early transfers of decision rights to bondholders and (2) signaling a firm’s credit quality. 
2.2.3. Distress and timely loss recognition 
Timely loss recognition (conditional conservatism) represents a salient dimension of accounting 
quality and is believed to play an efficiency-enhancing role in contracting.  Recognizing losses in earnings 
in a timely manner brings forward covenant violations in financially distressed firms.  Thresholds specified 
in covenants are commonly based on accounting information that is directly linked to reported earnings and 
book values of assets, liabilities, and equity.  Covenants are likely to be more efficient in mitigating the 
agency problems associated with financial distress if the accounting numbers incorporate adverse economic 
events in a more timely fashion, ensuring the early transfer of decision rights from managers to bondholders 
when bondholders face greatest expropriation risk.  As timely loss recognition increases the usefulness of 
accounting information in debt contracts with accounting-based covenants, this creates a demand for 
timeliness in recognizing economic losses.  Consistent with this idea, economies in which public debt 
financing plays a relatively more important role exhibit timelier loss recognition (Ball, Kothari, and Robin, 
2000, Ball, Robin, and Sadka, 2005, Ball and Shivakumar, 2005, 2006b). 
2.2.4. Covenants as a signaling device and timely loss recognition 
A helpful step towards understanding the concurrent use of covenants and conservative accounting 
has been made by Levine and Hughes (2005), who model the use of accounting-based debt covenants in 
tandem with the choice of conservative reporting.  The authors demonstrate that the use of covenants 
together with (conditionally) conservative reporting is an optimal contracting mechanism.
6  In their model, 
a firm seeks debt financing and signs two different contracts, a compensation contract with the manager and 
a debt contract with lenders.  The compensation contract aims at aligning managerial incentives.  In the 
absence of a bond covenant, firms with a lower risk of default can choose to design incentive compensation 
sub-optimally (to signal its type to lenders) and thus engage in costly distortions relative to optimal 
operating decisions.  The introduction of a bond covenant based on earnings combined with conservative 
measurement of earnings overcomes the need to incur these signaling costs.  Bond covenants force the 
“lesser type” firm into costly default early because the latter cannot mimic the covenant threshold set by the 
“better type” firm. 
More generally, the literature recognizes the signaling role of debt (Jensen, 1986, Harris and Raviv, 
1990, Zwiebel, 1996) and of debt covenants in particular (Garleanu and Zwiebel, 2005, Chava et al., 2005, 
Sridhar and Magee, 1996).  Since default is costly, managers who are privately informed about a firm’s poor 
future profitability or managers of firms suffering from agency problems will separate themselves by not 
including performance-based covenants into their debt contracts; consequently, these firms will be forced to pay 
                                                   
6 In their stylized model, no distinction is made between conditional and unconditional conservatism. Nevertheless, 
conditional conservatism arguably fits the spirit of the model better as their result is driven by the downside risk 
bondholders face.  
10 
a higher risk premium.  However, signaling through debt contracts with accounting-based covenants is unlikely 
to be successful unless the accounting information exhibits timely loss recognition.  Since reported performance 
is directly related to a manager’s welfare, he has incentives to introduce bias and noise into accounting measures 
used in contracts (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, 1990, Watts, 2003a).  Conditional conservatism curbs 
managerial ability to bias accounting numbers upwards and enables covenants to perform the signaling role 
better.  In the absence of this property, lenders are unlikely to rely on covenant restrictions and will look for 
other (costly) ways to mitigate agency problems that include increasing the risk premium, reducing the maturity 
of the debt issue, or providing funds in small instalments.
7  
2.3. Hypothesis 
The discussion in the preceding section suggests that the ability of covenant restrictions to detect 
and prevent agency problems hinges crucially on the ability of the accounting information system to 
generate conditionally conservative earnings numbers.  To the extent this complementarity view obtains, 
the inclusion of covenant restrictions in public debt contracts should be associated with a higher demand for 
timely recognition of economic losses.  Under an alternative view that firms can substitute timely loss 
recognition with contract modifications, no (or even negative) association between covenants and timely 
loss recognition is expected.  
There are several potential mechanisms through which a positive association may obtain. First, 
companies seeking to benefit from covenants as a contractual mechanism should anticipate the demand for 
timely reporting and accordingly adopt timelier, i.e., more conditionally conservative, financial reporting ex 
ante.
 8  The rationale is that because debt contracts require consistency of accounting practices, the adoption 
of more conservative policies is expected to take place in the years prior to the year in which a contract is 
signed.  There are many examples of conditionally conservative accounting policies.  For example, a 
company can commit ex ante to account for bad debts using the aging of receivables method.  Under this 
method bad debt expense is based on the age of accounts receivable, which brings the recognition of 
adverse conditions forward more quickly than the percentage of sales method, which expenses a fixed 
percentage of credit sales irrespective of their collectibility.  An increase in collection periods (possibly due 
to deteriorated financial health of major customers or to relaxed credit-granting policies) potentially is an 
early signal of default.  The aging of receivables method therefore is preferable from the lender’s 
viewpoint.  Appendix A provides a number of additional examples of timelier loss recognition policies.  
Second, because the quality of firm-lender relationships can be of significant value to the company, 
lenders can punish untimely loss recognition ex post.  In particular, a firm failing to recognize losses in a 
timely manner will tarnish its reputation and will subsequently suffer higher risk premia and/or more severe 
                                                   
7 See Nash et al. (2003) for a detailed discussion. 
 
8 The restrictions in the form of timely loss recognition are placed on the set of accounting practices that ex ante are 
likely to decrease the likelihood of ex post managerial opportunism (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, 1990). 
  
11 
contract terms upon future borrowing or renegotiations to waive the covenants.  Additionally, if a firm 
deviates from timely recognition of incurred losses, bondholders can discipline management by appealing 
to the court.  This implies that borrowers will be more careful in recognizing losses that would probably be 
overlooked in the absence of accounting-based debt contracts. 
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, timely recognition of economic losses is increasing in the use of covenant 
restrictions in public debt contracts. 
2.4. Research Design 
  I begin by constructing four indices of debt contract restrictiveness to examine the relation between 
restrictions placed on key managerial actions and the degree of asymmetric timeliness.  Each index captures 
the degree to which a debt contract is linked to accounting information.  Thus, each index serves as a proxy 
for (the inverse of) managerial flexibility in decision making.
9  The individual indices are based on 
restrictions of the following four types of restrictions: 
1)  Investment covenants. Covenants of this type restrict capital allocation, mergers and acquisitions, 
and disposal of assets.   
2)  Distribution or payout covenants – restrict payments to shareholders or other entities.  
3)  Financing covenants – limit managerial ability to raise funds by issuing additional debt or 
common/preferred stock or by conducting sale-and-leaseback transactions. 
4)  Control transfer covenants – facilitate transfer of control from shareholders to bondholders when 
the company approaches financial distress.  
I then construct an overall index of contract restrictiveness, which is the sum of the four individual indices.  
For more details on the covenant restrictions that are used to construct each index, see Appendix B.  
  The costs and benefits of covenant use are likely to be determined in part by environmental 
characteristics and characteristics specific to the firm.  These characteristics are likely to reflect market 
forces that also influence conservative reporting.  For example, prior research shows that the book-to-
market ratio is correlated with the degree of asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition (Roychowdhury and 
Watts, 2005) and, as a proxy for growth, also with covenant use (Nash et al., 2003).  Other characteristics 
such as size, volatility, leverage, and probability of default may be similarly correlated with both the 
reliance on covenants and timely loss recognition.  To control for these factors, I follow a two-stage 
regression procedure.  In the first stage I orthogonalize the indices of contract restrictiveness by regressing 
the indices on firm-specific characteristics and separating out the unexplained variation in covenant use in 
the form of a residual.  Specifically, I regress the following model: 
                                                   
9 While I cannot observe whether a particular covenant is accounting-based, I rely on earlier evidence (e.g., Leftwich 
and Holthausen, 1983, Leftwich, 1981), which documents that many covenants (including covenants limiting 
distributions, financing, and mergers and acquisitions) are accounting-based or are associated with accounting 
numbers in an indirect fashion (see also Beneish and Press, 1993).  
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where the dependent variable is one of the five restrictiveness indices described above.   
Intuitively, the residual in (1) proxies for situations in which the benefits of covenant use outweigh 
their costs, i.e., the covenants are chosen to constrain (unobserved) agency problems.  Identifying such 
situations, while randomizing with respect to other factors that influence reporting incentives, is required to 
address the research question.   
The control variables in Equation (1) are included as prior research shows that they affect the use of 
covenants
 (and hence are likely to be correlated with reporting properties).  In particular, size, profitability, 
volatility of returns, financial leverage, and Altman’s bankruptcy score (Z-score) are expected to be 
correlated with protective covenants as they proxy for the probability of financial distress.  Book-to-market 
and growth in assets are likely to be associated with higher costs of covenant use, as retaining flexibility is 
especially valuable in these firms, and variability of accounting income is expected to be associated with 
higher costs of violating covenants.  Dividend yield controls for costs (i.e., negative stock price effects) 
associated with the inability to pay out a normal level of dividends.  In addition, I include two debt contract 
features that are used to overcome agency problems (and thus that could substitute for covenants), namely, 
maturity and issue size.  Finally, I include year dummies to control for possible trends in covenant use.
10,11  
  In the second stage, I sort companies on unexplained variation in covenant use, ξ, and allocate them 
to 10 decile portfolios.  The degree of timely loss recognition is assessed for all firms in each portfolio.  
Note that running the first-stage model to control for confounding factors avoids numerous interaction 
terms and allows for a parsimonious second-stage model.
12  Following Basu (1997), I measure timeliness of 
loss recognition by regressing accounting income scaled by lagged price on annual returns, conditioning the 
relationship on the sign of economic news (as proxied by the sign of the returns).  Specifically, I estimate 
the following model across covenant restrictiveness deciles: 
                                                   
10 Begley and Freeman (2004) show that the use of covenants in public debt contracts has declined. However, this does 
not seem to be the case for all types of restrictions. Using FISD data, the evidence in Billett, King, and Mauer (2005) 
and Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2005) suggests that while some covenants (e.g. dividend constraints) have become 
less popular, the frequency with which others (certain types of investing, financing, and control transfer restrictions) 
have been adopted has increased over time.   
 
11 Developing a comprehensive set of variables that potentially affect the use of covenants is outside the scope of the 
paper; the primary reason for including these control variables is that they are potentially related to reporting quality 
and conservatism. 
 
12 I do not follow a pooled one-stage approach with interaction terms for the following reasons: (i) the number of 
interaction terms in a single-stage model would equal four (the number of variables in the Basu (1997) model) times 
the number of control variables in Equation (1), which would lead to an over-parametrized specification; (ii) there is 
no reason to expect a linear increase in timely loss recognition across restrictiveness deciles; and (iii) the standard 
errors from a pooled regression would suffer from cross-sectional dependencies. See also, Kothari and Shanken (1992, 
p.186) for a discussion of single-stage versus two-stage regression models.   
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where D(.) is an indicator dummy taking the value of unity when the condition inside the parentheses is 
true, Et stands for year t earnings, Pt-1 is the price at the end of year t-1, and Rett is the annual market-
adjusted return over year t.  The degree of asymmetric timeliness is measured by the coefficient β1 (or 
alternatively, by β0+β1). 
  I employ several measurement time horizons (windows) surrounding the debt issue.  Specifically, I 
estimate the second-stage equation, Equation (2), over years –3 to –1, year –1, year +1, and years +1 to +3 
relative to the year of issue.  The purpose of examining pre-issue period is twofold.  First, since lenders 
scrutinize prior financial statements, pre-issue analysis reveals whether companies anticipating debt issues 
change their accounting beforehand in an effort to enhance their reputation or simply to pre-commit to more 
conservative accounting practices ex ante (Ball and Shivakumar, 2006b).  Second, it is more difficult to 
document asymmetric timeliness ex post as managers have incentives to introduce additional noise into 
accounting numbers when trying to minimize the likelihood of covenant violations within the accepted set.   
2.5. Data and Sample Construction 
The data are taken from the Mergent Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD), which is a 
comprehensive database of publicly traded U.S. bonds.  FISD contains information on a number of bond 
characteristics including a bond’s principal amount, maturity, and price, but its distinguishing feature is that 
it also contains detailed information about the presence of covenants in the bond indenture.  Specifically, I 
use 41 indicators of various types of covenants to construct the five contract restrictiveness indices 
discussed in the previous section.  I then cumulate the covenant indicators related to investment (INVEST), 
financing (FINAN), distribution (DIST), and control transfer (CONTROL) decisions to compute the scores 
for each of the four separate indices.  The sum of these four indices represents the overall restrictiveness 
index (OVERALL). Appendix B provides more details on the covenants used to construct the indices. 
  Balance sheet and income statement data are taken from the COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual 
database and monthly return data are retrieved from CRSP.  Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample 
construction.  Covenant information is available in FISD for 11,947 bond issues by 4,394  industrial 
companies.  I exclude financial firms because they are subject to different accounting rules and regulations.  
After merging the remaining FISD data with COMPUSTAT and retaining only the first debt issue in a 
given year (in order to give equal weight to all companies), the sample is reduced to 5,036 debt issues by 
2,367 firms over the 1980-2004 period.
13  Data availability requirements reduce the sample to 3,382 issues. 
                                                   
13 FISD data are very incomplete prior to 1980. 14 
T a b l e 1 
Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Note: Both Compustat and FISD variables are winsorised at the 1% population level 
Panel A: Sample Construction  No. Obs. 
Issues by industrial companies with available covenant data before merging  
to Compustat  11,947 
Number of firms before merging to Compustat  4,394 
Number of issues that merge to Compustat  7,310 
Number of issuers that merge to Compustat  2,367 
Number of issues after retaining only one issue per year   5,036 
Number of issues after requiring non-missing data for control variables  3,382 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  No. Obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Min  Max 
OVERALL  4,999 8.370 4.565  0  26 
INVEST  4,999 2.236 0.941  0  6 
DISTR  4,999 0.736 0.944  0  3 
FINAN 4,999  3.026 2.502  0  15 
CONTROL  4,999 2.372 1.108  0  5 
ln(Assets)  4,734 7.331 1.670  -0.805 10.41 
Assets  4,734 4,895 7,784 0.447  33,207 
ROA  4,564 -0.003  0.274 -2.896  0.488 
Dividend Yield   4,386  0.011  0.017  0  0.091 
Leverage    4,726 0.333 0.224  0 1.001 
Book-to-Market    4,124 0.455 0.659 -4.17 4.584 
Assets  Growth  4,281 1.436 1.103 0.297 10.80 
Std.Dev. of Returns   4,067  0.029  0.015  0.007  0.143 
Number of losses over the last 
5  years  (nloss)  4,281 0.941 1.369  0  5 
Altman’s  Z-score  4,176 1.672 2.421  -46.28  9.08 
Std. Dev. of IBEI   4,018  0.078  0.239  0  3.698 
ln(Maturity)  4,987 2.274 0.589  0  4 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.5.1 Variable definitions 
  Income before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT item data18) scaled by beginning of fiscal year 
price (data199) times shares outstanding (data25) is used to measure the dependent variable in Equation (2) 
( 1 - /P E t t ).  Returns (Rett) are compounded over a 12-month period starting three months after the beginning 
of the fiscal year and are adjusted by subtracting the compounded return on a value-weighted market index.    
 The  control  variables  in Equation (1) are measured in the year prior to the debt issue and are 
defined as follows:  
ln(Assets) = natural logarithm of total assets (data6); 
ROA = return on assets, defined as income before extraordinary items (data18) divided by total assets 
(data6); 
Dividend Yield = dividends (data21) divided by end of year market value (data199 times data25); 
Leverage = ratio of long-term debt (data9) to total assets (data6); 
Book-to-Market = book value of equity (data60) divided by market value of equity (data199 times 
data25); 
Assets Growth = growth rate of total assets (data6); 
Std.Dev.(Returns) = standard deviation of monthly returns in CRSP; 
Std.Dev.(IBEI) = standard deviation of income before extraordinary items (data18) scaled by total 
assets (data6), measured over the five years preceding the issue; 
Number of Losses = number of times the company had a loss over the five years preceding a debt 
issue; 
Z-score = Altman’s bankruptcy score;
14 
ln(Maturity) = Natural logarithm of years to maturity; 
ln(Principal Amount) = Natural logarithm of the amount to be repaid at maturity. 
Table 1, Panel B provides summary statistics for these variables.  To mitigate the influence of 
outliers, I winsorize 1% of the extreme observations at the population level.  The mean value of the overall 
restrictiveness index (OVERALL) indicates that, on average, firms include 10 out of 41 restrictions in their 
contracts.  The standard deviation is 4.6, which suggests substantial cross-sectional variation; indeed, the 
maximum number of covenant restrictions used by a single firm in the sample is 27, while the minimum is 
zero.  The average company has $4.9 billion in total assets, leverage of 33%, and book-to-market of 0.45.   
Correlation statistics are provided in Table 2.  The restrictiveness indices INVEST, DISTR, 
FINAN, and CONTROL (respectively, investing-, distribution-, financing-, and control-related covenant 
restrictions) exhibit high cross-correlations, ranging from 0.42 to 0.73.  The correlations of these indices 
with the overall restrictiveness index (OVERALL) are as high as 0.93.  The evidence also suggests that the 
correlations between debt contract restrictiveness and the control variables employed in the analysis are 
                                                   
14 See Nash et al. (2002) for details.  
17 
substantial.  For example, the correlation coefficients between the overall index and leverage or size are 
0.38 and -0.20, respectively.   
2.6. Results 
In this section I first present the results from estimating the first-stage model (Equation (1)).  I then 
turn to the second-stage analysis of the relation between asymmetric timeliness and different levels of 
contract restrictiveness using the return-earnings specification (Equation (2)).  Finally, I repeat the second-
stage analysis using instead the accrual-cash flow relation – an alternative measure of asymmetric 
timeliness (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). 
2.6.1. Covenant equation 
Table 3 presents results of the first-stage estimation (Equation (1)) for each of the five restriction 
indices used as the dependent variable.  The model’s explanatory power is 32% for the overall restriction 
index and ranges between 19% (financing restrictions) and 62% (transfer of control restrictions) for the 
other four indices, indicating that there is a substantial amount of unexplained variation in covenant use that 
can be exploited in the subsequent analysis.   
As can be seen from the table, the coefficient on size indicates that in all models covenant restrictions are 
used significantly less in larger firms.  In contrast, ROA is positively associated with the use of covenants.  
The dividend yield is not related to overall contract restrictiveness, although examination of its components 
reveals that while dividend-paying firms try to avoid restrictions on distributions, investment activities, and 
the use of other control-related covenants, they constrain financing activities more frequently.  Leverage 
and book-to-market are both positively related to covenant use.  Firms in a fast changing environment, as 
measured by the standard deviation of returns, avoid financing restrictions, but they include covenants on 
distributions, investments, as well as other covenants.
15  The evidence further suggests that growth in assets, 
the frequency of past losses, and Z-score do not influence the use of covenants significantly in the presence 
of other controls.  Finally, the coefficient on maturity is significantly negative, whereas the principal 
amount is significantly positively related to the inclusion of covenant restrictions.   
These findings are broadly consistent with firms trading off the costs and benefits of covenant 
restrictions.  More frequent reliance on covenants among small firms (Malitz, 1986, Begley, 1994) and 
among firms with high leverage (Begley, 1994, Nash et al., 2003) is consistent with the more pronounced 
agency problems.  Similarly, dividend-paying firms impose restrictions on investment and financing 
activities, but at the same time seem to find it costly to constrain their dividend policy.  In line with Levine 
and Hughes (2005) and Chava et al. (2005), who argue that “good” firms signal their type via covenant 
inclusion, while firms with higher default risk will find this costly, firms with stronger profitability have 
                                                   
15 This parallels the evidence in Breadley and Roberts (2005), who show that high-growth firms restrict the use of 
funds, while avoiding restrictions on future financing. Firms with more volatile income also appear to avoid the use of 
covenants, in their study. 18 
T a b l e 3 
Determinants of Covenant Restrictiveness 
Covenant data are taken from Fixed Income Securities Database (which contains more than 40 covenant indicators). 
Five different contract restrictiveness indexes are constructed: an overall covenant restriction index, an investment 
covenant restrictions index, a distribution covenant restrictions index, a financing covenant restrictions index, and a 
transfer of control covenant restrictions index. Each index is constructed by cumulating corresponding covenant 
indicators for a particular contract.  The following multiple regression is estimated: 
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 Dependent  Variable 
Independent 











ln(Assets)  Estimate  -0.350*** -0.061*** -0.133*** -0.054*  -0.101*** 
  t-value  (-7.34) (-5.95) (-13.38)  (-1.88) (-11.05) 
ROA  Estimate  1.062** 0.171*  0.260***  0.566** 0.065 
  t-value  (2.40) (1.79) (2.81) (2.11) (0.76) 
Dividend Yield  Estimate  1.186 -3.272***  -2.163**  10.894***  -4.274*** 
  t-value  (0.26) (-3.27)  (-2.23)  (3.87) (-4.81) 
Leverage  Estimate  6.444*** 0.934*** 1.512*** 3.282*** 0.716*** 
  t-value  (19.17) (12.88) (21.48) (16.08) (11.13) 
Book-to-Market  Estimate  0.730*** 0.093*** 0.187*** 0.347*** 0.104*** 
  t-value  (7.02) (4.14) (8.59) (5.49) (5.20) 
Assets Growth  Estimate  -0.012 -0.029 0.019  -0.025 0.022 
  t-value  (-0.14) (-1.54) (1.07)  (-0.47) (1.32) 
Std. Dev. Of Returns  Estimate  10.121* 2.679*  5.396***  -0.521**  2.567* 
  t-value  (1.77) (2.18) (4.52) (-0.15)  (2.35) 
Number of losses 
over the last 5 years  Estimate  0.058 0.022*  0.018 -0.003  0.020* 
  t-value  (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) 
Altman’s Z-score  Estimate  0.030 -0.004  -0.002  0.017 0.019** 
  t-value  (0.74) (-0.44)  (-0.21)  (0.69) (2.39) 
Std. Dev. (IBEI)  Estimate  -0.944*** -0.035  -0.268*** -0.432**  -0.210*** 
  t-value  (-2.87) (-0.49) (-3.89) (-2.16) (-3.32) 
ln(Maturity)  Estimate  -0.490*** -0.027  -0.082*** -0.345*** -0.036* 
  t-value  (-4.71) (-1.21) (-3.76) (-5.46) (-1.81) 
ln(Principal)  Estimate  0.607*** 0.078**  0.056*  0.360*** 0.114*** 
  t-value  (3.99) (2.37) (1.76) (3.89) (3.90) 
Adjusted  R-squared    31.6/% 19.9/% 27.6/% 19.2/% 62.1/% 
Number of 
Observations   3,382 3,382 3,382 3,382 3,382 19 
more restrictive debt contracts.  The findings also suggest that firms with unexercised growth options will 
prefer to retain managerial flexibility and thus will avoid the use of covenants (Begley, 1994, Nash et al., 
2003, Khan and Yermack, 1998).  Volatile firms value flexibility and avoid the inclusion of financing 
restrictions, while at the same time these firms are perceived as risky and thus they include other types of 
restrictions in their lending contracts.  Finally, contract design choices such as the size of issue seem to 
substitute for covenants and hence appear to help mitigate possible conflicts of interest. 
2.6.2. Main results 
Table 4 presents the parameters of Equation (2) estimated across ten restrictiveness deciles.  The 
deciles are based on the residual from the first-stage model (Equation (1)) and are labeled Q1 (lowest 
restrictiveness) through Q10 (highest restrictiveness).  Panel A and Figure 1 report the evidence based on 
the overall contract restrictiveness index, while the evidence in Panels B through E is based on the separate 
analyses of investment, distribution, financing, and control transfer covenants, respectively.  For brevity, β1 
and R
2 statistics are reported in Panel A only. 
  From Panel A it can be seen that across all four time horizons around the debt issue that I consider 
(first column), β1 is both statistically and economically higher for the tenth decile (Q10) of the overall 
restrictiveness index as compared to the first decile (Q1).  More specifically, for companies in Q1 the 
estimates of β1 are 0.28 for years –3 to –1, 0.30 for year –1, 0.25 for year +1, and 0.34 for years +1 to +3, 
while their Q10 counterparts are 0.53, 0.66, 0.53, and 0.50, respectively.   
The same pattern arises when examining each of the other restrictiveness indices.  The analysis of 
the investment restrictions (Panel B) indicates that the differences calculated by subtracting the estimate of 
β1 for companies in Q10 from the estimate of β1 for those in Q1 are 0.12, 0.29, 0.27, and 0.22 for years –3 
to –1, year –1, year +1, and years +1 to +3, respectively.  Similarly, the differences based on the index of 
financing constraints (Panel D) are 0.26, 0.35, 0.58, and 0.39, respectively, for the same horizons.  All these 
differences are statistically significant at conventional levels.  The evidence based on the distribution 
restrictiveness index (Panel C) suggests that differences in the Q10 and Q1 estimates of β1 are positive but 
small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.  This result is driven by the very large coefficients for Q1 
firms, which drop considerably in magnitude in the second decile of distribution restrictions (Q2) and 
suggest an increasing pattern in β1 as we move towards the higher distribution restrictiveness deciles.  
Finally, the analysis of transfer of control covenants (Panel E) reveals that over years –3 to –1 and over year 
–1, Q10-Q1 differences in β1 are positive and statistically significant (0.22 and 0.30, respectively).  These 
differences become statistically indistinguishable from zero for years +1 and years +1 to +3, but they still 
remain positive. 
  Overall, the evidence in Table 4 supports the hypothesis that firms that rely more on covenants 
exhibit increased levels of timely loss recognition.  In addition, an examination of the coefficients of 
determination (R














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Timely Loss Recognition and Overall Contract Restrictiveness: 
 Return-Earnings Evidence 
The figure depicts the β1 coefficients from the piecewise-linear regression estimated over ten deciles, Q1 to 
Q10, and based on the orthogonalized overall contract restrictiveness index. The evidence, based on Table 4, 
comes from the following regression: 
. ) 0 Ret ( * Ret * Ret * ) 0 Ret ( * P / E t t 1 t 0 t 1 0 1 t t t D D ε β β α α + < + + < + = −  
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to the hypothesis that covenant usage is positively related to the timeliness with which negative economic 
news is reported in accounting income.   
  The discussion thus far has been on the highest and the lowest deciles of debt contract 
restrictiveness.  Note that the pattern in β1 estimates does not appear to be linear.  Specifically, the pattern in 
the coefficients for the lower part of the restrictions’ distribution is rather flat and in some cases it is even 
slightly downward sloping, but we observe a substantial increase in the estimates of β1 as we approach the 
highest restrictions’ deciles.
16  The increase is consistent with complementarity: as the timely loss 
recognition increases, the marginal gain in contracting efficiency due to covenants also increases and hence 
both mechanisms reinforce each other.  In contrast, the slightly downward-sloping relation in the lowest 
restrictiveness portfolios is consistent with covenants being a substitute for the asymmetric timeliness at the 
other extreme.
17 Figure 1 illustrates these patterns and reveals further that the estimated parameters from 
Equation (2) are quite volatile.
18  To assess formally whether there is a significant trend in the asymmetric 
timeliness estimates across restrictiveness deciles, I perform additional correlation and regression analyses 
as discussed next.   
  For each combination of time horizon and type of restriction index in Table 4, using ten 
observations I form the decile rank d, which ranges from 1 for the lowest restrictiveness decile (Q1) to 10 
for the highest decile of contract restrictiveness (Q10).  I then calculate both the Pearson and the Spearman 
correlations between d and β1, d and β0+β1, as well as d and R
2.  I also run the regression 
υ φ φ β + ⋅ + = d
d
r 1 0 ˆ , 
where d ∈ {1,…,10} is the restrictiveness decile rank and 
d
r β ∈{β0, β1, β0+β1, R
2} measures the degree of 
timely loss recognition.  The coefficient  1 φ  gives the average increase in the timeliness of loss recognition 
that occurs by moving to the next contract restrictiveness decile. 
Table 5 presents the results of this analysis.  Panel A reports correlations based on the overall 
restrictiveness index.  The results reveal that the decile rank (d) is strongly correlated with estimates of β1 
(and β0+β1), with Pearson correlation coefficients of 0.60, 0.38, 0.47, and 0.54 (0.63, 0.34, 0.72, and 0.71) 
for years –3 to –1, year –1, year +1, and years +1 to +3, respectively.  The evidence based on Spearman 
correlations yields very similar results.  Turning to the regression analysis, the estimates of  1 φ for the 
overall restrictiveness index are similar across all time horizons and imply that as contract restrictiveness 
                                                   
16 A related issue is whether there is a certain threshold beyond which further increases in conditional conservatism 
become prohibitively costly as they would provoke too frequent covenant violations. The findings suggest, however, 
that even if such a threshold exists, in practice it is not binding. 
 
17 This substitution may be due to the usefulness of conservatism in curbing agency problems unrelated to debt 
contracts (e.g., compensation contracts), which in turn may diminish the overall level of the agency problems and lead 
to a lesser use of covenants. 
 
18 This is not necessarily surprising as the number of observations in the analysis is rather limited, while the estimates 
in the piecewise linear regression of returns on earnings are substantially influenced by the extremes of the 
distribution. 24 
T a b l e  5 
Trends in Asymmetric Timeliness Estimates from the Basu (1997) model estimated across 10 Debt 
Contract Restrictiveness Deciles 
This table analyzes trends in coefficients and R
2s (reported in Table 4) from the piecewise-linear regression of earnings on returns 
(allowing for a differential effect of positive versus negative returns on earnings) estimated around the year of a debt issue across 10 
deciles of each of five contract restrictiveness proxies. In particular, the table reports Pearson and Spearman correlations between 
abnormal contract restrictiveness decile ranks and their corresponding estimated coefficients (from Table 4). In addition, the table 
reports the slope from the regression of estimated regression coefficients from Table 3 on their decile ranks. The following model is 
estimated: 
υ φ φ β + ⋅ + = d
d
1 0 ˆ , 
where d ∈ {1,..,10} is the decile rank  and β
d∈{β0, β0, β0+β1, R
2} is the decile estimate for the given type of restrictiveness 
measure. Significance levels for Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are based on ten observations (i.e., eight degrees of 
freedom); for coefficient φ  1 the significance is reported based on a Normal distribution, as φ1 is a linear combination of 
asymptotically normal estimates.  
Panel A: Overall Restrictiveness  
Horizon Statistic  ρ
Pearson
  P-value ρ
Spearman P-value φ1 t-stat P-value
 -3 to t-1  β0  -0.009 (0.981) -0.006 (0.987) 0.000 -0.02 (0.981)
  β1  0.604 (0.064) 0.418 (0.229) 0.020 2.14 (0.032)
  β0+β1  0.639 (0.047) 0.527 (0.117) 0.020 2.35 (0.019)
 R
2  0.265 (0.458) 0.139 (0.701) 0.002 0.78 (0.436)
 -1  β0  -0.391 (0.264) -0.297 (0.405) -0.005 -1.20 (0.229)
  β1  0.382 (0.276) -0.006 (0.987) 0.020 1.17 (0.242)
  β0+β1  0.340 (0.337) 0.200 (0.580) 0.015 1.02 (0.307)
 R
2  0.032 (0.931) 0.018 (0.960) 0.000 0.09 (0.929)
 +1  β0  0.485 (0.156) 0.503 (0.138) 0.011 1.57 (0.117)
  β1  0.471 (0.169) 0.358 (0.310) 0.023 1.51 (0.131)
  β0+β1  0.723 (0.018) 0.624 (0.054) 0.034 2.96 (0.003)
 R
2  0.359 (0.308) 0.261 (0.467) 0.009 1.09 (0.276)
 +1 to +3  β0  0.458 (0.183) 0.394 (0.260) 0.006 1.46 (0.145)
  β1  0.544 (0.104) 0.406 (0.244) 0.023 1.83 (0.067)
  β0+β1  0.711 (0.021) 0.600 (0.067) 0.030 2.86 (0.004)
  R
2  0.531 (0.114) 0.539 (0.108) 0.007 1.77 (0.076)
Panel B: Correlations for Separate Restriction Types 
    Investment Restrict. Distribution  Restrict. Financing  Restrict. Control  Transfer 
Horizon Statistic  ρ
Pearson
  P-value  ρ
Pearson
  P-value  ρ
Pearson
  P-value  ρ
Pearson
  P-value 
-3 to -1  β0  0.006 (0.99) -0.014 (0.97) -0.066  (0.86)  0.637 (0.05) 
  β1  0.513 (0.13)  0.47 (0.17) 0.461  (0.18)  0.13 (0.72) 
  β0+β1  0.582 (0.08) 0.496 (0.15) 0.497 (0.14) 0.406 (0.24) 
-1  β0  -0.715 (0.02) -0.464 (0.18) -0.566  (0.09)  0.08 (0.83) 
  β1  0.509 (0.13) 0.581 (0.08) 0.495 (0.15) 0.391 (0.26) 
  β0+β1  0.362 (0.30)  0.52 (0.12) 0.351  (0.32)  0.43 (0.22) 
+1  β0  0.242 (0.50) 0.408 (0.24) 0.198 (0.58)  0.46 (0.18) 
  β1  0.571 (0.09) 0.617 (0.06) 0.406 (0.24)  -0.175 (0.63) 
  β0+β1  0.757 (0.01) 0.734 (0.02)  0.59  (0.07) 0.208 (0.56) 
+1 to +3  β0  0.154 (0.67) 0.339 (0.34) 0.203 (0.58) 0.613 (0.06) 
  β1  0.774 (0.01) 0.614 (0.06) 0.484 (0.16)  -0.403 (0.25) 
  β0+β1  0.782 (0.01) 0.677 (0.03) 0.667 (0.04) 0.003 (0.99) 25 
increases by 10% (one decile), on average the magnitude of β1 (β0+β1) increases by approximately 0.02 
(0.015 to 0.03, depending on the horizon).  The magnitude of this effect is economically substantial and, 
while based on only ten observations, the estimates in Panel A are mostly statistically significant. 
Next, I repeat the analysis separately for each of the component indices that comprise the overall 
restrictiveness index and find similar results.  For brevity, Panel B reports Pearson correlations only.  The 
evidence on investing  restrictions indicates that the asymmetric timeliness estimates are positively 
correlated with the decile rank d.  The correlation coefficients depend on the time horizon and are as high as 
0.51, 0.51, 0.57, and 0.77 for β1 and 0.58, 0.36, 0.75, and 0.78 for β0+β1 for years –3 to –1, year –1, year 
+1, and years +1 to +3.  Over the same four horizons, analysis of restrictions on distributions yields 
correlation coefficients of 0.47, 0.58, 0.62, and 0.61 for β1 and 0.50, 0.52, 0.73, and 0.68 for β0+β1, and the 
evidence based on financing restrictiveness yields correlation coefficients of 0.46, 0.50, 0.41, and 0.48 for 
β1 and 0.50, 0.35, 0.59, and 0.67 for β0+β1.  The magnitudes of  1 φ  (not tabulated) are similar across the 
investing, distribution, and financing restrictiveness indices and range from 0.015 to 0.038 across the three 
panels.  Finally, as in Table 4, the results based on the transfer of control covenants indicate a positive 
correlation between decile rank d and asymmetric timeliness estimates only for years –3 to –1 and year –1.   
Together the evidence in Tables 4 and 5 suggests that we cannot reject the positive association 
between covenant use and asymmetric timeliness.  This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
use of accounting-based covenants creates demand for timely loss recognition and that firms respond by 
limiting their discretion ex ante.
19  
2.6.3. Accrual-based measure of asymmetric timeliness 
  Following Ball and Shivakumar (2005), I also use an alternative measure of asymmetric timeliness 
based on the relation between cash flows and accruals.  Accruals are used to incorporate revisions of the 
present value of future cash flows into the income statement.  Therefore, in addition to reducing the noise in 
cash flows from operations (Dechow, 1994), accruals allow for the timely recognition of economic gains 
and losses.  Since the demand for economic loss recognition is higher than that for gains, accruals are used 
to recognize economic losses in a timely manner while economic gains are more likely to be accounted for 
on a cash basis, i.e., when realized.  As a result, a positive but asymmetric correlation arises between cash 
flows and accruals.  I estimate the following piecewise-linear regression to measure the degree of 
asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition,  1 β .  
) 3 ( , ) 0 CFO ( CFO CFO ) 0 CFO ( ACC 1 0 1 0 t t t t t t D D ε β β α α + < × + + < + =  
                                                   
19 It may happen that this effect is due in part to prior debt issues, as contracts usually do not differ substantially within 
the same firm. A direct examination of this issue is difficult because of truncation and limited coverage of FISD before 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Timely Loss Recognition and Overall Contract Restrictiveness: 
 Accruals-Cash Flow Evidence 
 
The figure displays the β1 coefficients from the accrual-cash flow piecewise-linear regression estimated over ten 
deciles, Q1 to Q10, and based on the orthogonalized overall contract restrictiveness index. The evidence, based on 
the coefficients in Table 6, comes from the following regression: 
. ) 0 CFO ( * Assets / CFO * Assets / CFO * ) 0 CFO ( * Assets / Accruals 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 t t t t t t t t t D D ε β β α α + < + + < + = − − −
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T a b l e 7 
Trends in Asymmetric Timeliness Estimates from the Accrual-Return Model Estimated across 10 
Debt Contract Restrictiveness Deciles 
This table analyzes trends in coefficients and R
2s (reported in Table 6) from the piecewise-linear regression of accruals on cash 
flow (allowing for a differential effect of positive versus negative cash flows on accrual component of earnings) estimated around 
the year of a debt issue across ten deciles for each of five contract restrictiveness proxies. In particular, the table reports Pearson 
and Spearman correlations between abnormal contract restrictiveness decile ranks and their corresponding estimated coefficients 
(from Table 6). In addition the table reports the slope from the regression of estimated regression coefficients from Table 5 on their 
decile ranks. The following model is estimated: 
υ φ φ β + ⋅ + = d
d
1 0 ˆ , 
where d ∈ {1,..,10} is the decile rank and β
d∈{β0, β0, β0+β1, R
2} is the decile estimate for the given type of restrictiveness measure. 
Significance levels for Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are based on ten observations (i.e., eight degrees of freedom); 
for coefficient φ 1 the significance is reported based on a Normal distribution, as φ1 is a linear combination of asymptotically normal 
estimates  
Panel A: Overall Contract Restrictions 
Horizon Statistic  ρ
Pearson
  P-value ρ
Spearman P-value φ1 t-stat P-value
  -3 to -1  β0  -0.836 (0.003) -0.855 (0.002) -0.033 -4.30 (0.000)
  β1  0.814  (0.004) 0.806 (0.005) 0.065 3.97 (0.000)
  β0+β1  0.525  (0.119) 0.673 (0.033) 0.032 1.74 (0.081)
 R
2  0.594 (0.070) 0.539 (0.108) 0.011 2.09 (0.037)
    
  -1  β0  -0.904 (0.000) -0.915 (0.000) -0.048 -5.97 (0.000)
  β1  0.809  (0.005) 0.830 (0.003) 0.134 3.89 (0.000)
  β0+β1  0.628  (0.052) 0.503 (0.138) 0.085 2.28 (0.022)
 R
2  0.620 (0.056) 0.552 (0.098) 0.029 2.24 (0.025)
    
  +1  β0  -0.204 (0.571) -0.370 (0.293) -0.009 -0.59 (0.555)
  β1  0.455  (0.186) 0.442 (0.200) 0.045 1.45 (0.148)
  β0+β1  0.344  (0.330) 0.333 (0.347) 0.036 1.04 (0.300)
 R
2  0.096 (0.792) 0.297 (0.405) 0.003 0.27 (0.785)
    
  +1 to +3  β0  -0.104 (0.775) -0.103 (0.777) -0.003 -0.30 (0.768)
  β1  0.155  (0.668) 0.103 (0.777) 0.018 0.44 (0.657)
  β0+β1  0.146  (0.687) 0.103 (0.777) 0.015 0.42 (0.676)
  R
2  0.042 (0.908) 0.139 (0.701) 0.001 0.12 (0.905)
Panel B: Correlations for Separate Restriction Types 
    Investment Restrict. Distribution  Restrict. Financing  Restrict. Control  Transfer 
Horizon Statistic  ρ
Pearson
  P-value  ρ
Pearson
  P-value  ρ
Pearson
  P-value  ρ
Pearson
  P-value 
-3 to -1  β0  -0.668 (0.035)  -0.817 (0.004)  -0.854 (0.002)  -0.418 (0.230) 
  β1  0.408  (0.242)  0.589  (0.073)  0.659  (0.038)  0.718  (0.019) 
  β0+β1  0.225  (0.533)  0.356  (0.312)  0.429  (0.216)  0.632  (0.050) 
                 
-1  β0  -0.668 (0.035)  -0.663 (0.037)  -0.770 (0.009)  -0.741 (0.014) 
  β1  0.378  (0.281)  0.019  (0.959)  0.769  (0.009)  0.826  (0.003) 
  β0+β1  0.262  (0.464)  -0.140  (0.700)  0.495  (0.146)  0.728  (0.017) 
                 
+1  β0  -0.136 (0.709)  -0.055 (0.880)  0.141 (0.697)  0.007 (0.984) 
  β1  0.347  (0.325)  0.117  (0.747)  -0.145  (0.690)  -0.325  (0.360) 
  β0+β1  0.358  (0.310)  0.098  (0.788)  -0.115  (0.751)  -0.226  (0.531) 
                 
+1 to +3  β0  0.088 (0.810)  0.112 (0.758)  0.147 (0.686)  -0.437 (0.206) 
  β1  0.155  (0.670)  -0.007  (0.985)  0.046  (0.900)  -0.149  (0.682) 
  β0+β1  0.189  (0.601)  0.013  (0.971)  0.101  (0.780)  -0.286  (0.423)  
30 
where CFOt is year t cash flow from operations (COMPUSTAT item data308) and ACCt are accruals, 
which are measured by subtracting CFOt from cash flow statement earnings (data123), and 0) (CFO < t D  is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of unity when CFOt is negative and zero otherwise.  The variables 
CFOt and ACCt are scaled by lagged total assets.  The coefficient  1 β is expected to be positive as accruals 
are used to recognize economic losses in a more timely fashion (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005a, 2005b).
20  
Note that following Ball and Shivakumar (2005b) and Collins and Hribar (2002), in the above regression I 
use cash flow statement information available in COMPUSTAT for the period of 1987-2004. 
Equation (3) is estimated over ten restrictiveness deciles constructed based on the five indices of 
contract restrictiveness.  The results are reported in Table 6 and also depicted in Figure 2.  The tenor of the 
results is the same as in Table 4.  In particular, analysis of the overall restrictiveness index reveals that in 
the highest restrictiveness decile (Q10) the magnitudes of 1 β  are 1.00, 1.34, 0.77, and 1.09 for years –3 to –
1, year –1, year +1, and years +1 to +3, respectively, while their lowest decile (Q1) counterparts are 0.45, 
0.34, 0.42, and 0.67.  The differences between these estimates are both statistically and economically 
significant.   
The differences in asymmetric timeliness estimates between Q10 and Q1 are especially pronounced 
for investing restrictions, attaining values of up to 1.40, and are significant at the 1% level.  The evidence 
based on the distribution and financing restrictiveness indices, as well as on the index of control transfer 
covenants, indicates that in years prior to a debt issue there is a substantial and statistically significant 
increase in asymmetric timeliness from decile Q1 to Q10.
21 In the post-issue periods (year +1 and years +1 
to +3), on average 1 β increases in smaller increments moving from Q1 to Q10.   
Finally, Table 7 presents correlations of the decile ranks with the estimated parameters.  The 
correlations between the decile rank  and  1 β based on the overall restrictions (Panel A) are 0.81 for years –3 
to –1 and year –1, statistically significant at 1%.  However, the correlation coefficients decline to 0.46 and 
0.16 for year +1 and years +1 to +3, respectively, and are no longer statistically significant (based on ten 
observations).  A similar pattern obtains when I examine the different types of restrictions separately (Panel 
B).  Overall, the correlation coefficients computed for the horizons prior to the debt issue (years –3 to –1 
and year –1) are substantial, at about 0.50 on average, whereas in years following the issue, the trends in the 
estimates of β1 or β0+β1 become weaker.  These findings are consistent with management introducing noise 
into accounting formation. 
                                                   
20 The coefficient  0 β  is predicted to be negative, suggesting a noise-reducing role for accruals (Dechow et al., 1998). 
 
21 One exception is the payout restriction in year –1, where the difference between Q10 and Q1 is negative. However, 
examination of Q9 and Q8 strongly indicates an increasing pattern, so the result is likely to be driven by noise in the 
estimation.  
31 
2.7. Conclusions and Limitations 
I argue that the use of restrictive covenants in public debt contracts is associated with higher 
demand for the timely recognition of economic losses in accounting income.  The purpose of covenants is 
to transfer control rights from shareholders to bondholders when a firm approaches financial distress, 
thereby limiting the ability of a manager to take actions leading to bondholder wealth expropriation.  As 
most covenants depend either explicitly or implicitly on accounting information and become binding when 
accounting performance deteriorates, I argue that covenants are more effective in constraining opportunistic 
behavior by the manager (and in preventing the associated agency problems) when a firm’s accounting 
system is designed in a way such that it produces timely signals of the firm’s economic health.  Therefore, 
when contracts rely on covenants as a contractual mechanism to protect bondholders, higher demand with 
respect to timely loss recognition in financial statements should arise.    
The analysis shows that companies with the most restrictive contracts are about two times as timely 
in recognizing economic losses in earnings as companies with the lowest restrictions.  The results are robust 
to measures of asymmetric timeliness derived from return-earnings and accrual-cash flows relations.   
Overall, I conclude that the demands of contracting parties, at the firm level, are predictably associated with 
the degree of timeliness in the recognition of economic losses. 
My evidence is consistent with complementarity between conditionally conservative accounting 
and debt covenants.  While I argue that a company that relies on covenants will adopt more timely loss 
recognition ex ante, the debt contracts themselves may require that accounting information satisfy certain 
conditions, in which case they may specify modifications or adjustments to accounting information (Core 
and Verrecchia, 2006).  Leftwich (1983) presents early evidence that debt contracts adjust accounting 
information to be more conservative.  However, such accounting information is usually backed out from 
GAAP numbers.  Since it is likely to be very costly to specify a comprehensive set of accounting 
adjustments in a contract (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983), self-imposed constraints in the form of 
conditional conservatism should prove useful.  This conjecture is consistent with Beatty, Weber, and Yu 
(2006), who find that the demand for conservatism is not entirely met via conservative adjustments to 
accounting information. 
This study is subject to several potential limitations.  First, no attempt is made to determine 
causality in the relation between timely loss recognition and debt contract restrictiveness, that is, I do not 
establish whether timely loss recognition affects covenant design or whether the contractual features, i.e., 
the covenants influence companies’ decisions with respect to the timely recognition of losses.   
Nevertheless, under both scenarios the lenders relying on covenants, as a contractual mechanism to reduce 
agency problems, are concerned with timely loss recognition.  Thus, the latter is positively linked to 
contract design, which suggests that contract restrictiveness and asymmetric timeliness are complements.   
The second potential limitation to this study relates to the ability to pre-commit to conditionally 
conservative accounting practices.  Specifically, the empirical evidence presented above suggests that  
32 
companies adjust their accounting in the years preceding a debt issue.  This observation is consistent with 
Ball and Shivakumar (2006b), who argue that initial public offerings experience a great degree of scrutiny 
by investors and hence adopt timelier reporting.  However, in the years following the debt issue, I find 
weaker evidence of timely loss recognition when I rely on accrual-based regressions.  A possible 
explanation for this finding is that firms exert discretion over accounting as well as real activities to reduce 
the likelihood of covenant violations.  To the extent that this introduces additional noise into accruals, and 
more importantly into cash flows, an errors-in-variables problem exists.  This problem makes it more 
difficult to find significant changes in asymmetric timeliness when moving from one level of covenant 
restriction to the next.   
Finally, the restrictiveness indices I use in the analysis count the number of covenants included in 
debt contracts.  A higher number of covenants need not imply more restrictive contracts per se, as the 
contracts may provide a slack in meeting covenant thresholds.  Sridhar and Magee (1997) show that 
accounting information quality and covenant tightness are substitutes.  In contrast, consistent with the 
arguments in Levine and Hughes (2005) and others, I argue that covenant restrictions and timely loss 
recognition are complements.  The analysis of Sridhar and Magee applies to the tightness of covenants and 
not to their inclusion, which is the focus in this paper.  If the restrictiveness indices above are positively 
correlated with the tightness of covenants, this may bias my results.  However, the bias should generally 
work against finding the hypothesized relation. 
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2.A. Examples of timely accounting policies 
In general, firms can recognize losses in a more timely fashion by choosing to implement 
accounting policies that slow down the recognition of gains while speeding up the recognition of losses.  
The following discussion provides several examples of ways in which companies can move the recognition 
of losses forward.   
First, materiality principle implies that transactions of less than material amounts need not be 
accounted for by using principles of financial accounting.  This means that managers have a fair amount of 
discretion in accounting for immaterial transactions and implies that investors will often miss important 
information because companies deem such details “immaterial.”  Because the abuse of materiality may help 
a company avoid covenant violations, a commitment to decrease materiality thresholds in relation to 
accounting for losses and adverse economic events (e.g., treating virtually any loss as material unless it 
becomes prohibitively costly to do so) would be another way to commit to timelier loss recognition. 
In a similar vein, in the context of accounting for pensions, SFAS 87, which is designed to smooth 
the volatility of income due to fluctuations of the value of the fund, leaves room for improvements in timely 
loss recognition.  Realized returns on a pension fund’s assets virtually always differ from the expected 
return used to calculate the pension expense.  This, together with a number of other factors, such as changes 
in actuarial assumptions with respect to life expectancy, turnover, and salary growth, results in deferrals, 
i.e., the presence of unrecognized gains or losses.  Unless deferred gains or losses exceed (a substantial) 
materiality threshold,
22 firms are not required to recognize (amortize) the gain/loss.  A firm may adopt a 
policy to expense a loss (or start its amortization) whenever the deferred gain evolves into a deferred loss 
                                                   
22 Ten percent of the greater of the projected benefit obligation or the market-related value of plan assets.  
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(i.e., whenever it has been absorbed).  While such a policy may be extreme, nothing prevents a firm from 
implementing a policy to recognize deferred losses resulting from pension accounting sooner then deferred 
gains, for example, by using faster depreciation rates for losses than for gains.   
Additionally, managers often have a choice over the parameters used to calculate pension expense.  
Comprix and Muller (2006) provide evidence consistent with managers manipulating expected rates of 
returns to increase their compensation.  In a similar fashion, assumptions about expected returns can be 
used to avoid covenant violations.  A firm can move the recognition of economic losses forward by 
specifying ex ante the rules for the determination of the expected returns on a fund’s assets.  For instance, 
some firms use a moving average over actual realizations, which increases a firm’s expense when the fund 
is performing poorly.  Such a policy may be considered as consistent with more timely loss recognition 
over a cross-section of firms.   
Accounting for marketable securities also leaves room for timeliness of losses recognition as firms 
have discretion with respect to reclassifying marketable securities as available for trading or available-for-
sale.  Unrealized losses for the latter do not enter the income statement as presumably the company 
presently has no intention of selling these securities.  These need not be true intentions, however, and may 
just be a way to increase reported income and thereby avoid covenant violations.  Adoption of a policy not 
to reclassify available-for-sale securities as trading securities whenever doing so results in increased 
income, or alternatively, a commitment not to classify trading securities as available-for-sale whenever 
doing so avoids recording unrealized loss in the income statement, would be consistent with more timely 
recognition of losses.  Moreover, companies have discretion in whether to treat unrealized losses associated 
with available-for-sale securities as permanent or temporary.  The former necessitates expensing, which 
creditors would generally prefer.  A commitment to always treat unrealized losses as permanent would be 
another way to adopt timelier loss recognition. 
Contingent liabilities represent yet another area in which firms can demonstrate more timely loss 
recognition.  Consider a situation in which a court jury finds a company liable for punitive damages of $7 
million (with a subsequent settlement for $5 million) and the company files an immediate appeal but does 
not recognize any of the liability on the balance sheet or income statement (instead, the firm makes only a 
footnote disclosure).  The lenders are likely to prefer the alternative treatment of recognizing an immediate 
loss of $7 million and revising the loss downward if subsequent court decisions warrant such changes.  It is 
often the case that while a liability’s exact amount cannot be determined, the maximum amount is well 
defined (e.g., fines for environmental pollution), in which case adopting a policy to recognize the maximum 
liability would clearly represent timely accounting for losses.   
Finally, as Basu (1997) points out, firms may revise their estimates of an asset’s useful life 
upwards, which would have a positive impact on income over multiple years.   Since these revisions are 
subjective, creditors would prefer that a company commit against following such a practice.   
The remaining examples concern pre-commitments against overstating inventory and fixed assets.  
Accounting for changes in the replacement cost of obsolete inventory often requires estimating its net  
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realizable value, which in turn leads to (subjective) assessments of future demand, market conditions, etc.  
An optimistic assessment would prevent a timely write-down of inventory (to the replacement cost).  In 
contrast, a policy to assume, for example, that future demand for obsolete inventory is zero would avoid 
problems associated with discretionary assessments of future demand and would result in the recognition of 
economic losses being moved forward.  In addition, the choice of LIFO over FIFO to value inventory is 
consistent with more timely expense recognition in the context of increasing inventory prices. 
When accounting for maintenance and betterments of long-lived assets, firms often have a choice 
over whether to capitalize large maintenance expenses necessitated by the deterioration of an asset’s 
condition (which would result in higher income) or to expense them.  Since the discretion over this choice 
may be used to avoid the recognition of economic losses, a commitment to treat the costs associated with 
betterments as maintenance expenses (rather than to capitalize them) whenever, e.g., the betterments do not 
involve a purchase of new equipment would be consistent with more timely loss recognition.   
2.B. Index Construction 
The Investment Restrictions Covenant Index includes indicators for the following covenants: 
1.  Restrictions on consolidations or mergers between an issuer and other entities 
(consolidation_merger). 
2.  Restrictions on an issuer's investment policy in an effort to prevent risky investments (investments). 
3.  Restrictions on the ability of an issuer to sell assets or restrictions on the issuer's use of the proceeds 
from the sale of assets (sale_assets). 
4.  Restrictions on subsidiaries' investments (su_investments_unrestricted_subs). 
5.  Restrictions on an issuer’s business dealings with its subsidiaries (transaction_affiliates). 
6.  Restrictions on the use of proceeds from the sale of a subsidiaries' assets to reduce debt 
(su_sale_xfer_assets_unrestricted). 
 
The Distributions Restrictions Covenant Index includes indicators for the following covenants: 
1.  Restrictions on payments made to shareholders or other entities; payments may be limited to a 
certain percentage of net income or some other ratio (dividends_related_payments). 
2.  Restrictions on an issuer's freedom to make payments (other than dividend-related payments) to 
shareholders and others (restricted_payments). 
3.  Restrictions on a subsidiary’s payment of dividends to a certain percentage of net income or some 
other ratio (su_dividends_related_payments). 
 
The Financing Restrictions Covenant Index includes indicators for the following covenants: 
1.  Restrictions on an issuer from issuing additional funded debt (funded_debt).  
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2.  Restrictions on additional debt issues; the issuer must have achieved or maintained certain 
profitability levels (net_earnings_test_issuance). 
3.  Restrictions on incurring additional debt, with limits on the absolute dollar amount of debt 
outstanding or the percentage total capital (indebtedness). 
4.  Restrictions on the type or amount of property used in a sale leaseback transaction and on the use of 
proceeds from a sale (sales_leaseback). 
5.  Restrictions on the amount of senior debt an issuer may issue in the future (senior_debt_issuance). 
6.  Restrictions on issuing additional common stock (stock_issuance_issuer). 
7.  Restrictions on issuing secured debt unless the issues secures the current issue on a pari passu basis 
(negative_pledge_covenant). 
8.  Restrictions from transferring, selling, or disposing of the issuer’s own common stock or the 
common stock of a subsidiary (stock_transfer_sale_disp). 
9.  Restrictions on the issuance of junior or subordinated debt (subordinated_debt_issuance). 
10. Restrictions on the total indebtedness of subsidiaries (su_indebtedness). 
11. Restrictions on subsidiary borrowing, except from the parent (su_borrowing_restricted). 
12. Restrictions on subsidiaries issuing additional funded debt (su_funded_debt). 
13. Restrictions on issuing additional common stock in restricted subsidiaries (su_stock_issuance). 
14. Restrictions on subsidiaries' ability to issue preferred stock (su_preferred_stock_issuance). 
15. Restrictions on a subsidiary issuing guarantees for the payment of interest and/or principal of 
certain debt obligations (su_subsidiary_guarantee). 
16. Restrictions on subsidiaries from selling lease back assets that provide security for the debtholder 
(su_sales_leaseback). 
17. If an issuer's net worth (as defined) falls below a minimum level, certain bond provisions are 
triggered (declining_net_worth). 
18. Requirement that an issuer maintain a minimum specified net worth (maintenance_net_worth). 
19. Requirement that an issuer have a ratio of earnings available for fixed charges of at least a 
minimum specified level (fixed_charge_coverage). 
20. Restrictions on an issuer’s total indebtedness (leverage_test). 
21. Restrictions on subsidiaries' leverage (su_leverage_test). 
22. Requirement that in the case of default, the bondholders have the legal right to sell mortgaged 
property to satisfy their unpaid obligations.(liens). 
23. Restrictions on subsidiaries from acquiring liens on their property (su_liens). 




The Control Covenant Index includes indicators for the following covenants: 
1.  A bondholder protective covenant that will activate an event of default in their issue if an event of 
default has occurred under any other debt of the company (cross_default). 
2.  A bondholder protective covenant that allows the holder to accelerate their debt if any other debt of 
the organization has been accelerated due to an event of default (cross_acceleration). 
3.  A covenant whereby upon a change of control in the issuer, bondholders have the option of selling 
the issue back to the issuer (change_control_put_provisions). 
4.  A covenant whereby the issue's change of control provisions are triggered if an investor controls 
more than a given percentage of the issuer's stock (voting_power_percentage). 
5.  A covenant whereby the issue's change of control provisions are triggered if the issuer's employee 
retirement plan controls more than a given percentage of the issuer's stock 
(voting_power_percentage_erp). 
6.  A covenant whereby a decline in the credit rating of the issuer (or issue) triggers a bondholder put 
provision (rating_decline_trigger_put). 
7.  A covenant whereby property acquired after the sale of current debt issues will be included in the 
current issuer's mortgage (after_acquired_property_clause). 
8.  A covenant that indicates whether restricted subsidiaries may be reclassified as unrestricted 
subsidiaries (su_subsidiary_redesignation).  
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Chapter 3  
Agency Theory of Overvalued Equity as an 
Explanation for the Accrual Anomaly
π 
3.1. Introduction 
The prevailing hypothesis in the literature is that investor fixation causes the Sloan (1996) accrual 
anomaly, i.e., a predictable negative relation between accounting accruals and subsequent stock returns.  
Our tests show that the agency theory of overvalued equity, the agency hypothesis, explains the accrual 
anomaly, whereas the evidence does not support the investor-fixation hypothesis.  A large body of research 
articulates the agency theory of overvalued equity and its implications for corporate investment, financing, 
and financial reporting decisions.
23  One of the predictions of the theory is that overvalued firms’ managers 
attempt to boost their firms’ reported performance to meet investor expectations.  We therefore expect 
overvalued firms to aggressively engage in earnings management, and as a result, following a period of 
overvaluation, such firms gravitate toward the high accrual deciles of the population of firms.  Therefore, 
when firms are sorted according to accruals, firms with prior over-valuation are likely to be over-
represented in the high accrual decile portfolios.  However, since overvaluation and superior reported 
performance cannot last indefinitely, we expect, and find, negative abnormal returns for the high accrual 
decile portfolio.
24   
In contrast, undervalued firms are not expected to actively under-report accruals, i.e., manage 
earnings downwards.  In fact, under-valued firms might also attempt to manage earnings upward to correct 
the misevaluation.  Therefore, such firms are unlikely to be concentrated in the low accrual deciles of the 
population of firms; instead they might be dispersed across various accrual deciles of firms.  Hence, the low 
                                                   
π Based on the paper co-authored with S.P. Kothari (MIT) and Elena Loutskina (University of Virginia). 
 
23 See Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004), Jensen (2005), Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Baker, Stein, and 
Wurgler (2003), Polk and Sapienza (2004), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2005), Ritter (1991), Loughran and 
Ritter (1995), Graham and Harvey (2001), Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006), and others. 
 
24 Preceding discussion raises at least two questions.  First, how do some firms end up being overvalued (or 
undervalued) in an efficient market, the maintained assumption underlying the agency theory of overvalued equity?  
Second, why do managers of overvalued firms attempt to prolong overvaluation and thus face potential adverse 
consequences when prices revert to their normal level?  We address these questions below in section 2.   
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accrual decile portfolios’ future stock-price performance is expected to be normal.  This prediction differs 
from that of the investor-fixation hypothesis for the accrual anomaly.   
The fixation and agency hypotheses both imply that investors misunderstand company 
fundamentals for some firms, which leads to mispricing.  However, under fixation, accruals cause 
mispricing, whereas under the agency hypothesis high accruals are, in part, a byproduct of overvaluation.   
Overvalued firms’ managers likely engage in earnings management and report high accruals.  The fixation 
and agency hypotheses therefore generate different predictions.  (i)  Fixation predicts a linear relation 
between accruals and future returns.  In contrast, the agency hypothesis predicts a kink in the relation 
between accruals and future returns, with negative future returns for the high, but not positive returns for 
the low accrual decile portfolios.  (ii)  Since earnings management is motivated in part by prior 
overvaluation, the agency hypothesis also predicts an asymmetric relation between past returns and current 
accruals.  We expect high returns to precede high accrual decile portfolios, but not particularly low returns 
preceding the low accrual decile portfolios.  The fixation hypothesis does not make predictions about past 
returns and current accruals.  A systematic past return behavior that is consistent with the agency 
hypothesis constitutes evidence against fixation.
25  
Previous research also reports an asymmetry, but only in the relation between accruals and future 
returns.
26  We offer an economic rationale for this asymmetry, and also predict an asymmetric relation 
between accruals and past returns.  The latter is the result of agency incentives stemming from prior 
overvaluation.   
We complement the predictions of stock price performance surrounding the year of accrual 
measurement with predictions of asymmetry in the degree of analyst optimism, insider trading activity, and 
distortions in firms’ investment and financing decisions, i.e., expect these among firms in the high, but not 
the low, accrual deciles.  The predictions about analyst optimism, about distortions in firms’ investment-
financing decisions, or about unusual amount of insider trading activity among the high-accrual decile firms 
are distinct from the investor fixation explanation for the accrual anomaly.  The differing predictions based 
on the agency hypothesis versus investor fixation are helpful in discriminating between the competing 
explanations for the anomaly.  We find evidence consistent with all of our predictions based on the agency 
                                                   
25 This is much like systematic positive or negative abnormal performance following an event is inconsistent with 
market efficiency, which does not predict such systematic return behavior.  Also see Friedman (1950, p. 9) on 
choosing between alternative theories based on evidence contradicting and not contradicting the predictions.  
 
26 See Barth and Hutton (2004), Beaver, McNichols, and Price (2005), Beneish and Vargus (2002), Chan, Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (2006), D’Avolio, Gildor, and Shleifer (2001), Desai, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2004), 
Hirshleifer, Teoh and Yu (2005), Houge and Loughran (2001), Kraft, Leone, and Wasley (2006), Lesmond and Wang 
(2005), Lev and Nissim (2006), Teoh and Zhang (2006), and Thomas and Zhang (2002).  Sloan (1996) also finds an 
asymmetric pattern when abnormal stock performance is measured using Jensen’s alpha.   
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hypothesis.  Collectively, the evidence casts doubt on the prevailing hypothesis that market naïvely fixates 
on reported financial performance in generating the accrual anomaly.
27   
Background.  Following Sloan (1996), the accrual anomaly has received tremendous attention in 
the literature, with Xie (2001), Thomas and Zhang (2002), Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh, and Zhang (2004), and 
Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005) replicating and extending the anomaly.  The most common 
explanation for the anomaly is that investors naively fixate on accounting accruals without fully 
recognizing the lesser persistence of accruals (see Sloan, 1996, Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003, and Dechow, 
Richardson, and Sloan, 2006).  We label this explanation the fixation hypothesis.   
Many studies reexamine the accrual anomaly and document evidence that undermines the naïve 
investor fixation hypothesis, e.g., the evidence of asymmetry in the accrual-return relation.  While such 
evidence is damaging to the fixation hypothesis, the literature does not explain this asymmetry.  We 
propose the agency theory of overvalued equity as an economic rationale for the asymmetric relation 
between returns and accruals.   
Under the agency hypothesis, overvalued firms’ managers not only resist market “correction,” but 
they proactively attempt to prolong the overvaluation.  Thus, instead of disseminating information that 
would disappoint capital markets, shareholders, and even the board, managers are likely to take actions 
designed to meet the market’s optimistic performance expectations and sustain the overvaluation.
28  Among 
the actions, earnings management is expected to feature prominently, which leads to overvalued firms being 
over-represented among the high accrual firms.  In addition, overvalued firms’ managers are expected to 
make excessive debt and equity issues, capital expenditures, acquisitions paid for using equity, and they are 
likely to engage in insider trading.
29   
Considerable anecdotal evidence suggests managers do indeed attempt to mask bad news and 
engage in earnings management in the hope of prolonging a favorable assessment of the firm in the 
investment community.  Below we describe two such episodes.
 30  First, the software giant, Computer 
Associates (CA), in the 1990s backdated sales contracts to shift forward the revenues.  In 1995, CA 
awarded nearly $1 billion in shares to top company officers, with the shares vesting when the stocks price 
hits and stays at a target level.  This benchmark was met in 1998.  But the sales slowed down subsequently, 
dragging CA stock down.  The company’s top executives tried to sustain the overvaluation by engaging in 
fraudulent practices over 1998-2000, including about $1 billion in sales due to fraudulent and premature 
                                                   
27 While finding asymmetry in returns (as well as investment-financing decision, analyst forecasts errors, and insider 
trading) does not per se reject fixation hypothesis, observing systematic patterns in returns consistent with the agency 
hypothesis undermines the fixation hypothesis. 
 
28 See Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2006) for systematic evidence that managers delay the dissemination of bad news.   
 
29 See Jensen et al. (2004), Jensen (2005), Moeller et al. (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Baker et al. (2003), and 
Polk and Sapienza (2004).   
 
30 Additional examples of firms inflating earnings to sustain stock price, and thus benefit from option exercise or share 
sales, include Xerox, Tyco, and Waste Management (see Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006).  
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revenue recognition practices.  The company’s stock price declined by more than 50% followed by the SEC 
investigation and numerous lawsuits alleging management fraud contributing to stock price inflation.  In 
2004, U.S. District Judge Leo Glasser said that the “central goal” of CA accounting practice was to meet or 
exceed “revenue expectations.”  In 2006, the SEC investigation led to the former CEO pleading guilty to 
orchestrating $2.2 billion accounting fraud (for further detail, see Bloomberg, September 22, 2004; and 
CFO magazine, April 09, 2004).   
The second example is Shell Corporation, one of the world’s largest and most profitable firms (and 
also one of the most conservative and reliable firms, see Guardian, April 20, 2004), which overstated its oil 
reserves over the period 1997-2001.  The company’s management began to realize this problem as early as 
2000, but was unwilling to disclose this to the market and strived to find new oil reserves in order to back 
up their overly optimistic estimates.
31  One of the executives wrote to the CEO that he felt they were 
“caught in a box” due to aggressive booking of reserves over 1997-2000.  In 2002, the CEO, Sir Philip 
Watts, who had a sterling career with the company, sent an internal email emphasizing that it was vital not 
to take a write-down for the unproven reserves until new reserves had been found to replace them.  He 
suggested the executive to consider the whole spectrum of possibilities and “ to leave no stone unturned” 
(The Independent, April 20, 2004).
32  Eventually in 2004, Shell acknowledged that their reserves were 
overstated.  The CEO and several executives subsequently resigned.  The stock price declined by more that 
10%, the firm was fined, and S&P downgraded Shell’s credit rating.   
While the anecdotal evidence is consistent with overvalued firms’ managers seeking to prolong 
their firms’ valuation through favorable disclosures and/or earnings management, we now turn to providing 
systematic evidence consistent with the agency hypothesis as an alternative to the fixation hypothesis to 
explain the accrual anomaly.    
Summary of results.  Consistent with the predictions of the agency hypothesis, we find (i) an 
asymmetric relation between accruals and past, current, and future returns, (ii) asymmetry in the optimism 
of analysts’ long-term growth forecasts, (iii) asymmetric insider trading behavior, and (iv) asymmetric 
distortion in the investment-financing decisions.  Specifically, we report significant return reversals for the 
high accrual-decile firms, but weak/insignificant for the low accrual-decile firms.  To further discriminate 
between the fixation and agency hypotheses, we examine stock-price performance of the accrual-decile 
firms for three years prior to the year in which we classify firms into accrual deciles.  The high accrual-
decile firms’ abnormal returns for the prior three years are significantly positive at about 18% per year 
compared to only -3.6% for the low accrual-decile firms.  The asymmetric return-accrual relation in the 
                                                   
31 For example, Financial Services Authority, August 24, 2004, Final Notice (to Shell investigation). 
 
32 “I am becoming sick and tired about lying about the extent of our reserves issues and the downward revisions that 
need to be done because of far too aggressive/optimistic bookings,” van de Vijver (CEO of Shell’s Exploration & 
Production) wrote in a November 2003 e-mail to Mr. Watts, the CEO.  Still, in a subsequent email, when legal 
advisers sent van de Vijver a memo (saying that Shell should disclose the problems), he responded to 
Exploration&Production CFO: “This is absolute dynamite, not at all what I expected and needs to be destroyed.” (The 
Associated Press, April 19, 2004; Financial Director, May 2004).  
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prior years is not predicted under the fixation hypothesis.  We also observe return reversals only for the 
high accrual decile firms.  This evidence is consistent with over-valuation prompting managers to engage in 
earnings management, which leads such firms to gravitate towards the high accrual deciles.     
In addition, we observe unusually high levels of analyst optimism, insider-trading activity, debt and 
equity issues, capital expenditures, and M&A activity among the high accrual-decile firms prior to and 
during the year of high accruals compared to the low accrual-decile firms.  These phenomena, and their 
asymmetric relation to accruals, are predicted under the agency hypothesis, but not the fixation hypothesis.   
Finally, we conduct Mishkin market efficiency tests separately for companies with income-
increasing accruals (deciles 6 through 10) and income-decreasing accruals (deciles 1 through 5).  The 
results confirm the asymmetry as predicted under the agency hypothesis in that pricing is as if investors 
overestimate accrual persistence only for the high accrual deciles.  This asymmetry does not support 
investor fixation.   
Alternative explanations.  The fact that predictable stock price reversals follow equity 
overvaluation and earnings management among firms in the high accrual deciles is consistent with many 
explanations, including market inefficiency, limited arbitrage (see DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and 
Waldmann, 1990, and Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and trading frictions preventing a speedy adjustment of 
overvalued firms’ stock prices, survival biases, risk misestimation, etc.  These are explored in a large 
stream of research that focuses on survivor biases, risk misestimation, and distributional properties of the 
data as explanations for the abnormal performance of the accrual strategy (see Zach, 2004, Kraft et al. 2006, 
Khan, 2005, Kothari, Sabino, and Zach, 2005, etc.).  Related research also examines whether trading 
frictions and arbitrage risk account for the apparent slow price adjustment to accrual information (e.g., Ali, 
Hwang, and Trombley, 2000, Lesmond and Wang, 2005, Hirshleifer, Teoh, and Yu, 2005, Mashruwala, 
Rajgopal, and Shevlin, 2006, and Pontiff, 2006).
33  Our study does not pursue any of the above lines of 
inquiry. 
We believe it is unlikely that limited arbitrage due to higher costs of short-sale constraints for the 
high accrual firms would explain the observed asymmetry.  Short sale constraints can generate the 
asymmetry because the constraints will impede shorting of the high accrual decile firms, but not affect 
investors’ ability to exploit the mispricing among the lowest accrual decile firms.  However, D’Avolio 
(2002) finds that short-sale constraints are unlikely for 91% of the stocks, and Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 
(2005, p. 243) conclude that “For the overwhelming majority of stocks, short interest and institutional 
ownership levels make short interest constraints unlikely.”  Therefore, short selling constraints are unlikely 
to explain three years of subsequent stock underperformance of the high accrual firms.
34  
                                                   
33 There is no consensus in the literature whether limited arbitrage can explain asset pricing anomalies, e.g., see Brav 
and Heaton (2006). 
 
34 An additional relevant factor is that difficulties to borrow the stock are likely to exist when there is a divergence of 
opinion in investor valuation (Miller, 1977) and thus overvaluation itself (not necessarily accruals) likely contributes 
to the difficulty of borrowing a stock for short-selling.  D’Avolio (2002) argues that investor optimism can limit  
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Outline of the paper.  Section 2 summarizes the relevant literature, develops testable hypotheses, 
and outlines the empirical predictions.  Section 3 describes sample selection and variable construction.  
Section 4 presents our empirical tests and results.  We summarize and conclude in Section 5.   
3.2. Hypothesis Development and Empirical Predictions 
In this section we examine the accrual anomaly in the context of the agency theory of overvalued 
equity.  We describe some of the existing evidence surrounding the accrual anomaly, which accords with 
the implications of the theory of overvalued equity rather than investor fixation on accruals.  We then 
present a set of testable hypotheses and empirical predictions that would discriminate between the agency 
theory of overvalued equity and fixation as the driving force behind the accrual anomaly.  
3.2.1. Hypothesis Development 
The accrual anomaly is that a zero-investment strategy with a short position in the highest accrual-
decile firms and a long position in the lowest accrual-decile firms earns an economically significant 
magnitude of abnormal return.  Sloan (1996) and others attribute the abnormal performance to investors’ 
fixation on accruals.  Under the fixation hypothesis, investors overestimate the persistence of the accrual 
component of earnings.  Investors thus overvalue high accrual firms and undervalue low accrual firms.  
This systematic mispricing is corrected in future years, thus generating predictable price reversals for the 
extreme accrual stocks.   
We advance an alternative explanation for the accrual anomaly, namely, agency cost of overvalued 
equity (see references in the Introduction).  Even in an efficient market, some firms can get overvalued for a 
number of reasons.  Optimistic assessment of or withholding of adverse internal information about (i) the 
demand for a firm’s products, (ii) a firm’s profitability from revenue growth and cost and scale efficiency, 
(iii) the prospects of a new technology, (iv) the quality of management, and/or (v) macroeconomic 
implications for the company’s business are some of the reasons that can lead to a particular firm to be 
overvalued.  The management might also genuinely share the optimism about the firm’s future and/or might 
even have proactively contributed to the market’s optimistic assessment.  Under these circumstances, the 
management is expected to make investment, operating, and financing decisions that might validate their 
and the market participants’ expectations.   
However, at some point, the management might come to the realization that it would be a challenge 
to meet the expectations.  At this juncture, the agency hypothesis predicts that an overvalued firm’s 
management has many reasons to generate signals (e.g., via managed earnings) that would maintain the 
overvaluation.  First, the management benefits from the firm’s continued growth and overvaluation through 
                                                                                                                                                                        
arbitrage via the loan market mechanism. When market is overly optimistic about a company, non-lending optimists 
are likely to absorb a large fraction of shares, which leads to higher costs of shorting.    
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higher compensation and high valuation of their stock and options in the firm.
35  Second, the incentive 
might also come from the managerial labor-market – managers with superior past performance are in 
demand.  A stock-price decline, even if it’s a correction, would tarnish the manager’s record and thus 
reduce his/her cache in the labor market.  Third, earnings management might also be due in part a CEO’s 
attempt to fulfill the market’s expectation of high performance in line with the overvalued stock price.  
Managers might be hopeful that they will be able to ride out future reversals of current earnings 
management with good news that will roll in and offset the reversals.  Finally, managers engaging in 
earnings management might have a high discount rate such that they heavily discount the potential future 
downturn and/or adverse consequences in favor of their high utility for continued good times resulting from 
the firm’s overvaluation.  This is consistent with managers’ utility function displaying significant loss 
aversion.   
The unwinding of the overvaluation and the earnings management, however, are inevitable, on 
average.  Thus, under the agency hypothesis, the predictability of subsequent underperformance for the 
high accruals portfolio is rooted in the prior overvaluation motivating managers to report upward managed 
earnings.
36  That is, when firms are sorted according to accruals, overvalued firms are likely to be over-
represented at the high end of the accrual distribution in part because over-valued firms’ managers are 
expected to have managed earnings up.  We emphasize that not all of the accruals of the high accrual 
portfolio are due to earnings management motivated by prior overvaluation.  In fact, a large fraction of a 
firm’s accruals are likely to be an outcome of its underlying economic fundamentals (e.g., sales growth, 
capital intensity, etc.).  It is just that the combination of (i) relatively high levels of accruals due to good 
economic performance (e.g., high growth), and (ii) upward managed earnings due to the incentives facing 
managers of overvalued firms makes it likely that overvalued firms will be over-represented in the high-
accrual portfolios formed on the basis of ranking the population of stocks on accruals.   
In contrast, low accrual firms’ subsequent price performance is not predicted to be superior under 
the agency hypothesis.  Low accruals are typically a result of slow-down in growth and poor operating 
performance, which likely is reflected in adverse prior stock-price performance.  Like some over-valued 
firms, some of these firms might even be undervalued.  However, the undervalued firms’ managers do not 
face incentives to under-report their accruals, i.e., lower their performance through earnings management.  
In fact, managers of undervalued firms might be motivated to manage earnings upward (i) to signal their 
superior fundamentals relative to the market’s valuation and thus attempt to correct the misevaluation, and 
                                                   
35 Several studies suggest equity incentives as a motive for earnings management (see Cheng and Warfield, 2005, 
Burns and Kedia, 2006, and Bergstresser and Phillipon, 2006).   
 
36 In an efficient market, the correction should take place quickly after the public release of information such that even 
for the high accrual stocks future performance should not be predictably negative for one or more years.  The observed 
evidence of negative abnormal performance for the high-accrual portfolios has multiple potential explanations.  They 
include (i) market inefficiency, (ii) limited arbitrage, trading frictions, and arbitrage risk, which prevent a speedy price 
adjustment, (iii) survival and hindsight biases, and (iv) risk misestimation, i.e., the fact that inferences from estimated 
abnormal performance are tests of the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and a model of equilibrium expected 
returns.  Relevant references appear in the Introduction section of the paper.    
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(ii) for the usual agency incentives stemming from management and/or debt contracts.  Such actions could 
cause these stocks to migrate away from the lowest accrual decile portfolio.  Therefore, undervalued firms 
are unlikely to gravitate toward the low end of the distribution of firms ranked according to accruals.  They 
are more likely to be dispersed among several of the accrual-decile portfolios, probably among the middle 
and low accrual portfolios.  Thus, we do not expect the lowest accrual decile portfolio to be over-
represented with undervalued stocks.  Hence, the agency hypothesis does not predict positive abnormal 
future stock-price performance for the low accrual firms.  Overall, the agency hypothesis predicts an 
asymmetric relation between accruals and future returns.   
3.2.2. Related evidence 
There is voluminous prior research on the accrual anomaly.  While we are unaware of any research 
linking the accrual anomaly to the agency hypothesis, we note that some of the findings in the accrual 
anomaly literature are consistent with the agency hypothesis.  We classify these findings into five streams.  
First, Xie (2001), Thomas and Zhang (2001), and DeFond and Park (2001) find that the accrual strategy’s 
success in predicting subsequent returns is primarily related to the discretionary component of accruals.  
The agency hypothesis directly ties overvaluation to discretionary accruals, i.e., earnings management, 
motivated in part by a desire to prolong the overvaluation.     
Second, mispricing of the accrual component of earnings is observed primarily among specific 
subsets of the population of firms: (i) firms whose insiders were abnormal sellers of their equity (see 
Beneish and Vargus, 2002), (ii) glamour stocks (see Desai, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam, 2005), and (iii) 
firms engaged in mergers, acquisitions, or divestures (Zach, 2003).  These all three subsets of firms are 
likely to be overvalued.  For example, insiders of overvalued firms sell equity (e.g., Jenter, 2005), glamour 
stocks are hypothesized to be overvalued (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994), and, as pointed 
out earlier, overvalued firms excessively engage in M&A activities.  The evidence in Zach (2003), though 
not directly implying overvaluation, is consistent with overvalued firms’ managers (i) using equity as cheap 
currency to make acquisitions to satisfy growth expectations, and (ii) raising external capital to over-invest 
in risky green-field projects.  Additionally, Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a, 1998b) find that long-term 
underperformance of initial or seasoned public offerings is associated with high accruals at the time of the 
issue. Such evidence is consistent with these firms timing the market, i.e., issuing the equity during the 
periods of overvaluation, while at the same time managing accruals to sustain market’s expectations at high 
level.  
Third, research suggests sophisticated and individual investors process accrual information 
similarly (e.g., Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan, 2001, Barth and Hutton, 2004, and Ahmed, Nainar, and 
Zhou, 2001).  This is inconsistent with the naïve fixation hypothesis in which sophisticated investors are 
more discerning.  However, the lack of difference between naïve and sophisticated investors is consistent 
with the agency hypothesis.  Analysts and other sophisticated investors might have fueled the market’s 
expectations about firm performance and led to some firms being overvalued.  Therefore, when these firms’  
48 
managements report superior financial performance, both real and managed, sophisticated investors might 
find it in line with their expectations and thus might not immediately conclude that it represents earnings 
management.  It is also possible that high performance expectations of sophisticated investors and analysts 
exert pressure on management to report high performance to meet those expectations (see Degeorge, Patel, 
and Zechauser, 1999).  An overvalued company with more extensive analyst coverage faces more pressure 
to deliver the expected superior performance.  Ali et al. (2000) find the negative association between 
accruals and future returns is more pronounced for firms with extensive analysts’ coverage and greater 
institutional ownership.   
Fourth, stock underperformance is observed subsequent to periods of high investments, particularly 
those leading to high current accruals and, more generally, high net operating assets, (Fairfield, Whisenant 
and Yohn, 2003, Richardson and Sloan, 2003, Wei and Xie 2004, Titman, Wei and Xie, 2004).  As the 
agency hypothesis predicts, in addition to accrual management, overvalued firms to over-invest to increase 
the probability of meeting market’s expectations.   
Finally, accrual mispricing is observed primarily among the firms reporting income increasing 
accruals.
37  While inconsistent with fixation, this asymmetry in the accrual-return relation is suggestive of 
the agency hypothesis, as described earlier.   
3.2.3. Empirical Predictions 
To empirically distinguish between investor fixation, i.e., the fixation hypothesis, and the agency 
hypothesis, we test four sets of predictions with respect to: (i) the return-accrual relation, (ii) analysts’ 
forecasts, (iii) insider trading, and (iv) firms’ investment and financing decisions.   
Return predictions.  We make predictions about return behavior in the year of, years prior to, and 
years following the accrual measurement year, year zero.  Under the fixation hypothesis, returns in year 
zero are increasing in accruals, and in years one and beyond, the return-accrual relation is negative.  The 
fixation hypothesis is silent with respect to the pattern of stock returns in the years leading up to year zero.   
The agency hypothesis implies an asymmetry in the relation between year zero accruals and stock 
returns of all periods.  Specifically, we expect a price run up in the years leading up to and in year zero 
among the higher accrual decile firms because these portfolios are likely to be over-represented with over-
valued firms that might have attempted to prop up reported earnings through accruals.
38  For the high 
accrual decile firms, this produces a positive relation between leading period returns and year zero accruals.  
In addition, a contemporaneous positive return-accrual association is expected in year zero.  Some of the 
                                                   
37 See Barth and Hutton (2004), Beaver, McNichols, and Price (2005), Beneish and Vargus (2002), Chan et al. (2006), 
D’Avolio, Gildor, and Shleifer (2001), Desai et al. (2004), Houge and Loughran (2001), Hirshleifer et al. (2005), Kraft 
et al.  (2006), Lesmond and Wang (2005), Lev and Nissim (2006), Teoh and Zhang (2006), and Thomas and Zhang 
(2002).   
 
38 Some of the price run up is rational anticipation of superior future accounting performance capturing economic 
fundamentals of the firm.  This is stock prices anticipating future accounting performance, which has been long 
documented in the literature going back to Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver, Lambert, and Morse (1980).  Unlike 
overvaluation, the rational price run up is not expected to reverse in the future.   
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high accrual decile firms’ performance represents earnings management, which is managers’ response to 
overvaluation that began to occur in the years prior to year zero.  Therefore, in the years leading up to year 
zero, we expect positive abnormal returns for the high accrual decile firms, but not the low accrual decile 
firms.  The return reversals in years one and beyond are also expected primarily for the high accrual decile 
firms because these were overvalued firms that engaged in accrual management to prolong the 
overvaluation.  Overall, asymmetry in the accrual-return relation is predicted under the agency hypothesis, 
but not under the fixation hypothesis.   
Since the agency hypothesis is premised on the assumption that overvaluation motivates earnings 
management, we expect the subset of relatively more overvalued firms to bear out the return predictions of 
the agency hypothesis more compellingly than other firms.  Using prior one year’s abnormal price run-up 
as a (crude) proxy for overvaluation, we test whether the reversals in stock prices are more pronounced in 
future years, i.e., years one and beyond, for the highly overvalued stocks.  In contrast, the fixation 
hypothesis implies that current period’s accruals, not prior abnormal returns, predict return reversals in 
future years.    
Analysts’ optimism.  The optimistic assessment of the prospects of the overvalued firms is likely to 
be shared by analysts and thus reflected in their forecasts of the firms’ future performance.  Therefore, 
under the agency hypothesis, because we expect over-valued firms to be over-represented in the high 
accrual portfolios, analysts will exhibit an optimistic bias in forecasting the prospects of the high accrual 
firms, but not the low accrual firms, in the year of and years prior to the accrual measurement year.  
Predictions under the naïve fixation hypothesis depend on the maintained hypothesis about analysts’ 
sophistication.  If analysts are assumed to be sophisticated, then we would not predict a systematic variation 
in the degree of analyst optimism across high and low accrual firms.  On the other hand, if analysts are also 
naively fixated on accruals, then we expect analysts to be pessimistic about the low accrual firms and over-
optimistic about the high accrual firms.  This implies a symmetric relation.   
Insider trading.  The agency hypothesis predicts asymmetry in the insider trading activity across 
the accrual deciles.  Insiders among the high accrual decile firms are predicted to be net sellers because 
those firms are overvalued.
39  The agency hypothesis does not expect insiders of the low accrual-decile 
firms to exhibit abnormal buying of firm equity in the years surrounding year zero of the accrual anomaly.  
In contrast, under the fixation hypothesis, we expect insiders to be net sellers of firm equity among the high 
accrual decile firms and net buyers of firm equity among the low accrual decile firms.  Thus, insider trading 
activity is predicted to be symmetric in its occurrence and magnitude across the accrual deciles under the 
fixation hypothesis.   
Investment-financing decisions.  The agency hypothesis makes several predictions about 
corporations’ investment-financing decisions, which are distinct from the behavior predicted under the 
                                                   
39 Insiders are likely to sell equity on average, and/or it may be more costly for them to purchase additional stock when 
they believe their firm is undervalued, which may lead to asymmetric insider trading patterns.  To address this 
concern, we adjust our measures of insider trading for mean insider selling of companies of similar size, so that 
executives who refrain from selling will appear to be net buyers.   
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fixation hypothesis.  Specifically, the agency hypothesis predicts that in year zero and prior years the high 
accrual decile firms will (i) excessively tap the debt and equity markets; (ii) excessively use (overvalued) 
equity as currency to pay for mergers and acquisitions; and (iii) over-invest in property, plant, and 
equipment (i.e., capital expenditures) and R&D.  Once again, these investment-financing decisions are 
expected to be asymmetric, i.e., observed among the high accrual decile firms, but not the low accrual 
decile firms.  The fixation hypothesis does not predict (especially discretionary) accruals to impact firms’ 
investment-financing decisions.  It also does not predict an asymmetry in the relation between accruals and 
investment activity.  
We acknowledge the possibility that investors are naively fixated on accruals, but managers 
recognize that stocks are misvalued and that they take actions to exploit the misevaluation.  In this scenario, 
managers of over-valued firms might excessively tap the equity and debt markets, which means both 
agency and fixation hypotheses make the same prediction.  However, (i) we do not expect over-valued 
firms to make over-investments under the fixation hypothesis, and (ii) we would expect managers of both 
over- and under-valued firms to engage in insider trading to exploit the misevaluation under the fixation 
hypothesis.  Thus, (i) some of the predictions of the agency and fixation hypotheses differ, and (ii) when 
they are similar, the predicted behavior under the fixation hypothesis requires an agency relationship to 
influence management’s behavior much like that under the agency hypothesis.    
3.3. Data and Sample Selection 
3.3.1. Sample Selection 
We analyze all firms with available data on Compustat and CRSP files excluding closed-end funds, 
investment trusts and foreign companies.  Our initial sample contains 42 years of financial data beginning 
in 1963 and ending in 2004.  Due to the difficulties involved in interpreting accruals for financial firms, 
consistent with the literature in this area, we drop companies with SIC codes from 6000 to 6999.  These 
procedures yield 157,456 firm-year observations with non-missing total accruals data and 156,000 firm-
year observations with discretionary accruals data, where discretionary accruals are estimated using the 
within-industry cross-sectional modified-Jones model.  We do not require firms in our sample to survive 
through the period of our analysis. We include all valid firm-year observations irrespective of their fiscal-
year-end, though some tests in our analysis require December year-end firms (e.g., buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns). In each sub-section we specify the additional sample restrictions we impose.     
For the purpose of our analysis, each year we divide the sample of firms into decile portfolios based 
on the magnitude of either total accruals or discretionary accruals.  We do not restrict our analysis only to 
discretionary accruals because (i) naïve fixation as a behavioral theory underlying the accrual anomaly is 
not specified in a particular measure of discretionary accruals, but likely to be in total accruals as distinct 
from cash flows; and (ii) discretionary accruals as a measure of managed earnings are well-known to 
contain estimation error, which might induce a bias and/or reduce the power of our tests.  Hence, we also  
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use total accrual portfolios.  The results are qualitatively similar using the two different measures.  For any 
given measure, the assignment of firm-years to the accrual deciles remains constant throughout the analysis 
to insure comparability of results across different sets of tests even though some tests (e.g., insider trading 
behavior) impose additional filters on our primary sample.   
3.3.2. Total and Discretionary Accruals Variables 
We use the balance-sheet method to compute total accruals.   Collins and Hribar (2002) show that 
total accruals measured from the balance-sheet data contain a measurement error while those measured 
directly from the statement of cash-flows are more accurate. To account for the error, we also implement 
our empirical tests using the total accruals estimated via statement of cash flows for the sample of financial 
statements after 1987.  The results are qualitatively the same.  The total accruals (TAj,t) for a firm  j  in year 
t  are computed as follows:  
t j t j t j t j t j t j t j Dep TP STDebt CL Cash CA TA , , , , , , , ) ( ) ( − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ =    (1) 
where ∆CAj,t is change in current assets (Compustat item #4), 
∆Cashj,t is change in cash/cash equivalents (Compustat item #1), 
∆CLj,t is change in current liabilities (Compustat item #5), 
∆STDj,t is change in debt included in current liabilities (Compustat item #34), 
∆TPj,t is change in income taxes payable (Compustat item #71), and 
Depj,t is depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat item #14). 
For comparability across sample firms, the dollar amount of total accruals is deflated by the 
beginning of the year total assets (Compustat item #6). 
Further, we use cross-sectional modified-Jones model to separate discretionary and non-
discretionary accrual components (Jones, 1991, and Dechow et al., 1995). We estimate the following cross-
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where ∆Revj,t is change in sales revenues (Compustat item #12), 
∆ARj,t is change in accounts receivable (Compustat item #2), and 
PPEj,t is gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat item #7). 
We denote the predicted values of the modified-Jones model as non-discretionary accruals 
( t j NDA , ) and the residuals as discretionary accruals ( t j DA , ).
40 
3.3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for several variables of interest.  Panel A presents the analysis 
by total accrual decile portfolio and Panel B by discretionary accrual decile portfolio.  All variables are 
                                                   
40 The modified-Jones model likely yields biased estimates of discretionary accruals for firms experiencing extreme 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































measured contemporaneously with accruals. We find the characteristics of firms in our sample to be similar 
to those reported in earlier studies. First, we find that firms with extreme accruals, those in the lowest and 
highest accrual deciles, are smaller than the firms in the middle accrual deciles.  Both market capitalization 
and total assets exhibit an inverted U-shaped pattern with respect to the accrual deciles.  Moreover, the 
median size of the lowest accrual decile firms is smaller than that of the highest accrual decile firms, but the 
mean size of the lowest accrual decile firms is larger than the mean size of the highest accrual decile firms.  
Second, firms with extreme income increasing accruals have higher market-to-book ratios than firms with 
income-decreasing accruals.  Third, firm performance, measured by median income before extraordinary 
items as a percentage of total assets, hereafter earnings, is increasing monotonically with accruals.  Median 
earnings increase from -7% for the lowest total accrual decile portfolio to 7.5% for the highest total accrual 
decile portfolio.  Finally, leverage of extreme accrual decile firms is lower than that of firms in the middle 
of the accrual distribution. 
3.4. Empirical Tests and Results 
In this section we present the results of our empirical tests that are designed to distinguish between 
the agency and fixation hypotheses.  We analyze the pattern of abnormal stock performance, analysts’ 
earnings growth forecasts, insider trading behavior, and firms’ investment-financing decisions in event time 
period centered on the year in which we form accrual decile portfolios, year 0.  We then describe results of 
the Mishkin market efficiency tests separately for firms with income-increasing and income-decreasing 
accruals.  Finally, we perform quantile regression tests of the relation between accruals and returns. 
3.4.1. Abnormal Stock Returns 
We begin by analyzing abnormal stock return performance in the year of, years prior to, and years 
following the accrual measurement year using two methodologies. First, we compare the size and book-to-
market adjusted annual buy-and-hold returns computed by following the procedure outlined in Barber, 
Lyon, and Tsai (1999).  Second, we estimate annualized alphas from Fama-French three factor model based 
on the calendar-time monthly accrual portfolio returns.  In each case we use CRSP monthly stock returns 
adjusted to include delisting returns using the method detailed in Beaver, McNichols, and Price (2005). 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
This sub-section summarizes results using size and book-to-market adjusted abnormal buy-and-
hold returns.  The benchmark portfolio returns are constructed as follows.  Each year we compute end of 
April capitalization quintile cutoffs for the sample of NYSE firms.  Based on these cutoff points we assign 
all of the sample firms to size quintile portfolios.  Since the lowest size quintile contains roughly half of 
firm-year observations, we further divide this quintile into five additional portfolios.  Each of the resulting 
nine size portfolios is then divided into quintile portfolios based on book-to-market ratio, where book value 
is taken as of previous fiscal year end and market value is as of the end of the following April.  This  
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procedure yields 45 benchmark portfolios.  Annual abnormal return for each firm-year is computed as one-
year buy-and-hold return (12-month return starting May 1) less average annual return of the corresponding 
size and book-to-market portfolio.  The start date of May 1 for calculating annual return ensures that the 
market has information about the prior year’s financial performance.  For consistency between benchmark 
returns and individual firm returns we limit our sample to December fiscal-year-end firms. 
Table 2 presents time-series means and Fama-MacBeth t-statistics for annual abnormal buy-and-
hold returns.  Average abnormal returns for each accrual decile portfolio are calculated for nine annual 
periods from event-year -4 to year +4, where event-year 0 is the accrual measurement year.  Panel A 
presents the results for total accrual portfolios while Panel B presents the results for discretionary accrual 
portfolios.  We illustrate the results graphically in Figures 1a and 1c, where we graph annual buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns for the 1
st, 5
th, and 10
th accrual decile portfolios. 
Firms with the highest income increasing accruals (both discretionary and total) experience 
significant abnormal price run-up prior to the accrual measurement year, i.e., year 0, and underperform 
subsequently.  In case of total accruals, the highest accrual decile portfolio experiences 29.43% abnormal 
return in year -1, which is followed by -7.63% abnormal return (reversal) in year +1.  Similarly, the highest 
discretionary accrual decile portfolio earns 18.3% abnormal return in year -1, which is followed by -8.3% 
of underperformance in year +1.  Superior performance prior to firms recording high accruals, i.e., high 
earnings growth, is consistent with the market anticipating strong earnings performance, i.e., returns leading 
earnings (e.g., Beaver et al. 1980, and Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn, 1987).
41  However, the evidence is 
also consistent with the agency hypothesis that a portion of the price run-up is overvaluation and that the 
overvalued firms engage in accrual management, and experience market correction in years +1 and beyond.  
This latter evidence of return reversal suggests that the prior price run up was not due entirely to rational 
anticipation of future earnings, i.e., prices leading earnings, but due in part to overvaluation.   
The performance behavior of the lowest accrual portfolio in the years subsequent to and prior to 
year 0 lends further credence to the agency hypothesis and helps us in discriminating between the fixation 
and agency hypotheses.  Specifically, consistent with prior research, the lowest accrual decile portfolio’s 
performance in years +1 and beyond is not significantly positive.  In fact, the point estimates of average 
abnormal return for the lowest accrual decile portfolio are insignificantly negative.  Turning to the 
performance in years prior to 0, the lowest accrual decile portfolio experiences considerably smaller 
magnitude of negative abnormal performance compared to the highest accrual-decile portfolio.  Panel A of 
Table 1 shows that, in year -1, the lowest accrual decile portfolio’s abnormal return is -11.8% compared to 
29.4% for the highest decile accrual portfolio.  Corresponding numbers when portfolios are formed on the 
basis of discretionary accruals in Panel B are -5.3% and 18.33%, which again reveals the large disparity in 
performance in prior years.   
                                                   
41 Consistent with the earnings anticipation explanation for the price run-up, we do not observe high levels of accruals 
in years -4 to -1 for the highest accrual decile portfolio.  Thus, past price run up for the high accrual stocks is not due 
to extraordinary past accounting performance.  The accrual behavior in years -4 to -1 is also not unusual for the lowest 
accrual decile firms.    
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T a b l e  2 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
This table presents time-series means, with associated Fama-MacBeth t-statistics, for annual abnormal returns on 10 
accrual portfolios. The accrual portfolios are constructed in year zero, and abnormal returns are computed as follows. 
Each year we use end of April market capitalization to allocate all companies in our sample into size quintiles based 
on cutoffs computed for NYSE sub-sample. We further allocate lowest size quintile firms into another 5 quintiles. 
Subsequently each of the resulting nine size portfolios is allocated into quintiles based on book-to-market ratio, which 
results in 45 benchmark portfolios in total. The book value is measured as of December of the previous (fiscal) year. 
The annual abnormal return for each stock is computed as one-year buy-and-hold return (12 month return starting in 
April) less average annual return of the corresponding size – book-to-market portfolio. Panel A presents the results for 
total accruals portfolios. Total accruals are computed using the balance sheet method. Panel B presents results for 
discretionary accruals portfolios. Discretionary accruals are estimated using the within industry, cross-sectional 
modified Jones model. ***, **, and * indicate significance of the t-statistics for the tests of difference in means at 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively. The sample contains all firm-years from 1963 to 2004. To be included in the 
sample, a firm-year should contain sufficient information in Compustat to calculate of the presented characteristics 
and be present in the CRSP Monthly Returns file. 
 
Year With Respect to Accrual Measurement  Accrual 
Decile  -4  -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Panel A: Case of Total Accruals 
Lowest  0.49 -2.35 -7.02 -11.82 -7.22 -1.92 -1.29 -0.83 0.57 
2  -0.29  -1.02 -5.24 -8.74 -3.23 1.17 -1.11  -0.50  -1.93 
3  1.87 -0.92 -3.42 -5.91 -1.20 -0.43 0.33 -0.72 -0.03 
4  0.49 -0.94 -2.60 -4.87 -0.95 0.14 0.28 -0.98  -1.57 
5  -0.69 0.28 -0.92 -3.09 -1.61 0.57 -1.15 0.25 -0.81 
6  1.02  1.29  0.54  -2.03  -1.71 -0.19 -0.53 -0.97 -0.96 
7  1.33  1.12  1.06  -0.28  -1.60 -1.22 -1.24 -1.57 -2.40 
8  3.33  3.19  5.05  2.86  -2.40 -1.69 -0.20 -0.71 -1.12 
9  4.46  3.38  9.74  10.23  0.28  -4.07 -2.40 -2.09 -0.98 
Highest  0.41  7.48  14.83 29.43  5.45  -7.63 -5.53 -3.34 -0.84 
              
10th - 1st  -0.08  9.82***  21.84***  41.25***  12.66***  -5.70***  -4.23**  -2.50  -1.41 
1st - 5th  1.17  -2.63  -6.09  -8.72  -5.61  -2.48  -0.14  -1.07  1.37 
10th - 5th  1.09  7.19***  15.74***  32.52***  7.05***  -8.19***  -4.37***  -3.58**  -0.03 
 
Panel B: Case of Discretionary Accruals 
Lowest  -0.38  -1.20 -2.10 -5.29 -2.19 0.21 -2.18  -1.91  -2.06 
2  -0.47  -0.23 -4.36 -6.53 -0.96 0.11 -0.96  -0.30  -0.54 
3  2.49 1.11 -2.22 -4.28 -1.32 0.16 0.24 0.25 -1.56 
4  2.72 0.42 -1.14 -3.53 -0.02 0.07 -0.13  -1.57  -1.01 
5  1.25 1.76 -1.27 -1.39 -0.95 0.41 -0.09  -0.33 0.07 
6  1.52 -0.76 -0.29 -1.34 -2.66 -0.20 1.50 -0.38 -1.29 
7  -0.04 1.02  0.63  -1.32  -1.77 -1.48 -0.75 -0.30 -1.64 
8  0.67  1.62  2.39  -0.49  -2.28 -1.79 -2.96 -0.87 -0.17 
9  2.77  1.16  5.63  2.78  -2.46 -2.39 -2.85 -1.77 -2.86 
Highest  -1.22  3.46 9.57 18.33 0.33 -8.36  -4.91  -3.97  0.13 
              
10th - 1st  -0.84  4.65**  11.67***  23.63***  2.51  -8.57***  -2.73  -2.07  2.20 
1st  -  5th  -1.63 -2.96 -0.83  -3.90  -1.24 -0.20 -2.09 -1.57 -2.14 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As a test of asymmetry in the performance of the highest and lowest accrual decile portfolios in 
prior years, we compare their performance against that of accrual decile portfolio 5.  Portfolio 1’s, i.e., the 
lowest accrual decile portfolio’s performance is statistically indistinguishable from that of portfolio 5 in 
years -1 and -2, whereas portfolio 10 statistically outperforms portfolio 5 in years -1 and -2.  The 
considerable asymmetry in abnormal returns across the highest and lowest accrual decile portfolios coupled 
with the absence of significantly positive subsequent abnormal return for the portfolio of income decreasing 
accruals is inconsistent with the fixation hypothesis but supports the agency hypothesis. 
Annualized Alphas from Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
Below we repeat the abnormal return analysis using annualized alphas as a measure of the accrual 
decile portfolios’ abnormal return performance. We estimate the Fama-French three factor model using 
calendar-time monthly portfolio returns.  Intercepts from these regressions for each of the 10 accrual 
portfolios are estimates of abnormal performance.  We estimate the regression over five different event-
time horizons: event years -3 to -1, year -1, year zero, year +1, years +1 to +3.  As before, the return 
measurement period is four months after the fiscal year end for each firm included in the analysis.  To 
estimate abnormal performance, i.e., alphas, we regress monthly equal-weighted accrual portfolio returns 
on the three Fama-French factors, namely market, size, and book-to-market.  Similar to Table 2, Panel A of 
Table 3 reports results for the total accrual portfolios and Panel B for the discretionary accrual portfolios.  
Figures 1b and 1d present the results graphically.   
The tenor of the results based on alphas as a measure of abnormal performance is similar to that 
based on buy-and-hold abnormal returns.  The highest accrual-decile portfolio earns significantly positive 
abnormal returns prior to year zero and significantly negative abnormal returns beyond year zero.  Prior to 
year 0, the annualized value of estimated alpha for the highest total-accrual-decile portfolio is 25.58% for 
year -1 and 17.82% when averaged over years -3 to   -1.  In contrast, the estimated alphas for the lowest 
accrual decile firms are negative prior to year 0, but they are remarkably smaller in magnitude when 
compared to alphas of the highest accrual decile firms.  Specifically, in Panel A, the abnormal alpha is -
3.92% for the lowest decile versus 17.82% for the highest decile using total accrual portfolios, and, in Panel 
B, it is -0.06% versus 12.88% using discretionary accrual portfolios. 
The asymmetry in the performance of the highest and lowest accrual decile portfolios is also 
observed in year +1 and beyond.  In Panel A, the estimated annualized alphas for the highest total accrual 
portfolio are -8.12% for year +1, and -5.36% when averaged over years +1 to +3.  In contrast, the lowest 
accrual decile portfolio’s year +1 or year +1 to +3 alphas are statistically and economically insignificant.  
Furthermore, while the highest accrual decile portfolio alphas are significantly different from those of the 
5
th accrual decile portfolio, the lowest decile portfolio’s alphas are not.  The above conclusions are also 
applicable to the results using discretionary accruals as reported in Panel B of Table 3.  
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T a b l e  3 
Annualized Alphas from Fama-French Three Factor Model 
This table presents annualized Jensen’s alphas for 10 accrual portfolios and for different holding horizons. The accrual 
portfolios are constructed in Year t. The alphas are estimated from calendar time regressions based on Fama-French’s 
three-factor model using monthly returns: () ptf t m tf t t t t R R R R s SMB h HML αβ ε −= + − + ⋅ + ⋅ + , where Rpt  is the 
return on the accrual portfolio in month t; Rmt is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index in month t; Rft is the 3-
month T-bill yield in month t; SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms in month t; and HMLt 
is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks in month t. The factor 
definitions are described in Fama and French (1993). The accrual portfolios are constructed in the following way. For 
companies in each accrual decile in year t, we include monthly returns earned over five different horizons (around year 
zero): Years -3 to -1, Year -1, Year zero, Year 1, Years 1 to 3. Monthly returns are included starting from 4 months 
after the beginning and 4 months after the end of each horizon. Panel A presents results for total accruals portfolios. 
Total accruals are computed using balance sheet data. Panel B presents results for discretionary accruals portfolios. 
Discretionary accruals are estimated using the within industry, cross-sectional modified Jones model. The sample 
contains all firm-years from 1963 to 2004. To be included in the sample, a firm-year should contain sufficient 
information in Compustat to calculate of the presented characteristics and be present in the CRSP Monthly Returns 
file.  T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance of the t-statistics for the tests of 
difference in means at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
 
Panel A: Case of Total Accruals 
Accrual 
Decile  Years -3 to -1  Year -1  Year 0  Year 1  Years 1 to 3 
  Alpha  T-Stat Alpha  T-Stat  Alpha  T-Stat  Alpha  T-Stat  Alpha  T-Stat 
Lowest  -3.92 (1.97)**  -8.03 (3.70)***  -3.94  (1.74)*  2.11  (0.98)  1.64 (0.87) 
2  -2.79 (2.29)**  -6.12 (4.41)*** 0.12 (0.08)  3.80  (2.76)***  3.45 (2.82)*** 
3  -1.65 (1.66)*  -4.09 (3.60)*** 1.66 (1.37)  4.57  (4.24)***  3.98 (4.14)*** 
4  -1.14 (1.37)  -2.73 (2.88)*** 0.46 (0.47)  2.77  (3.05)***  2.23 (2.85)*** 
5  -0.39 (0.51)  -2.35 (2.74)*** 0.36 (0.39)  1.57  (1.83)*  1.78 (2.37)** 
6  0.82 (1.09)  -0.27 (0.32)  1.03  (1.13)  2.25 (2.23)**  1.99 (2.52)** 
7  3.00 (3.50)***  2.17 (2.32)** -0.15  (0.17)  1.83 (2.02)**  1.65 (1.99)** 
8  5.08 (6.04)***  4.96 (5.23)***  0.91  (0.99)  0.22 (0.24)  1.19 (1.34) 
9  8.59  (8.21)***  10.74 (9.90)*** 1.50 (1.44)  -2.13  (1.80)*  -0.87 (0.77) 
Highest  17.82 (12.29)*** 25.58 (17.06)***  4.88 (3.62)***  -8.12  (5.18)***  -5.36 (3.51)*** 
                  
10th - 1st  21.73  (8.82)***  33.61  (12.75)***  8.82  (3.35)*** -10.24  (3.84)***  -7.00  (2.89)*** 
1st - 5th  -3.52  (1.65)*  -5.69  (2.44)**  -4.30  (1.76)* 0.54  (0.23)  -0.14  (0.07) 
10th - 5th  18.21  (11.11)***  27.93  (16.17)***  4.51  (2.74)*** -9.69  (5.42)***  -7.14  (4.20)*** 
 
Panel B: Case of Discretionary Accruals 
Accrual 
Decile  Years -3 to -1  Year -1  Year 0  Year 1  Years 1 to 3 
 Alpha  T-Stat  Alpha  T-Stat Alpha  T-Stat Alpha  T-Stat  Alpha  T-Stat 
Lowest  -0.06 (0.04)  -1.40 (0.73)  0.94 (0.45)  1.30  (0.65)  1.12 (0.63) 
2  -1.04 (0.80)  -3.10 (2.13)**  2.49 (1.63)  4.35  (2.90)***  3.74 (2.90)*** 
3  -0.34 (0.33)  -1.82 (1.56)  1.34 (1.17)  3.53  (3.19)***  2.82 (2.73)*** 
4  0.33 (0.39)  -1.42 (1.55)  0.69  (0.64)  2.08 (2.09)**  2.09 (2.25)** 
5  0.48 (0.62)  -0.71 (0.80)  0.64  (0.66)  3.07 (3.54)***  2.43 (3.11)*** 
6  0.88 (1.29)  0.14 (0.17)  -0.13  (0.16)  0.70 (0.86)  1.57 (2.09)** 
7  1.49 (2.25)**  0.54 (0.73)  -0.24  (0.30)  0.87 (1.06)  1.26 (1.76)* 
8  2.46 (3.09)***  1.52 (1.74)*  0.40  (0.45)  0.02 (0.02)  0.55 (0.66) 
9  5.21 (5.14)***  5.88 (5.66)***  0.16  (0.16)  -0.35 (0.27)  0.13 (0.13) 
Highest  12.88 (9.02)***  17.04 (11.46)***  1.10 (0.84)  -7.10  (4.58)***  -4.48 (3.02)*** 
                  
10th - 1st  12.94  (5.71)***  18.44  (7.60)***  0.16  (0.06)  -8.40  (3.33)***  -5.60  (2.42)** 
1st - 5th  -0.54  (0.28)  -0.69  (0.32)  0.30  (0.13)  -1.77  (0.82)  -1.31  (0.68) 
10th - 5th  12.40  (7.62)***  17.76  (10.24)***  0.46  (0.28)  -10.17  (5.73)***  -6.91  (4.13)***  
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Accrual Anomaly Conditioning on Prior Return Performance  
Below we examine whether the extent of future return reversal for the accrual decile portfolios 
varies with the firms’ prior stock-price performance.  The fixation hypothesis predicts price reversals as a 
function of accruals regardless of prior stock price performance.
42  In contrast, under the agency hypothesis, 
prior performance as a proxy for misvaluation predicts subsequent reversals, especially for the high-accrual 
portfolios.  To perform the tests, we subdivide accrual decile portfolios each year into quartiles based on the 
annual abnormal buy-and-hold return (calculated by adjusting for size and book-to-market) in year -1.  The 
goal here is to maintain roughly equal accrual performance for the quartile portfolios within each accrual 
decile portfolio, but form the quartiles to segregate firms into portfolios on the basis of prior price 
performance.  In Table 4 we report return performance in year +1 for the quartile portfolios within each of 
the accrual-decile portfolios 1, 5, and 10.
43  We present time-series means and Fama-MacBeth t-statistics 
for the abnormal returns.  Panels A and B of Table 4 present results for total and discretionary accrual-
decile portfolios.   
Table 4 shows that return reversals in Panels A and B both are predominantly observed for the 
extreme prior return quartiles Q4 and Q3 and that too prominently only within the highest accrual decile 
portfolio.  Specifically, in Panel A, the highest return quartile Q4 within accrual decile portfolio 10 earns an 
average annual abnormal return of -10.57% compared to -3.99% for Q4 within the lowest accrual decile 
portfolio.  The Q4 portfolio within the lowest accrual decile portfolio earns negative, not positive, abnormal 
returns in year +1.  This is inconsistent with low accrual firms earning positive abnormal returns according 
to the accrual anomaly.  Average abnormal returns of the Q3 portfolios within accrual deciles 1 and 10 are 
consistent with return reversals, but the magnitudes are markedly smaller.  Specifically, Q3 portfolios 
within accrual deciles 1 and 10 earn average annual abnormal returns of 2.13%and -3.84.  The abnormal 
return magnitudes for Q1 and Q2 portfolios are small in absolute magnitude, particularly for those within 
the lowest accrual decile portfolio.  These results reveal the asymmetry in return performance of the high 
and low accrual portfolios, which is consistent with the agency, but not the fixation, hypothesis.  The 
concentration of reversals in the extreme high prior return portfolio, particularly, conditioning on high 
accruals, is also consistent with the agency, not fixation, explanation for the accrual anomaly.   
As further evidence of the asymmetry, we compare abnormal returns of quartile portfolios within 
deciles 1 and 10 with those of the quartile portfolios within the 5
th decile.  The fifth decile portfolio is used 
as the benchmark to assess whether performance of the portfolios within decile 1 and 10 is asymmetric as 
predicted under the agency hypothesis.  The results in Panels A and B both reveal that only the performance   
                                                   
42 To the extent past returns predict future return reversals, the year +1 performance of the portfolios is influenced by 
not only investor fixation on accruals or the agency hypothesis, but also by predictability of returns as a function of 
past price performance.  This concern, however, is muted by the fact that we form quartile portfolios on price 
performance in year -1, whereas the future return performance is for year +1.  Thus, we skip year 0 in which most of 
the effects of predictability based on past price performance are expected to be observed.   
 
43 In this subsection we only include December fiscal year-end firms.  This is similar to the previous analysis using 
buy-and-hold returns in section 4.1.1.    
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T a b l e  4 
Magnitude of the Accrual Anomaly and Prior Overvaluation 
This table presents time-series means and Fama-MacBeth t-statistics for the average annual abnormal stock return in 
year +1 for accrual portfolios constructed in year 0.  The abnormal returns are size and book-to-market adjusted as 
described in Table 2.  Within each decile accrual portfolio, we assign sample companies to quartile portfolios based on 
their abnormal return in year -1, i.e., they year prior to the accrual measurement year.  We report abnormal returns for 
each quartile portfolio within selected accrual-decile portfolios.  The sample contains all firm-years from 1963 to 
2004. To be included in the sample, a firm-year should contain sufficient information in Compustat to calculate of the 
presented characteristics and be present in the CRSP Monthly Returns file.   
Panel A presents the results for total accruals portfolios. Total accruals are computed using the balance sheet method.  
Panel B presents results for discretionary accrual portfolios.  Discretionary accruals are estimated using the within 
industry, cross-sectional modified Jones model. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance of the t-statistics for the tests of difference in means at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns in Year +1 for Total Accruals Portfolios (%) 
For quartile portfolios formed on the basis of abnormal return in year -1  
Accrual Decile  Q1 Q2  Q3  Q4 
1 0.48  -0.25  2.13  -3.99 
  (0.20) (0.10)  (0.74)  (1.49) 
5 2.34  -1.21  0.54 0.34 
 (1.30)  (1.11)  (0.49)  (0.18) 
10 -1.54  -1.14 -3.84  -10.57 
 (0.43)  (0.33)  (1.41)  (6.34) 
       
10th-1st -2.02  -0.89  -5.97  -6.58** 
 (0.47)  (0.21)  (1.51)  (2.08) 
1st-5th -1.86  0.96  1.59  -4.33 
 (0.61)  (0.36)  (0.52)  (1.32) 
10th-5th -3.88  0.07  -4.38 -10.91*** 
 (0.97)  (0.02)  (1.49)  (4.34) 
 
Panel B: Abnormal Returns in Year +1 for Discretionary Accruals Portfolios (%) 
For quartile portfolios formed on the basis of abnormal return in year -1  
Accrual Decile  Q1  Q2  Q1  Q4 
1 2.70  2.11 2.10  -4.92 
 (0.80)  (0.56)  (0.69)  (1.57) 
5 -0.27  1.64 2.09 -2.27 
 (-0.13)  (1.32)  (1.53)  (1.38) 
10 -2.94  -6.19 -3.98  -11.68 
 (0.86)  (2.97)  (1.47)  (7.19) 
        
10th-1st  -5.64  -8.30* -6.07 -6.76* 
 (1.18)  (1.92)  (1.49)  (1.91) 
1st-5th 2.97  0.47  0.00  -2.65 
 (0.75)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0.75) 
10th-5th -2.67  -7.83*** -6.07** -9.41*** 
 (0.66)  (3.25)  (2.00)  (4.07)  
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of the Q4 portfolio within decile 10 is significantly different from that of Q4 within decile 5.  Once again, 
the asymmetry and concentration of abnormal performance in Q4 are consistent with the agency 
hypothesis, and inconsistent with the fixation hypothesis. 
3.4.2. Analyst Optimism 
The second prediction under the agency hypothesis is about analyst optimism across the accrual 
decile portfolios.  In the interest of brevity, we only report results using total accruals.  However, the 
evidence based on discretionary accruals is similar.   
We analyze analysts’ forecasts of long-term earnings growth (LTG) each year over a 9-year 
window centered on the accrual measurement year (year 0).  LTG forecast error is a measure of analyst 
optimism, measured as the realized long-term earnings growth rate minus the forecasted long-term earnings 
growth rate.  Unbiased estimates of this measure are difficult to calculate (see Kothari, 2000).   
Acknowledging that growth forecast errors are likely to be upward biased as a function of firm size and 
earnings volatility, we adjust them by subtracting the average forecast error for the companies in the same 
beginning-of-the-year market capitalization decile.  Following Dechow and Sloan (1997) and Dechow, 
Hutton, and Sloan (2000), the realized earnings growth is computed as the slope coefficient of an ordinary 
least squares regression of the natural logarithm of annual earnings per share on a constant and a time trend 
over 5-year moving window (e.g., from the beginning of year 0 to the end of year 5) using a maximum of 6 
annual observations.  This estimation procedure restricts the sample of firms to those with at least three 
non-missing earnings per share observations within this 5-year moving window.  Negative earnings per 
share observations are excluded because growth rates with negative earnings denominator are not 
interpretable.  The forecasted long-term earnings growth rate is taken from IBES summary file as of the 
beginning of each fiscal year (specifically within 4th month after prior fiscal year end).  We also leave out 
outliers by trimming 1% of observations at both tails of the distribution.
44  Since IBES data is sparse before 
1980, we restrict our analysis to the period from 1980 to 2004.   
Table 5 and figure 2 present the results of LTG forecast error analysis.  Panels A and B report 
annual average and median size-adjusted LTG forecast errors for 10 total accrual portfolios.  The results 
show that around the year of accrual measurement (i.e., in the beginning of years -1 through 1) analysts 
significantly overestimate long-term growth for the highest accrual decile firms compared to the firms in 
deciles 1 and 5.  In year 0, decile 10 firms enjoy 8.15% (8.06%) positive mean (median) analysts’ growth 
forecasts errors.  These errors are significantly different from the errors of firms in 1
st and 5
th accrual 
deciles.  Analysts’ over-optimism regarding prospects of the highest accrual decile firms is noticeable in 
years -1 and -2, peaks in year 0, and is virtually unobservable from the beginning of year +2 onwards.   
The asymmetry in analyst optimism becomes apparent when we compare the errors for the tenth 
decile against the lowest accrual decile.  Both mean and median size-adjusted forecast errors of portfolio 1  
                                                   
44 The annual means of forecast errors are sensitive to the inclusion of outliers, but the results remain qualitatively 
similar if outliers are not deleted.    
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T a b l e  5 
Long-Term Earnings Growth: Analysts’ Forecast Errors 
This table presents the analysis of the relation between total accruals and analysts’ long-term earnings growth forecast 
errors (LTG forecast error). LTG forecast error is computed as a difference between forecasted by analysts and 
realized long-term earnings growth rates. Subsequently LTG forecast errors are size adjusted by subtracting the 
average LTG forecast error of companies in the same year and size decile portfolio. Panels A and B present the time-
series means of the annual size-adjusted mean and median LTG forecast errors respectively, conditional on year 0 
accrual decile.  Analysts’ forecasts of long term growth rate are from the IBES summary file as of the beginning of 
each fiscal year (specifically within 4th month after prior fiscal year end). Following Dechow and Sloan (1997) and 
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000), we compute realized long-term growth rate from the slope coefficient of the OLS 
regression of natural log of realized EPS on a constant and the time trend over 5-year moving window (using 
maximum of 6 annual observations). This estimation procedure restricts the sample of firms to those with at least three 
non-missing and positive earnings per share observations within the 5-year moving window. Furthermore, since IBES 
data is sparse before 1980 we restrict our analysis to the period from 1980 to 2004. To reduce the influence of outliers 
1% of observations is left out from each tail of the distribution before any statistics are computed. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance of the t-statistics for the tests of difference in means at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
 
Panel A: Mean Size-adjusted LTG Forecast Error (%)  Accrual  
Decile  Year With Respect to Accrual Measurement 
  -4  -3  -2 -1  0  1 2 3 4 
Lowest 1.32  0.47 -1.03 -2.54  -2.13  0.68 -0.58 0.10 0.00 
2  2.35  0.60  -1.86 -2.59  -2.61 -0.69  -0.12 1.20 0.92 
3  0.10  -0.87 -1.83  -1.66  -2.54  -1.58 -1.78 -2.60 -1.90 
4  -0.80  -1.60 -2.04  -2.46  -2.34  -1.70 -1.03 -0.98 -1.37 
5  -1.55  -1.46 -1.06  -1.37  -1.89  -1.90 -1.82 -1.99 -1.34 
6  -2.28  -1.65 -1.44  -1.31  -1.03  -1.20 -0.99 -1.19 -1.66 
7  -0.94  0.22 0.52  1.17  1.04  0.15 -0.40 -0.21 -0.88 
8  -0.37  0.16 1.75  3.03  3.01  2.02 1.63 0.49 -0.12 
9  -1.12  1.54 3.44  5.41  5.47  2.86 1.83 1.32 1.40 
Highest  -1.80  1.49 2.70  7.63  8.15  5.38 1.25 2.38 1.84 
10th - 1st  -3.12  1.02  3.73**  10.17***  10.28***  4.71***  1.83  2.28  1.85 
1st - 5th  -2.86  -1.92  -0.03  1.17  0.24  -2.57*  -1.24  -2.09  -1.34 
10th - 5th  -0.25  2.95**  3.75***  9.00***  10.04***  7.28***  3.07**  4.37***  3.19*** 
Panel B: Median Size-adjusted LTG Forecast Error (%) 
Lowest 2.18  2.54 0.12  -0.61  -0.91  2.34 0.24 -0.66 0.47 
2  3.33  2.15  -0.08 -0.40  -0.91 0.78 1.41 1.91 1.43 
3  1.32  -0.21 -0.92  -1.17  -0.84  -0.62 -0.71 -1.08 -1.51 
4  0.05  -0.48 -0.82  -1.63  -1.15  -1.06 -0.25 -0.33 -0.86 
5  -0.26  -0.47 -0.61  -0.51  -0.73  -0.97 -1.57 -1.54 -1.30 
6  -1.46  -1.09 -0.87  -0.74  -0.62  -0.47 -0.44 -0.38 -1.11 
7  0.14  0.65 0.69  1.50  1.24  0.59 0.78 0.55 0.10 
8  0.13  1.16 2.26  2.52  3.35  2.37 2.07 1.28 1.12 
9  -0.23  2.17 4.40  5.57  4.82  3.95 3.17 2.46 1.81 
Highest  2.78  2.64 5.57  7.91  8.06  7.10 2.06 4.08 3.54 
10th - 1st  0.59  0.10  5.45***  8.52***  8.97***  4.75**  1.82  4.74***  3.08 
1st - 5th  -2.44  -3.01**  -0.73  0.10  0.18  -3.31**  -1.81  -0.88  -1.77 
10th - 5th  3.04**  3.11*  6.18***  8.42***  8.79***  8.06***  3.63***  5.63***  4.84***  
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Figure 2 graphs time-series means (Panel A) and medians (Panel B) of analysts’ long-term earnings growth forecast 
errors (LTG forecast error) for firms in 1
st, 5
th, and 10
th total accrual deciles.  The total accruals portfolios are formed 
in the accrual measurement year zero by ranking stocks according to total accruals calculated using the balance sheet 
method.  LTG forecast error is computed as the difference between LTG forecasted by analysts and realized long-term 
earnings growth.  The LTG forecast errors are size adjusted by subtracting the average LTG forecast error of 
companies in the same year and size decile portfolio.  The sample contains firm-years from 1980 to 2004.  
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do not appear noticeably different from portfolios 2 through 5 or to its own forecast errors in the prior or 
future years. In addition they are statistically indistinguishable from the forecast errors for the 5
th accrual 
decile.  Thus, the forecast errors also exhibit an asymmetry as predicted under the agency hypothesis. 
The earlier evidence of a substantial price run-up experienced by the highest accrual decile 
portfolio coupled with the evidence of significant analyst optimism for the highest decile portfolio is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the high accrual decile portfolios are overvalued and exhibit accrual 
behavior as predicted under the agency hypothesis.  Overall, the evidence of asymmetry in analyst 
optimism and earlier evidence of asymmetry in the return behavior with respect to the accrual decile 
portfolios support the agency hypothesis.   
3.4.3. Insider Trading Behavior 
The agency hypothesis implies differences in the insider trading behavior for the firms in different 
accrual deciles.  The data for the insider-trading analysis comes from Thomson Financial Insider Filing 
Form 4 that provides all common and ordinary shares transactions of insiders (purchases and sales only).  
Our definition of insiders includes CEO, COO, CFO, president, and chairman of the board.  For firms in 
each accrual-decile, we analyze insiders’ equity transactions over 9 years from year -4 to year 4, where year 
0 is the year of accrual measurement.  For each year we include transactions occurring during the fiscal 
year.  Consistent with the earlier literature (see, e.g., Lakonishok and Lee,  2001), we exclude small 
transactions defined as those with the number of shares traded less than 100.  Due to the unavailability of 
the Thomson Financial Insider Filing Data prior to 1986, the analysis in this subsection covers activities 
from 1986 to 2004.
45  
Table  6 presents evidence on three measures of insider trading.  Figure 3 presents the results 
graphically comparing insider trading across 1
st, 5
th, and 10
th accrual-decile portfolios. Panel A presents the 
average net purchase ratio calculated according to Lakonishok and Lee (2001) as the number of shares 
purchased minus the number of shares sold, divided by the total number of shares traded by the insiders.  
The second measure is the net purchase dollar volume (see Lakonishok and Lee, 2001) calculated as the 
dollar volume of purchases minus the dollar volume of the sale transactions, divided by the total dollar 
volume of all transactions by the insiders (Panel B).  Finally, we use the average net shares traded (see 
Beneish and Vargus, 2002), which is calculated as the number of shares purchased by insiders minus 
number of shares sold by insiders, divided by the total number of shares outstanding (Panel C).  All three 
measures are size adjusted by subtracting the average insider trading characteristic of all the companies 
with the same fiscal year and belonging to the same size decile portfolio.   
Management of firms in the highest accrual decile engage in insider trading behavior consistent 
with firm overvaluation prior to and during the year of accrual measurement, i.e., year 0.  Specifically, the 
insiders are abnormal sellers of their equity in the firm in years -1 and 0, and continue to do so in year +1.  
                                                   
45 The limited number of years for which the data is available also prevents us from presenting Fama-MacBeth 
standard errors in our analysis.  Instead we present means and t-statistics based on pooled sample.  
65 
T a b l e  6 
Insider Trading By Total Accrual Deciles 
This table presents insider trading activity for companies in different total accruals deciles.  Total accruals are 
computed in year t using balance sheet data.  Panel A presents mean net purchase ratio as number of shares purchased 
minus number of shares sold divided by total number of shares traded by the insiders.  Panel B presents mean net 
purchase volume ratio as volume of purchase transactions minus volume of sale transactions divided by total volume 
of shares traded by the insiders.  Panel C presents mean net shares traded as number of shares purchased by the 
insiders minus number of shares sold by the insiders divided by total number of shares outstanding.  All three 
measures are size adjusted by subtracting the average insider trading characteristic of companies in the same year and 
size decile portfolio.  The definition of insiders includes: CEO, COO, President, Chairman of the board, and CFO.  
The insider trading data is the common shares transactions (purchases and sales only) recorded in Form  4 from 
Thomson Financial Insider Filing Data.  We exclude small transactions with number of shares traded less than 100.  
The sample period is 1986-2004. ***, **, and * indicate significance of the t-statistics for the tests of difference in 
means at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
 
Year With Respect to Accrual Measurement  Accrual 
Decile  -4 -3 -2 -1 0  1  2  3  4 
Panel A: Size Adjusted Net Purchase Ratio (%) 
Lowest -0.389 -3.726 -6.806 -1.718 2.848 4.968 -0.804 3.356 0.903
2  -10.367 -7.520 -6.012 -1.701  2.333 -1.250 -1.213 -2.192 -0.845 
3  -4.383 -2.395 -4.215 -1.531  1.974 -1.035 -3.087 -2.334 -3.025 
4  -6.039  -0.974  -1.009 2.443 7.633 6.437 3.700 0.929 5.599 
5  -3.024  -0.117 1.828 9.075 8.649 5.801 3.318 5.349 3.975 
6  1.797 2.471 4.782 3.980 6.698 6.477 4.545 5.050 2.439 
7  -2.425 -2.590  1.091  0.762  2.275 -1.173 -2.206 -1.475 -1.103 
8  -8.741 -6.696 -8.483 -5.031 -2.152 -5.882 -3.261  0.144 -4.918 
9  -8.488 -12.765 -16.412 -17.465 -11.031  -9.406  -8.370  -7.690  -4.842 
Highest  -8.899 -8.168 -8.919  -11.686  -19.374  -15.670 -9.029 -6.944 -4.270 
10th  -  1st  -8.509 -4.442 -2.113 -9.969 -22.223*** -20.638*** -8.225*** -10.300** -5.173** 
1st  -  5th  2.635  -3.609 -8.634 -10.793** -5.801*** -0.833**  -4.122 -1.993 -3.072 
10th - 5th  -5.874  -8.051  -10.747*  -20.761*** -28.024*** -21.471*** -12.347*** -12.294*** -8.245***
Panel B: Size Adjusted Volume Net Purchase Ratio (%) 
Lowest 0.024 -3.352 -6.980 -2.536 2.393 3.738 -1.742 2.534 -0.084
2  -10.318 -7.452 -6.298 -2.429  2.186 -1.279 -1.819 -2.399 -0.177 
3  -5.017 -2.841 -5.187 -1.834  1.738 -1.533 -3.372 -2.262 -3.047 
4  -6.603  -1.208  -0.763 2.260 7.819 5.924 3.554 0.828 5.245 
5  -2.904 0.012 2.159 9.189 8.669 6.270 3.591 5.484 4.464 
6  2.070 2.432 5.019 4.074 6.793 6.723 4.927 4.843 2.622 
7  -2.099 -2.621  0.871  0.534  2.451 -0.983 -2.260 -1.652 -1.119 
8  -8.835 -6.400 -8.415 -4.755 -2.010 -6.428 -3.552 -0.387 -5.648 
9  -8.765 -13.058 -16.340 -17.389 -11.049  -9.946  -9.140  -8.183  -4.439 
Highest  -8.920 -8.913 -9.364  -12.409  -19.221  -16.365 -9.986 -7.758 -4.862 
10th  -  1st  -8.943 -5.562 -2.383 -9.873 -21.614*** -20.103*** -8.243*** -10.291** -4.777** 
1st  -  5th  2.928  -3.364 -9.140 -11.725** -6.276*** -2.532**  -5.334 -2.950 -4.548 
10th - 5th  -6.015  -8.926  -11.523*  -21.598*** -27.890*** -22.635*** -13.577*** -13.241*** -9.326*** 
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Table 6. Continued. 
Panel C: Size Adjusted Net Shares Traded (%) 
Lowest 0.881 -0.585 -0.897 1.599 1.661 2.173 -0.591 -1.124 -1.861
2  -1.842  0.144 -1.184 -1.552  0.021 -0.376  0.831 -0.048 -1.403 
3  -1.544 -1.047 -0.495 -0.375 -1.568 -1.543 -0.018 -0.430 -0.256 
4  -0.522 0.666 2.911 1.096 1.510 2.956 2.928 2.519 2.695 
5  0.693  -1.157 0.583 2.143 1.820 0.952 1.126 2.152 2.974 
6  0.239 2.442 2.265 2.505 2.238 1.648 3.231 3.473 2.761 
7  0.277 0.036 0.845 1.506 2.136 1.234 0.431 1.157 0.861 
8  1.044 0.442  -0.520  -0.468 0.328 0.141 0.580 1.697 0.682 
9  1.394 -0.564 -5.172 -5.363 -2.294 -1.734  0.662  1.638  2.073 
Highest  0.512  0.140 -1.203 -3.736 -5.848 -7.318 -5.789 -2.451 -2.235 
10th - 1st  -0.369  0.725  -0.306  -5.335  -7.508*** -9.491*** -5.198**  -1.327*  -0.374 
1st  -  5th  0.188 0.572 -1.480  -0.544  -0.160  1.222 -1.716  -3.276  -4.835** 
10th - 5th  -0.181  1.297  -1.786  -5.879  -7.668*** -8.270*** -6.915***  -4.603***  -5.209*** 
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Figure 3 graphs the abnormal frequency of insider trading for firms in total accruals deciles 1, 5, and 10. Total 
accruals are calculated in year 0 using the balance sheet method.  Figure 3a graphs the average net purchase ratio, 
Figure 3b the average net purchase volume, and Figure 3c presents the average net shares traded.  All three measures 
are size adjusted (see Table 6 for calculation details).  Insiders include: CEO, CO, President, Chairman of the board, 
and CFO. The insider trading data is the common/ordinary shares transactions (purchases and sales only) recorded in 
Form 4 of Thomson Financial Insider Filing Data.  
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As seen from Figure 3 and Table 6, the selling activity of insiders of decile 10 firms is the highest of all the 
portfolios using all three measures of insider selling.  In year 0, the highest accrual decile firms’ insiders 
sell around 19% more shares (in terms of number of shares and dollar volume) than they buy.  This 
isequivalent to selling, on average, 3.7% of company shares outstanding (see Panel  C), which likely 
represents a substantial fraction of the insiders’ stake in the company.  To assess statistical significance, we 
compare decile 10 insider selling with that of decile 5.  In year 0, all three measures indicate insiders of 
decile 10 firms sell more equity than insiders of decile 5.  In years -1 and -2, the net purchase ratio and the 
net dollar volume of transactions ratio in Panels A and B for decile 10 are significantly greater than those 
measures for decile 5.  The third measure has a negative point estimate, as predicted, but they are not 
statistically significant in years -1 and -2.   
The insiders of the lowest accrual decile firms do not exhibit a consistent buying or selling behavior 
around year 0.  They are net buyers of company stock in year 0, but the magnitude is neither economically 
nor statistically different from the buying behavior of the insiders of decile 5 firms.  In fact, the buying of 
firm equity by the insiders of the firms in decile 1 is generally lower than that of decile 5 insiders.  If low 
accruals were to indicate undervaluation, the insiders of firms with extreme low accruals, i.e., decile 1, 
should be more aggressive in acquiring equity than the insiders of the firms with the average magnitude of 
accruals, i.e., decile 5, which should not be mispriced, on average. 
The insider trading evidence described above is consistent with the agency hypothesis.  The 
asymmetry in the insider behavior across the high and low accrual-decile portfolios is as predicted under 
the agency hypothesis.  Decile 1 insiders’ net selling prior to year 0 also suggests the management of these 
firms were aware of overvaluation and attempt to take advantage of it by unloading their ownership stake in 
the firm.  The fixation hypothesis does not predict such asymmetry.   
3.4.4. Investment-Financing Decisions 
Management might attempt to prolong the overvaluation by making certain investment-financing 
decisions that are not necessarily value-maximizing for the shareholders.  Managers of overvalued firms are 
likely to (i) raise excessive amount of equity cheaply, (ii) use overvalued equity as currency in merger and 
acquisition transactions; and (iii) overinvest in capital assets, i.e., PP&E, and in R&D.   
Table  7 and figure 4 report the investment and financing decisions of the firms in various accrual 
deciles.  In Panel A we report firms’ average external equity issues as a percentage of total assets (Compustat 
data item #108/item #6).  Panel B summarizes the contribution of new equity through mergers and acquisitions, 
as a percentage of total assets (Compustat data item  #129/item  #6).  Finally, Panel  C examines the firms’ 
intensity of investment in capital assets and R&D, which we measure as the growth in the sum of capital assets 
and R&D expenditures (Compustat data item #128 + item #46).  All three investment-financing variables are 
size adjusted by subtracting the average investment-financing amount for the portfolio of companies in the same 
year and size decile portfolio of the sample firms.  The sample contains all CRSP-Compustat firm-years from 
1963 to 2004 for which sufficient data exists to construct considered firm characteristics.  Figure 4 presents our  
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decile portfolios.  
T a b l e  7 
Financing and Investing Decisions of Firms in Total Accrual Deciles 
This table presents time-series means and Fama-McBeth t-statistics for the operating decision of companies in 
different total accruals deciles.  The deciles are formed in the accrual measurement year zero using balance sheet data.  
Panel A presents portfolio means of equity issues as a percentage of total assets (Compustat data item 108/item 6).  
Panel  B presents mean contributions from acquisitions as a percentage of total assets (Compustat data 
item  129/item  6).  Panel  C presents mean growth in capital and R&D expenditures (Compustat data item  128 + 
item  46).  All three measures are size adjusted by subtracting the average operating decision characteristic of 
companies in the same year and size decile portfolio.  The sample contains all firm-years from 1963 to 2004.  To be 
included in the sample, each firm-year observation should contain sufficient Compustat data to calculate the presented 
characteristics and also have data on the CRSP Monthly Returns file. ***, **, and * indicate significance of the t-
statistics for the tests of difference in means at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
 
Year With Respect to Accrual Measurement  Accrual 
Decile  -4  -3  -2  -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Panel A: Equity Issues as Percentage of Total Assets (%) 
Lowest 8.42 9.03 8.06 6.64 7.21 3.66 0.97 -0.03 -1.18
2  3.26  3.16  2.15  1.66 -1.43 -1.80 -2.38 -2.83 -3.25 
3  1.46  1.31  0.75 -0.35 -2.93 -2.31 -2.80 -3.15 -3.71 
4  0.09  1.28  0.67 -0.10 -2.92 -2.97 -3.07 -3.29 -3.78 
5  0.37  0.41  0.62  0.49 -2.75 -2.47 -2.75 -2.76 -3.13 
6  0.47  0.61  0.88  1.22 -2.92 -2.89 -2.60 -3.07 -3.40 
7  1.32  1.12  2.01  1.81 -2.65 -2.69 -2.68 -3.23 -3.61 
8  1.86  2.09  2.65  3.17 -2.12 -2.37 -3.22 -3.66 -3.75 
9  2.67 3.04 3.22 4.73 2.76  -1.71  -2.68  -3.69  -4.00 
Highest  7.98 7.60 8.32 9.14  30.62 1.77  -0.06  -0.95  -1.73 
10th - 1st  -0.435  -1.427  0.258  2.500  23.415*** -1.888** -1.034  -0.915  -0.550 
1st  -  5th  8.046*** 8.623*** 7.449*** 6.155*** 9.959*** 6.130*** 3.722*** 2.731*** 1.945***
10th  -  5th  7.611*** 7.196*** 7.707*** 8.655*** 33.375*** 4.241*** 2.689*** 1.816***  1.394** 
Panel B: Contribution from Acquisition as Percentage of Total Assets (%) 
Lowest 0.09 0.08 0.03 -0.06 0.28 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.08
2  0.01  0.11  0.07 -0.07 -0.30 -0.11 -0.15 -0.19 -0.18 
3  0.06  0.01  0.02 -0.10 -0.55 -0.18 -0.24 -0.15 -0.17 
4  0.17  0.22  0.12  0.06 -0.68 -0.19 -0.24 -0.25 -0.42 
5  0.03  0.07  0.05  0.04 -0.62 -0.18 -0.22 -0.34 -0.28 
6  0.02  0.07  0.00 -0.01 -0.62 -0.27 -0.32 -0.39 -0.42 
7  0.02  0.02  0.13  0.14 -0.36 -0.15 -0.19 -0.32 -0.35 
8  0.00 0.00 0.15 0.21 0.04  -0.10  -0.21  -0.22  -0.28 
9  -0.03  -0.09 0.17 0.29 0.83 0.24 0.03  -0.13  -0.22 
Highest  -0.11  -0.02 0.01 0.41 2.82 0.41 0.02  -0.10  -0.26 
10th - 1st  -0.196*  -0.103  -0.016  0.471*** 2.541*** 0.402*** -0.039  -0.169*  -0.340***
1st - 5th  0.056  0.007  -0.022  -0.103  0.905*** 0.186**  0.283***  0.406***  0.360***
10th - 5th  -0.140  -0.097  -0.038  0.368*** 3.446*** 0.589*** 0.244***  0.237**  0.020 
Panel C: Growth in Capital Expenditures and R&D (%) 
Lowest 8.67 13.04 12.34 2.38 9.55 -1.22 6.21 1.89 -0.70
2  6.93  7.81  3.84 -3.85 -7.20 -6.83 -3.62 -3.50 -4.76 
3  5.53  2.60  0.98 -3.39  -11.18 -5.45 -5.68 -5.77 -5.86 
4  3.01  2.10  1.19 -2.96  -10.63 -5.81 -6.10 -7.06  -10.36 
5  -0.02 -1.10 -0.35 -1.62  -10.74 -4.73 -4.86 -7.80 -6.46 
6  -1.98  0.86 -1.15 -0.12 -9.15 -6.14 -6.56 -5.96 -8.24 
7  3.42  0.65  3.07  3.50 -5.87 -4.34 -7.04 -7.22 -7.73 
8  3.82 3.54 5.36 8.32 2.38  -2.37  -7.13  -6.43  -7.40 
9  4.61 6.16 7.55  13.85  13.93 0.66  -5.33  -6.82  -5.41 
Highest  11.21 12.62 18.38 30.84 61.48 20.03 -3.29 -3.37 -1.10 
10th - 1st  2.539  -0.427  6.040  28.469*** 51.929*** 21.247*** -9.501***  -5.257*  -0.402 
1st - 5th  8.689***  14.143***  12.684*** 3.998  20.290*** 3.516  11.067***  9.691***  5.760** 
10th - 5th  11.228***  13.717***  18.724*** 32.467  72.220*** 24.762  1.567***  4.434***  5.357**  
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accrual deciles. The total accruals portfolios are formed in the accrual measurement year zero, with total accruals 
calculated using the balance sheet method. Figure 4a graphs the firm’s equity issues as a percentage of total assets 
(Compustat data item  108/item  6), Figure 4b the contributions from acquisitions as a percentage of total assets 
(Compustat data item  129/item  6), and Figure 4c the growth in capital expenditures and R&D (Compustat data 
item 128 + item 46).  All three measures are size adjusted.  The sample contains firm-years from 1963 to 2004. 
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Panels A-C of Table 7 demonstrate that firms in decile 10 exhibit very high levels of investment-
financing activity in year 0 and in prior years compared to decile 5.  In Panel A, mean amount of equity 
issued as a percentage of total assets is 30.62% for decile 10 compared to -2.75% for decile 5 in year 0, and 
the difference is highly significant.  While the decile 10’s equity issues are of considerably smaller 
magnitudes in year -4 through -1, they are nonetheless significantly greater than those of the firms in decile 
5.  The lowest accrual decile firm, contrary to the fixation hypothesis, also raises equity in year 0, but the 
magnitude is considerably smaller at 7.21% of its total assets.
46  Overall, the evidence on firms’ equity 
issues reinforces the asymmetric pattern as predicted under the agency hypothesis.   
Besides equity issues, the M&A activity as well as the growth in capital expenditures and R&D 
expenditures for decile 10, but not decile 1, are high in year 0.  The differences between the highest and the 
lowest accrual firms increase in years prior to and peak in year zero, when the highest accrual-decile firms 
have 10 times larger levels of M&A activity, and 6 times higher growth in capital and R&D expenditures 
compared to the lowest accrual decile firms.  This supports the overvaluation hypothesis, but the 
asymmetry in the investment-financing decisions is not predicted under the fixation hypothesis.    
Mishkin Test 
In addition to documenting the predictability of returns using accruals, the literature shows that 
investors overestimate the persistence of the (discretionary) accrual component of earnings.  Such evidence 
is consistent with the fixation hypothesis.  Following the literature, in this sub-section we use the Mishkin 
(1983) test to determine whether the relation between accruals and stock returns is asymmetric, i.e., non-
linear.  Evidence of asymmetry would be inconsistent with the fixation hypothesis.  We apply the 
Mishkin  (1983) framework of testing the rational expectations hypothesis and estimate the following 
system of simultaneous equations: 





1 1 0 1 )  Accruals Total   Flows Cash    Earnings ( Returns   Abnormal
2 0 + + + + − − − + = t t t t t ζ γ γ γ β β  (4) 
Equation (3) is the forecasting equation for predicting one-year-ahead earnings and γ coefficients 
reflect the persistence of the earnings components.  Equation (4) is the valuation equation and γ
* 
coefficients reflect the market persistence beliefs in valuing stocks.  Sloan (1996) and others document that 
market underestimates the persistence of cash flows (
*
1 1 γ γ > ) and overestimates the persistence of accruals 
(
*
2 2 γ γ < ), which contributes to the predictability of returns using accruals.  Under the fixation hypothesis, 
investors are expected to overestimate the persistence of accruals in a similar fashion for income-increasing 
and income-decreasing accrual firms.  That is, fixation should be symmetric.  Hence, we predict 
*
2 2 γ γ −  of 
a similar magnitude across sub-samples under the fixation hypothesis.  In contrast, the agency cost of 
                                                   
46 The surprising positive equity issues for the 1
st decile could be due in part to the low value of assets of the firms 
reporting losses, i.e., low accruals.   
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T a b l e  8 
Mishkin Test of the Market Pricing of Cash Flows and Accruals  
This table presents results of the Mishkin test.  Panel A reports the market pricing of the cash flow and total accrual 
components of earnings.  Panel  B reports the market pricing of the cashflow, discretionary accrual, and non-
discretionary accrual components of earnings.  We present two sets of estimates: (i) the coefficients estimated via the 
iterated non-linear least squares using full sample of firm-years (“Pooled Estimates”); and (ii)  Fama-MacBeth 
coefficients and t-statistics generated from annual estimates of the iterated non-linear least squares.  In addition, we 
implement the Mishkin test for two subsets of the sample.  Based on accruals in year t (total accruals in Panel A and 
discretionary accruals in Panel B) we separate the sample into bottom five accrual decile firm-years (1
st through 5
th 
deciles) and top five accrual decile firm-years (6
th through 10
th deciles).  The sample contains all non-financial firms 
from 1963 to 2004 with data on both CRSP and Compustat in year t and t+1 for which abnormal buy-and-hold returns 
can be calculated.  The t-statistics for the difference in the coefficients are reported in round parentheses and the chi-
square statistics for the difference in the estimated coefficients are reported in square parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance of the test statistics for the difference in estimates at 1, 5, and 10 percent significance levels. 
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γ1  0.746 0.763  0.732    0.761 0.764  0.770 
γ1*  0.613 0.620  0.663    0.677 0.595  0.722 
γ1 - γ1*  0.133 0.143  0.069    0.084 0.169  0.047 
 [38.17]***  [18.35]***  [5.61]**    (1.85)* (3.71)***  (0.69) 
γ2  0.703 0.701  0.713    0.706 0.695  0.709 
γ2*  0.796 0.411  0.899    0.833 0.454  0.698 
γ2 - γ2*  -0.092 0.291  -0.186    -0.127 0.240  0.011 
 [6.34]**  [11.12]***  [13.14]***   (1.03)  (3.33)***  (0.18) 
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γ1  0.746 0.762  0.726    0.760 0.758  0.770 
γ1*  0.612 0.617  0.647    0.636 0.596  0.686 
γ1 - γ1*  0.134 0.145  0.079    0.124 0.163  0.084 
 [38.99]***  [16.33]*** [8.97]***   (3.08)***  (3.42)***  (1.79)* 
γ2  0.709 0.705  0.683    0.710 0.703  0.699 
γ2*  0.837 0.500  0.860    0.692 0.481  0.697 
γ2 - γ2*  -0.128 0.204  -0.177   0.018  0.222  0.002 
 [9.91]***  [4.44]**  [9.80]***    (0.41)  (2.08)**  (0.04) 
γ3  0.685 0.648  0.710    0.688 0.675  0.704 
γ3*  0.668 0.449  0.756    0.617 0.547  0.671 
γ3 - γ3*  0.017 0.199  -0.047    0.071 0.129  0.033 
 [0.07]  [2.81]*  [0.43]   (0.75) (0.92)  (0.37)  
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overvalued equity hypothesis predicts that 
*
2 2 γ γ − would be negative for high accrual firms and zero for 
the low accrual firms.   
We briefly comment on whether potential differences in the persistence of low and high accrual 
firms due to accounting conservatism might generate the observed asymmetry and thus confound with the 
predictions of the agency hypothesis.  Low accrual firms typically report losses.  As reported in table 1, 
mean and median earnings before extraordinary items for the lowest accrual decile firms are negative.  
Because of accounting conservatism, losses often represent a capitalized amount of accruals, including asset 
write-offs and impairments, which are less persistent than gains.  Therefore, naïve investor fixation on 
earnings and over-estimation of persistence are expected to be a more severe problem with low accruals 
than high accruals.
47  Thus, the conservatism phenomenon is likely to bias against finding the hypothesized 
asymmetric relation predicted under the agency hypothesis.    
Table 8 presents results of the Mishkin test for the full sample and two sub-samples of firm-years in 
the top and bottom five deciles of the accrual distribution.  Panel A reports results of the market pricing for 
the cash flow and accrual components of earnings.  Panel  B further decomposes the accruals into 
discretionary and non-discretionary components.  In panel B, we split the full sample into sub-samples at 
the median of the discretionary-accrual distribution.  We report coefficients estimated using the pooled 
sample regressions as well as the Fama-MacBeth coefficient estimates of the non-linear system (3)-(4) and 
test whether 
*
1 1 γ γ =  and 
*
2 2 γ γ = .  
We find that investors’ mis-processing of the persistence of accruals differs dramatically between 
income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals.  Surprisingly, investors underestimate,  not 
overestimate, the persistence of accruals for the low accrual decile portfolios 1 through 5.  For these firms, 
(
*
2 2 γ γ − ) is positive 0.29 when estimated for the pooled-sample and 0.24 using the Fama-MacBeth 
estimates, both significant at the 1% level.  Similarly, when we decompose accruals into discretionary and 
non-discretionary components, the bias is due mostly to investors underestimating the persistence of 
discretionary accruals.  In contrast, investors overestimate the persistence of accruals for the high accrual 
decile portfolios 6 through 10.  Based on the pooled-sample estimates, (
*
2 2 γ γ − ) is -0.18 for total accruals 
in Panel A and -0.17 for discretionary accruals in Panel B, both significant at the 1% level.  The Fama-
MacBeth estimates suggest that investors’ pricing of total and discretionary accruals is indistinguishable 
from rational pricing in an efficient market.   
We also performed the Mishkin test by each decile.  We do not find a consistent pattern of over- or 
under-estimation of the persistence of accruals across the deciles.  This is not surprising.  There is very little 
variation in the independent variable (accruals) when the analysis is conducted by deciles formed on the 
                                                   
47 Alternatively, investor naiveté varies systematically across accrual deciles, which makes it impossible to predict ex 
ante how it will affect the relation between accruals and future returns.   
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basis of accruals, which econometrically leads to imprecise estimation and large standard errors.  Naturally, 
a consistent pattern in the results fails to emerge.   
Overall, results using the Mishkin test reinforce the asymmetry in investors’ pricing of income-
increasing and income-decreasing accruals.  Since we are able to replicate the accrual anomaly for the full 
sample, the evidence of asymmetry is unlikely to be due to some unusual attributes of our sample.  The 
observed asymmetry is inconsistent with investor fixation on accruals.  The results are consistent with the 
agency hypothesis in that investors over-estimate the persistence of high accrual firms.  Surprisingly, 
however, we also find that investors underestimate the persistence when accruals are low.  This result is not 
predicted under the agency hypothesis or the fixation hypothesis.   
3.4.5. Relation between Stock Returns and Accruals 
To further discriminate between the fixation and agency hypotheses, in this section we test for the 
causality implications of the two hypotheses.  The fixation hypothesis implies that investors’ over-
estimation of accrual persistence leads to stock-price over-reaction, especially in the extreme accrual 
portfolios.  This means extreme accruals should forecast future return reversals, whereas past returns should 
not predict future accruals.  The agency theory, on the other hand, contends that it is over-valuation in the 
first place that leads to overstated accruals.  Below we discriminate between the hypotheses by first 
performing an instrumental variable analysis, which shows that overvaluation causes earnings management.  
Second, we perform quantile regressions (described below), which demonstrate a striking asymmetry in the 
relation between accruals and past and current returns.   
Instrumental Variables Analysis 
We regress accruals on past and present abnormal returns, with abnormal returns as a crude proxy 
for overvaluation.  However, we recognize that returns contain information about (future) earnings and 
hence accruals (see Beaver et al. 1980, and Collins et al. 1987), so past returns’ predictive ability can be due 
to returns leading earnings, not just overvaluation.  To enhance the quality of abnormal returns as a proxy 
for overvaluation, we propose instruments that are likely to be correlated with overvaluation, but not with 
the information about future unmanaged accruals or earnings.  This set of instruments, when used in the 
two-stage least squares framework, allows us to identify the causal relation between overvaluation and 
future accruals as implied by the agency hypothesis.   
One set of instruments is managerial actions, except earnings management, which firms are likely 
to take to prolong the overvaluation.  Our instruments include: (i) equity issuance as a percentage of total 
assets, (ii) acquisitions as a percentage of total assets, (iii) growth in PPE and PPE as a fraction of total 
assets, (iv) growth in R&D and R&D as a fraction of total assets, (v) growth in capital expenditures and 
capital expenditures as a fraction of total assets, (vi)  dummy for a positive income contribution from 
acquisitions, and (vii) dummy for a positive change in goodwill.  Under the agency hypothesis, an increase 
in each of these variables is indicative of overvaluation, but is unlikely to be correlated with future 
unmanaged accruals.  
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Table 9 reports the results of 2SLS regressions of accruals on one year lagged returns (Panel A) and 
contemporaneous returns (Panel B), where the returns are instrumented using firm characteristics above.  In 
our analysis we require non-missing data on the instrumental variables and buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(described in Section 4.1.1).
48  The instruments are measured contemporaneously with the independent 
variable (abnormal return).  The table presents time-series average coefficients and associated Fama-
MacBeth test statistics. 
T a b l e  9 
Relations between Returns, Accruals, and Operating Decisions 
This table presents evidence of a causal relation between prior/present returns (as proxies for overvaluation) and 
current accruals and operating decision characteristics. Panel A reports time series means of slope coefficients from 
cross-sectional regressions of accruals at time t on annual buy-and-hold abnormal returns at time (t-1)  where the 
returns are instrumented using instrumental variables measured at time (t-1).  Panel B reports time series means of 
slope coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of accruals at time t on annual buy-and-hold abnormal returns at 
time t where the returns are instrumented using instrumental variables measured at time t.  Annual buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns are size and book-to-market adjusted as described in Table 2. In both panels the instrumental 
variables are (i) equity issuance as percentage of total assets, (ii) acquisitions as percentage of total assets, (iii) growth 
in PPE and PPE as a fraction of total assets, (iv) growth in R&D and R&D as a fraction of total assets, (v) growth in 
CapEx and CapEx as a fraction of total assets, (vi) dummy for positive income contributions from acquisitions, and 
(vii) dummy for positive change in good-will. Panel C reports the time series means of the slope coefficient of the 
cross-sectional regression of operating decisions at time t on annual buy-and-hold abnormal returns at time (t-1).  We 
consider six operating decisions characteristics: (i)  equity issues as a percentage of total assets (Compustat data 
item 108/item 6), (ii) debt issues as a percentage of total Assets (Compustat data item 111/item 6), (iii) contributions 
from acquisitions as a percentage of total assets (Compustat data item 129/item 6), (iv) growth in capital expenditures 
(Compustat data item 128), (v) growth in R&D expenditures (Compustat data item 46), and (vi) growth in property 
plant and equipment (Compustat data item 7).  The sample contains all non-financial firms from 1963 to 2004 with 




1 Accruals Abnormal Return tt t αβ ε − =+⋅ + 
11 1 Abnormal Return Instrumental Variables tt t cD ξ −− − =+ ⋅ +  
  Coefficient (β)  T-stat P-value 
Number of 
observations 
Total Accruals  0.0764  2.556  0.015  38 
Discretionary Accruals  0.0390  2.111  0.041  38 
Panel B:Accruals Abnormal Return tt t αβ ε =+⋅ + 
Abnormal Return Instrumental Variables tt t cD ξ =+ ⋅ + 
  Coefficient (β)  T-stat P-value 
Number of 
observations 
Total Accruals  0.1568  4.101  0.001  38 
Discretionary Accruals  0.1240  4.014  0.001  38 
Panel C: 
1 Operating Decision Abnormal Return tt t αβ ε − =+⋅ + 
  Coefficient (β)  T-stat P-value 
Number of 
observations 
Equity Issues (% of Total Assets)  0.0565  6.468  0.001  32 
Debt Issues (% of Total Assets)  0.0268  6.444  0.001  32 
Acquisitions (% of Total Assets)  0.0086  7.691  0.001  32 
Growth in Capital Expenditures  0.5610  11.157  0.001  38 
Growth in R&D  0.0725  10.906  0.001  38 
Growth in PPE  0.1356  11.157  0.001  38 
                                                   
48 Since we use the buy-and-hold abnormal return we limit our consideration to December fiscal-year-end firms.  
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Panel A shows year -1 abnormal returns’ effect on year zero total and discretionary accruals.  The 
coefficients on lagged returns are 0.076 (p-value 0.02) for total accruals and 0.039 (p-value 0.04) for 
discretionary accruals.  The coefficient magnitudes imply one percentage point increase in lagged buy-and-
hold abnormal returns leads to a 7.6 basis-point increase in total accruals as a percentage of total assets and 
a 3.9 basis-point increase in discretionary accruals. Since the highest accrual-decile firms exhibit 29.5% 
abnormal buy-and-hold return in year -1, it translates into a 2.24% increase in total accruals as a percentage 
of assets.  Panel B reports contemporaneous 2SLS regression of year zero accruals on year zero returns.  
The coefficient magnitudes more than double to 0.157 and 0.124 in the total and discretionary accrual 
cases, with both being significant at the 1% level.  Since the return variable in these regressions is the fitted 
value of returns using proxies for overvaluation, the evidence supports our conjecture that the agency 
hypothesis contributes to the accrual anomaly. 
Finally, Panel C of Table 9 shows that overvaluation proxies predict managements’ investment-
financing decisions.  We show that lagged buy-and-hold abnormal returns lead to increased levels of equity 
and debt issuance, participation in acquisitions, and investments in capital and R&D.  This evidence 
validates our choice of instrumental variables and also provides evidence consistent with the agency 
hypothesis.   
Relation between Accruals and Returns: Quantile Regression Results  
We evaluate the symmetry in the accrual-return relation by examining the effect of returns on the 
tails of accrual distribution.  This is done using the Quantile regression framework.  Similar to an OLS 
regression, which models the relation between regressors and conditional mean of the distribution of the 
dependent variable, a quantile regression estimates the relation between regressors and the conditional 
quantiles of the distribution of interest (see Koenker and Hallock, 2001, for details and economic 
applications).  Specifically, a Quantile regression estimates the linear conditional quantile function 
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49 Although we estimate the quantile regression model for each quantile of the dependent variable, quantile regressions 
are not equivalent to the OLS regressions estimated over subsets of observations partitioned on the dependent variable 
into quantiles.  It’s well-known that the latter lead to biased and inconsistent slope coefficient estimates because the 
regression errors are likely to be non-zero for different partitions of the data on the dependent variable.  In contrast, 
quantile regressions employ all of the data when fitting the quantiles and therefore produce unbiased and consistent 
effects of the independent variables on conditional quantiles.   
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Table 10 presents time-series average coefficient estimates and Fama-MacBeth t-statistics for the 
quartile regressions.   Panel  A and Panel  B report the slope coefficients for the cases of total and 
discretionary accruals.  Figure 5 presents our results graphically showing not only Fama-MacBeth slope 
coefficient estimates but also pooled sample estimates plotted against different quantiles q.
50 
T a b l e  10 
Quantile Regression Analysis of the Relation between Returns and Accruals 
The table reports the time series means and Fama-MacBeth t-statistics for the slope coefficients from cross-sectional 
regressions: (i) of accruals in year 0 on annual abnormal buy-and-hold return in year -1, and (ii) of annuals abnormal 
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Panel A presents the results for total accruals, whereas Panel B presents the results for discretionary accruals. Annual 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns are size and book-to-market adjusted as discussed in Table 2. The total accruals are 
computed using the balance sheet data. The discretionary accruals are estimated via within industry, cross-sectional 
modified Jones model. The sample contains all non-financial firms that are present in both CRSP and Compustat in 
years -1, 0, and 1 and covers period from 1963 to 2004. 
 
Accrualsit = α + β Retit-1+εit  Accrualsit = α + β Retit+εit 






Panel A: Total Accruals 
5% 0.021  (4.88)  0.006  (1.37) 
10% 0.020  (5.39)  0.004  (1.28) 
20% 0.021  (6.83)  0.004  (1.40) 
30% 0.022  (7.89)  0.002  (0.88) 
40% 0.024  (8.78)  0.001  (0.49) 
50% 0.027  (9.59)  0.001  (0.47) 
60% 0.031  (11.44)  0.002  (0.75) 
70% 0.036  (11.50)  0.003  (1.20) 
80% 0.045  (12.43)  0.006  (1.97) 
90% 0.067  (13.45)  0.015  (3.29) 
95% 0.092  (13.93)  0.026  (3.79) 
95%-5% 0.071  (13.23)  0.019  (2.59) 
95%-50% 0.066  (12.17)  0.024 (4.18) 
5%-50% -0.005  (1.69)  0.005 (1.37) 
Panel B: Discretionary Accruals 
5% 0.010  (2.69)  -0.003  (0.58) 
10% 0.011  (3.89)  -0.003  (0.91) 
20% 0.013  (5.32)  -0.004  (1.83) 
30% 0.013  (6.22)  -0.004  (2.23) 
40% 0.013  (7.00)  -0.004  (2.59) 
50% 0.013  (8.33)  -0.003  (1.87) 
60% 0.014  (9.72)  -0.003  (1.64) 
70% 0.017  (11.76)  -0.003  (1.69) 
80% 0.021  (12.68)  -0.003  (1.29) 
90% 0.033  (12.93)  0.001  (0.01) 
95% 0.054  (9.68)  0.003  (0.52) 
95%-5% 0.045  (8.78)  0.006  (0.87) 
95%-50% 0.042  (8.08)  0.006 (1.18) 
5%-50% -0.003  (1.17)  0.001 (0.01) 
 
                                                   
50 In this section of our analysis we use December fiscal-year-end firms for which the data on total (discretionary) 
accrual and returns in years -1, and 0.    
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Figure 5a. Quantile Regressions of Total  







































Fama MacBeth Pooled Sample
 
Figure 5b. Quantile Regressions of Discretionary 





































Fama MacBeth Pooled Sample
 
Figure 5c. Quantile Regressions of Total Accruals 
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Figure 5d. Quantile Regressions of Discretionary 








































Fama MacBeth Pooled Sample
 
Figure 5 graphs the slope coefficients for quantile regressions of accruals in year 0 on annual abnormal buy-and-
hold returns in year -1 (Figures 5a and 5b), and slope coefficients for the quantile regressions of accruals in year 0 
on annual abnormal buy-and-hold returns in year 0 (Figures 5c and 5d).  The slope coefficients are estimated for the 
following set of percentiles: 2%, 5%, 10% through 90%, 95%, and 98%.  The buy-and-hold annual abnormal returns 
are size and book-to-market adjusted (see Table 2 for calculation details).  Figures 5a and 5c graph results for the 
total accrual portfolios, while Figures 5b and 5d present for the discretionary accrual portfolios. 
 
Estimation of model (5) reveals that high abnormal returns of year -1 positively impact year 0 
accruals, but this phenomenon is observed primarily for the upper tail of the accrual distribution.  In case of 
total accruals, the slope coefficient 
95 . 0 β  is 0.09, which is 4.5 times as large as the 
05 . 0 β  coefficient of 
0.02.  A similar order of magnitude difference is observed when the regressions use discretionary accruals.  
Figures 5a and 4b reveal striking patterns in quantile coefficients where the relation appears to grow 
geometrically as we approach the tail of the income increasing accruals.  The evidence suggests that 
variation in prior returns drives higher accrual quantiles to a much greater extent.  This is consistent with 
abnormal price run-ups driving accruals of those firms that are likely to be manipulate them.  
Estimation of model (6) shows that contemporaneous return-accrual relation is weak over the range 
of accrual distribution except for its highest quantiles.  The evidence is in line with that of the predictive  
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model (5) and confirms pronounced asymmetry in the accruals-return relation.  Overall the results of this 
section confirm the pronounced asymmetry in the relation between abnormal returns and accruals.  
3.5. Summary and conclusions 
Agency theory of overvalued equity predicts that the overvalued firms are likely to engage in 
income increasing earnings management in order to meet the unrealistic performance expectations 
incorporated in the stock prices.  This prediction suggests an alternative explanation for accrual anomaly as 
we expect that a sub-sample of firms with upward managed accruals will be more heavily populated with 
overvalued firms and the subsequent negative stock performance of such companies is a mere overvaluation 
reversal.  We formulate a number of testable predictions that allow us to distinguish between the agency 
theory of overvalued equity and the traditional naïve investor fixation hypothesis as the driving force 
behind the accrual anomaly. 
Consistent with the agency theory of overvalued equity, we find an asymmetry in the relation 
between accruals and returns, accruals and analyst optimism, accruals and insider-trading patterns, and 
accruals and corporate investment-financing decisions.  Such asymmetry is not predicted under the naïve 
investor fixation on accruals.  We find that companies in the highest income increasing accrual decile 
experience an economically large abnormal price run-up prior to the accrual management year, which is 
followed by stock underperformance in the subsequent years.  This type of relation is not observed for the 
lowest accrual decile portfolio.  Finally we find evidence consistent with the prediction of the agency 
theory of overvalued equity using the instrumental variable framework which allows us to isolate a casual 
relationship from overvaluation to accrual management. 
Overall, the evidence in our study casts doubt on the prevailing hypothesis that market naively 
fixates on accruals or earnings.  In contrast to earlier studies that merely present evidence inconsistent with 
fixation, we provide an alternative economic mechanism rooted in the agency theory of overvalued equity 
to explain the relation between returns and accruals.   
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The Endogeneity Bias in the Relation between Cost-of-




  Corporate disclosure policy is one of the most widely researched topics in accounting. Theory has 
generally suggested a negative causal relation between the quality of information disclosed by a firm and its 
cost of capital (Verrecchia, 2001, Dye, 2001, Easley and O’Hara, 2004).  The basic idea is that disclosure 
reduces both the information differences and incentive problems between the firm and its investors (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001). Investors, then,  ‘reward’ firms for high-quality disclosures with lower required returns.  
In recent years, however, both the existence and sign of the relation between disclosure and cost-of-
capital has been called into question not in the least because the empirical literature has provided 
conflicting results. While some studies find strong negative associations consistent with theoretical 
predictions (Welker, 1995, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000, Sengupta, 1998), other fails to document a 
significant relation (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002, Botosan and Frost, 1998), find only partial evidence 
(Botosan, 1997, Healy et al., 1999, Richardson and Welker, 2001) or even report a positive association 
(Heiflin, Shaw and Wild, 2003). 
Some commentators have pointed to the possibility of endogeneity bias as a potential explanation 
why empirical findings are not consistent with theory and report contradicting results with regard to the 
sign of the relation  (Healy and Palepu, 2001, Core, 2001, Zhang, 2001).
51  It is well know that endogeneity 
causes Ordinary Least Squares regressions to be biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2002). Findings from 
OLS regressions of cost-of-capital onto disclosure are difficult to interpret in the presence of endogeneity 
and this may very well account for the lack of agreement in the empirical literature on the sign of the 
relation. 
                                                   
π Based on the paper co-authored with Laurence van Lent (Tilburg University) and published in European Accounting 
Review, Vol. 14, 2005. 
 
51 Other potential explanations for these conflicting results are the current high standards of mandatory disclosure 
(rendering voluntary disclosure choices of second order importance) and measurement problems in the somewhat 
elusive key constructs of ‘information problems’ and ‘disclosure quality’ (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000, Healy and 
Palepu, 2001, Zhang, 2001).  
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We document the effect of endogeneity bias on the relation between disclosure and cost-of-debt 
capital. We define endogeneity bias broadly as any situation where the disturbance term of the structural 
equation is correlated with one or more independent variables.
52 Intuitively, our reasoning is that 
differences exist in the cost of debt that are correlated with the firm’s disclosure policy, but that are not 
necessarily caused by this policy. Instead, these differences are caused either by (1) unobservable 
heterogeneity among firms in a cross sectional sample or (2) observable determinants of cost-of-debt capital 
which are correlated with disclosure but omitted from the analysis. Note that these two sources of 
endogeneity bias are both variations of the correlated omitted variable problem and are in fact theoretically 
equivalent. To an empirical researcher they are different, however, because the first source is unobservable 
and should be roughly constant over time, while the second is observable and may change over the period 
of investigation. We will provide an illustration of both sources of endogeneity bias in turn. 
One example of unobserved heterogeneity is the difference in ‘costs of disclosure’
53 among firms. 
High costs of disclosure will reduce the optimal level of disclosure and at the same time increase the 
equilibrium cost-of-capital (Zhang, 2001). While in a cross sectional analysis, it will appear as if disclosure 
is causally related to cost-of-capital, what we observe in fact are equilibrium changes of both disclosure 
level and cost-of-capital each caused by the unobservable firm-specific characteristic of ‘costs of 
disclosure’. 
  At least some of the determinants of a firm’s disclosure choice would appear to be also related to 
the default risk of the firm (Jaffee, 1975, Kidwell et al. 1984, Fung and Rudd, 1986), and as such impact on 
the cost-of-debt.
54  For example, larger firms are generally considered less risky and therefore enjoy lower 
cost-of-debt capital (Fama and French, 1992, 1993). Larger firms also benefit from economies of scale in 
producing information. They usually have specialized departments set up to deal with investors’ 
information needs and it will generally be less costly for them to compile more information and disclose it 
to the capital market. Empirically, size is significantly correlated with disclosure in many studies. In sum, 
size is associated both with cost-of-debt and with disclosure. When omitted from the analysis, one may find 
                                                   
52 This definition is consistent with the econometrics literature (Greene, 2000, Wooldridge, 2002) and with the 
proposal in Chenhall and Moers (2004). 
 
53 Often these costs of disclosure are defined to include the costs of collecting, processing, reporting and verifying 
information and the cost due to loss of competitiveness (see, e.g., Wagenhofer, 1990, Guo, Lev and Zhou, 2004). 
Potentially interesting definitions also refer to the costs associated with uncertainty about investor reactions to a 
certain disclosure (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003, Verrecchia, 2001) or litigation costs (Skinner, 1997).   
 
54 Within standard asset pricing models, such as the CAPM, only undiversifiable risk is priced on the market, and 
therefore we have to assume that the proposed joint determinants of ‘cost-of-debt capital’, such as the firm’s default 
risk, are at least partly correlated across firms. Indeed, an often-heard critique on studies that relate disclosure to cost 
of capital is that differences in disclosure quality are idiosyncratic and therefore should not ‘survive the forces of 
diversification’ (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2005: 1) nor impact on the cost-of-capital. Leuz and Verrecchia (2005), in 
contrast, argue that disclosure improves the coordination between the firm and its investors with respect to capital 
investment decisions. As such, poor disclosure quality can lead to misaligned investments and higher cost-of-capital. 
Other studies have suggested that disclosure may impact on cost-of-capital, even if it is idiosyncratic, because it 
improves market liquidity (Verrecchia, 2001, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000), reduces estimation risk (Barry and Brown, 
1985) or increases the investor base (Merton, 1987).    
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a negative relation between cost-of-debt and disclosure policy, but this association is likely driven by firm 
size.  
  After a brief review of the econometrics of endogeneity, we discuss in more detail the sources of 
endogeneity bias in the relation between disclosure and cost of capital. We then document empirically the 
effect of endogeneity bias in regressions of cost-of-debt capital on disclosure policy. Specifically, we use 
Sengupta’s (1998) original model
55 as a starting point of our analysis and replicate this study’s results in a 
sample similar to his.  As in Sengupta, we establish a strong negative association between disclosure and 
cost-of-debt capital. We then augment Sengupta’s model with variables that are known to be associated 
with a firm’s disclosure policy and which are likely to affect cost-of-debt capital in order to address the 
endogeneity bias caused by omitted variables. Our results show that the coefficient on disclosure is reduced 
to approximately 50% of its former magnitude in the benchmark model and disclosure is no longer 
significantly related to cost-of-debt capital in the augmented version of our regressions. The omitted 
variable effect seems substantial.  
Next, we evaluate both sources of endogeneity bias at the same time and use panel data techniques 
to estimate the augmented model. We find that once observable determinants of disclosure and cost-of-debt 
capital are included in the regression and the estimation technique controls for firm-specific effects, we re-
establish the negative association between disclosure and cost-of-debt capital. The association is stronger 
than before and the difference is economically significant – the fixed effects coefficient on disclosure is 
over 200% larger than the OLS coefficient in the same model – which suggests that the cost-of-capital 
benefits of increased disclosure are much larger than previously thought and economically significant. 
Based on these analyses, our beliefs about the existence of endogeneity bias in the benchmark model are 
reinforced. We then suggest a simple procedure to directly assess whether the independent variables in the 
regression (in particular, the disclosure policy variable) are associated with unobservable firm heterogeneity 
and document that, in fact, disclosure policy is strongly positively correlated with firm heterogeneity.  
Synthesizing our findings, we show that at the level of the individual firm, increases in disclosure 
are causally
56 associated with lower cost-of-debt capital. However, in cross-sectional analyses that do not 
control for endogeneity bias, a negative association between these two variables should not be interpreted 
causally and is likely caused by firm heterogeneity effects, which are compounded in the disclosure 
variable. The resulting association between disclosure and cost-of-capital is (at least partly) spurious. 
  Together these results speak strongly in favor of dealing explicitly with endogeneity when 
investigating the relation between disclosure policy and cost-of-capital. Note that while endogeneity has 
                                                   
55 Sengupta’s model provides a convenient vehicle to illustrate the effect of endogeneity bias in disclosure research. It 
is also to some extent an arbitrary choice since endogeneity bias is present in many contexts in (financial) accounting 
research and many potential candidates exist for similar analysis as is conducted in this paper. Chenhall and Moers 
(2004), Ittner and Larcker (2001), and Larcker and Rusticus (2005) provide helpful discussions of endogeneity in 
accounting research. 
 
56 We recognize that causal statements cannot be made based on statistical considerations, but only on theory. When 
we refer to a causal relation, we use this as shorthand for ‘a causal relation as suggested by theory and underpinned by 
empirical evidence’.  
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been identified as the ‘most important limitation’ (Healy and Palepu, 2001, 430) of disclosure studies, few 
attempts have been made to address the issue empirically (Cohen, 2003).  
  The remainder of this paper is organized into six sections. Section 2 provides a self-contained 
discussion of the econometrics of endogeneity bias in the context of financial accounting research. Section 
3 discusses firm heterogeneity and correlated omitted determinants as two sources of endogeneity bias in 
the relation between cost-of-debt capital and disclosure. Section 4 outlines the research design and provides 
the variable definitions. Section 5 describes the sample and some summary statistics. Section 6 presents the 
empirical results on the extent of endogeneity bias in the association between disclosure and cost-of-debt 
capital. The final section summarizes the results and discusses the limitations to our analyses. 
4.2. A note on endogeneity 
The traditional textbook definition of endogeneity we used so far requires the disturbance term in 
the structural equation to be correlated with one or more explanatory variables. This rather arcane definition 
is not very helpful to applied researchers. We therefore propose a more intuitive definition (following 
Heckman, 2000), which is closer to the practice of economists. Economics “undertakes to study the effect 
which will be produced by certain causes, not absolutely, but subject to the condition that other things are 
equal and that causes are able to work out their effects undisturbed” (Marshall 1961, p. 36). Researchers 
aim at identification of these causal effects, which is done by measuring the effect of a certain cause while 
holding all the other causes in the model constant. This in itself is not a straightforward task since many 
causes will not vary independently. Our intuitive definition of endogeneity then is any situation where the 
ceteris paribus condition is not fulfilled whenever the independent variable of interest is changed.  
Empirical researchers typically use an economic model or informal reasoning to arrive at a 
structural model, which represents the causal relations between the variables of interest. Although theory or 
earlier empirical work will often suggest that many of these variables cannot be said to be truly exogenous, 
empirical researchers will have to assume some are, to estimate the parameters of the structural model. A 
careful justification of why certain variables are exogenous is therefore required. In his presidential address, 
Demski (2004) advocates to explicate the micro foundations (preferences, expectations) of the choice 
behavior of economic actors in the relation under study and to apply equilibrium reasoning to derive a 
structural model. Such procedure allows for a better understanding of how all the salient aspects of 
behavior, such as causal effects, are captured into the model.  
 Suppose an empirical researcher is interested in the following structural model: 
u x x x y k k + + + + = α α α ... 2 2 1 1                                                                    (A) 
where y, x1, x2, … xk are observable random scalars and u is the unobservable random disturbance. 
An explanatory variable xj is said to be endogenous in equation A if it is correlated with the disturbance 
term u; xj is exogenous if it is uncorrelated with the disturbance term. It is important to stress that in this 
‘empirical’ or econometric definition, variables are inherently neither exogenous nor endogenous; instead  
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their nature is conditional on the way the structural model is written (Greene, 2000). An empirical 
researcher will be interested in estimating the parameters in the structural model. It is important to the 
researcher to know whether an explanatory variable is endogenous in a specific structural equation because 
it affects the way in which its parameter should be estimated. The upshot of all this is that it is paramount to 
be careful when using the words ‘endogenous’ or ‘exogenous’, since these designations are context-
specific. The litmus test of the econometric form of endogeneity is whether the parameters of interest in the 
context of a specific structural model are affected by correlation between any explanatory variables and the 
disturbance term (Maddala, 2001). If they are the variable is said to be endogenous, if not it is exogenous. 
Since there is no clean-cut statistic or diagnostic instrument available to ‘test’ for endogeneity, the 
econometrics literature often advises empirical researchers to apply introspection (Wooldridge, 2002) or the 
criterion of reasonableness
57 (Greene, 2000, Kennedy, 2003) as a way to determine whether there is an 
endogeneity problem. It would appear that researchers are left rather vulnerable against allegations that 
their model suffers from ‘endogeneity problems’. In the end, researchers have to determine which variables 
they care about (i.e., are the focus of their analysis) and should therefore be as free from bias as possible, 
and which variables they do not care about and are only in the model as a control. Bias in the estimates of 
the latter variables are less of a problem and should not be weighted to heavily when evaluating the 
soundness of empirical work. 
4.2.1.  Sources of ‘econometric’ endogeneity 
The source of correlation between the structural disturbance and an explanatory variable is 
important because it provides clues how endogeneity can be addressed. Wooldridge (2002) lists three 
common sources of endogeneity: (1) omitted variables, (2) simultaneity and (3) measurement error. Our 
discussion will focus on the first two of these. Considerable advances have been made to mitigate 
measurement error in variables using latent variables techniques. While some of the methods to address 
endogeneity we discuss below may also reduce measurement error, the literature seems to move towards 
the use of these latent variables techniques (Larcker and Rusticus, 2005), and we defer further elaboration 
here. Note that each source of econometric endogeneity will affect the consistency of the estimation in a 
similar fashion and as such confound the interpretation of the regressions. 
4.2.1.1. Omitted variables: causes 
The first source of endogeneity arises if the structural disturbance term consists of omitted variables 
and these variables are correlated with one or more of the explanatory variables. This may occur because 
data is not available on those variables the researcher would like to include additionally into the model.  
These omitted variables are said to be unobservable to the researcher.
58  Omitted variables also may be due 
to a failure of the researcher to include all the observable factors theory suggest to be important in 
                                                   
57 One test is that the choices made should be palatable to the researcher’s peers. 
 
58 While the disturbance term then includes variables that are unobservable to the researcher, these factors may very 
well be observable to the economic agent under study. Indeed, endogeneity arises when the explanatory variables 
represent decisions made by the agent on the basis of such factors (Hayashi, 2000).  
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explaining the dependent variable. Economic relations are often such that two factors that are determinants 
of the same dependent variable will be mutually associated. If one such factor is omitted from the analysis 
and thus included in the disturbance term, the latter will be correlated with the included factor. One special 
case of omitted observable variables arises when the omitted variable is a function of an explanatory 
variable in the model. This type of omitted variable problem is often referred to as ‘functional form 
misspecification’. 
In sum, omitted variables can be either observable or unobservable to the researcher. Omitted 
variables are captured by the disturbance term in the structural equation. When these omitted variables are 
correlated with explanatory variable xi, then xi is endogenous in that particular structural equation.  
4.2.1.2.  Omitted variables: potential ‘solutions’  
We emphasized that omitted variables may be either observable or unobservable to the researcher 
because this dimension matters when trying to mitigate the problems associated with estimating the 
parameters in the structural model. It should be noted that it is unlikely for any of the methods we describe 
to resolve fully the issues associated with endogeneity. 
Omitted observable variables. This source of endogeneity can be addressed by including all factors 
that are important in explaining the dependent variable and, at the same time, are associated with one of the 
explanatory variables, into the structural equation. Factors that are associated with both dependent and one 
or more explanatory variables are said to be ‘joint determinants’.  In practical terms, this will usually 
require the researcher to conduct a thorough review of the extant theoretical and empirical literatures to 
identify these joint determinants. Once included in the structural model, the disturbance term is purged 
from the source of its correlation with the explanatory variables and the estimation of the parameters of 
interest should no longer be affected by endogeneity. 
Omitted unobservable variables. Since the researcher will not be able to gather data on omitted 
variables that are unobservable, our earlier recipe of including any joint determinants will no longer work. 
We will discuss two distinct instances of omitted unobservable variables and methods to address these, 
which are relevant to the accounting literature, (1) self-selection and (2) firm-specific heterogeneity.   
4.2.1.3.  Self or sample-selection 
 Self or sample-selection arises if the probability that a firm is included into the sample and the 
dependent variable are both affected by an (omitted unobservable) variable.  As a result the sample is no 
longer random. Alternatively, the omitted unobservable variable may affect the way in which an 
observation is categorized within the sample, although all observations are included.
59  A good example in 
an accounting context is provided by Leuz and Verrecchia (2000). These authors study a sample of firms 
that have switched from a German to an international reporting regime. They are interested in the question 
whether a commitment to increased disclosure, as required under international standards, has tangible 
                                                   
59 Self selection bias will also arise when the sample is truncated or censored, or sampling is on the dependent 
variable. When sampling is on one of the exogenous variables, the sample will not be random but estimation of the 
structural model is unaffected (Wooldridge, 2002). See also Shehata (1991) for a discussion of selection bias issues in 
an accounting context.  
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benefits in the form of lower cost-of-capital. Firms will decide on disclosure based on the expected 
consequences with regard to their cost-of-capital. Therefore, the factors that determine the disclosure choice 
(expected net cost-of-capital benefit) are likely to also affect the dependent variable, current cost-of-capital.  
Simply regressing cost-of-capital on disclosure would not do in this context because it ignores the fact that 
only those firms with positive expected net cost of capital benefits will have selected to switch reporting 
regime. As Leuz and Verrecchia are careful to point out, without discounting this selection  effect the 
association between disclosure and cost-of-capital will be overstated for those firms that have switched 
regimes and understated for the firms that have not. Although, the expected net benefits of increased 
disclosure to the firm are unobservable to the researcher, they should be accounted for when estimating the 
structural model of interest. This is usually done by modeling the selection mechanism explicitly and 
adjusting the estimation of the parameters in the structural model for the selection effect. Heckman’s (1979) 
procedure offers an often-used, easily implemented approach to achieve this.  
4.2.1.4.  Firm-specific heterogeneity  
Unobserved omitted variables often represent features of the firm that are given and do not change 
over the period in question. Specifically, firm characteristics like managerial ability, structural 
arrangements, and employee skills can be thought of as roughly constant over time.  As before, if these firm 
characteristics impact on both the dependent variable and one or more explanatory variables, the structural 
disturbance (which captures heterogeneity across units of observation) will be correlated with those 
explanatory variables. For example, more talented managers may prefer high-quality disclosures and, at the 
same time, the market may think these managers better ‘risks’ and charge a lower cost-of-capital. The talent 
of management is difficult to observe for a researcher and should be relatively constant. Regressions of 
cost-of-capital onto disclosure are affected by firm-specific heterogeneity bias if the talent of managers is 
not properly discounted.  
Firm-specific heterogeneity can be addressed in several ways. Researchers may find a proxy 
variable for the firm characteristic and plug this into the structural equation. Alternatively, instruments 
might be available for those explanatory variables that are correlated with the unobservable firm 
characteristic and instrumental variable (IV) estimation can be used to estimate the parameters of the 
structural equation consistently (see, Wooldridge, 2002). Often, it will be the case that accounting 
researchers can observe a firm at different points in time. If so, panel data techniques are available to 
account for heterogeneity. 
Since the choice of which method to use to address firm-specific heterogeneity directly impinges 
on our empirical work and is of practical concern in many other settings as well, we digress briefly from the 
main topic and discuss the tradeoffs involved when using IV versus panel data techniques.
60 
                                                   
60 This discussion is geared towards one panel data technique in particular: fixed effect estimation.  
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Asymptotically, IV and fixed effects estimation must agree,
61 which makes it relevant to compare their 
properties in applied settings.
62 Panel data techniques address a narrower problem because they can only 
deal with time-invariant omitted variables. IV estimation does not assume that firm characteristics are 
constant and hence admits modelling the impact of a broader set of unobservable variables. Nevertheless, 
IV estimation is vulnerable to producing misleading results when the instruments used are not valid or 
weak.  Instrument variables must be independent of the (unobservable) structural disturbance term and as 
highly correlated as possible with the explanatory variable they represent. The first condition cannot be 
tested; the second is frequently not met in practice (Larcker and Rusticus, 2005). Not only is it often 
difficult to find valid and strong instruments in applied settings, the choice between alternative candidate 
instruments is subjective and may impact on the robustness of the empirical work.
63 Panel data techniques, 
on the other hand, are easy to implement and do not involve a subjective choice by the researcher. They 
assume, however, that the relation under study is essentially driven by changes within the firm, not by 
differences between firms. In other words, the cross-sectional variation should be limited compared to 
changes within firms. Since panel data techniques require multiple observations of a firm, the likelihood of 
a selection bias is higher than when IV estimation is applied.  In sum, neither IV estimation nor panel data 
techniques dominate when trying to solve for endogeneity. The final choice between the two methods will 
depend on the specifics of the research design. 
We conclude this section on omitted variables with an often-misunderstood fact. The mere fact that 
some variable represents a decision (or choice) to the firm or, more generally, an economic agent, is not in 
itself sufficient for ‘econometric endogeneity’ to arise.  Only if the factors that impact on the decision by 
the economic agent, whether observable or nor, are also inter-related with the dependent variable will 
endogeneity exist. 
4.2.1.5.  Simultaneity: causes 
In many settings of interest to accounting researchers, the data generating process is essentially 
such that variables are simultaneously determined and interdependent. Simultaneity arises when at least one 
of the explanatory variables is determined simultaneously along with the dependent variable (Wooldridge, 
2002). If so, the structural disturbance and the explanatory variable will be correlated. Intuitively, one can 
think of simultaneity as describing instantaneous feedback relations among variables. An accounting 
example is provided in Welker (1995). This author is interested in the relation between disclosure policy 
and liquidity in equity markets. He notes that effective corporate disclosure will mitigate information 
                                                   
61 If fixed effects and IV estimation do not agree, the implication is that the model is misspecified (e.g., the 
instruments are invalid or endogeneity is not alleviated by fixed effects estimation. A Hausman-type test may be used 
to discriminate between the estimators.  
 
62 It is not immediate which estimator will be more efficient asymptotically. This will depend on the number and 
quality of instruments and the amount of within-variation. 
 
63 It is often not immediate whether including more than one instrumental variable is beneficial in finite sample 
settings. See, e.g., Kennedy (2003) for a discussion. A Sargan (1958) - Hansen (1982) test is available to evaluate 
whether extra instruments should be used.   
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problems in the market and thus increase liquidity. At the same time, corporate disclosure may be 
influenced by the information differences between the firm and the market and thus by current liquidity. 
There is an ‘equilibrium feedback mechanism’ (Griffiths et al. 1993) operating on disclosure and liquidity 
to determine the equilibrium outcomes for both variables.    
4.2.1.6.  Simultaneity: potential ‘solutions’ 
To capture instantaneous feedback relations, researchers write a system of equations that consists of 
separate structural equations for each endogenous variable. When variables y1 impacts on y2 and vice versa, 
y2 would be included as an explanatory variable in the structural equation for y1;  y1, in turn, is an 
explanatory variable in the structural equation of y2.  Estimation of this system of equations is possible, 
provided it is identified – i.e., rank and order conditions are met – using (inefficient) single equation 
methods (indirect least squares, two-stage least squares, or LIML) or (efficient) system methods (three-
stage least squares, FIML).
64 Most econometric textbooks contain detailed discussions of the estimation of 
systems of equations (e.g., Greene, 2000). 
In conclusion, we support Heckman’s (2000) suggestion that it is sensible to think of endogeneity 
as the case where the ceteris paribus condition does not hold while manipulating one of the explanatory 
variables. Sources of endogeneity include omitted variables and simultaneity. Potential solutions for 
endogeneity following from both causes are available, but their success in applied settings varies greatly. 
4.3.  Omitted variables in the relation between cost-of-debt capital and 
disclosure 
The previous section emphasized two main sources of endogeneity bias: (1) correlated omitted 
variables and (2) simultaneity. We will concentrate in the remainder of this paper on the first source 
because earlier literature has already investigated simultaneity bias in the relation between cost-of-capital 
and disclosure (Welker, 1995, Hail, 2002) and found that simultaneity bias does not appear to invalidate the 
results of OLS estimation.
65 
We first discuss (1) costs of disclosure
66 and (2) management reputation
67 as examples of 
unobservable firm characteristics that are likely correlated with disclosure and relatively fixed over time.  
                                                   
64 The tradeoff between single equation and system methods is that the latter are more susceptible to misspecification 
since they require the correct specification of all equations in the system. As an equivalent alternative one may 
estimate the reduced form of the structural model and then solve for the structural parameters in terms of reduced form 
parameters.  
 
65 We choose a research design that allows us to investigate endogeneity caused by omitted variables in relative 
isolation from endogeneity caused by simultaneity. We provide more details on this in Section 4. In short, we rely on 
the pre-determinedness of most of our RHS variables to argue that simultaneity is less likely to be severe. 
Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that simultaneity bias is present and our results should be interpreted 
with this caution in mind. One possible explanation why these earlier studies have not found that OLS is inconsistent 
might be that the instrument variables that were used in prior work were weak (see also, Larcker and Rusticus, 2005)  
66 Recent studies have pointed explicitly to the failure of many disclosure studies to take between-firm differences in 
costs of disclosure into account (Fields et al., 2001, Cohen, 2003).  
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Next, we review the literature in search of joint, observable determinants of both disclosure and cost-of-
debt capital that were omitted in Sengupta (1998).  
4.3.1  Unobservable firm characteristics 
  Costs of disclosure. While it is likely that the direct costs of disclosure (gathering and reporting 
information) differ between firms, some recent papers have focussed on a potentially interesting source of 
firm heterogeneity, i.e., the costs associated with investor uncertainty about the disclosure of information 
(Verrecchia, 2001). This uncertainty can originate from differences in technical expertise to understand the 
disclosure among the firm’s investors (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003) or because it is unclear whether 
withholding disclosure results from firms having no information or having unfavourable information (Dye, 
1985, 1998, Jung and Kwon, 1988). Whatever its origin, these models suggests that the extent of 
uncertainty affects the optimal disclosure policy of the firm. Intuitively, the firm may benefit from 
uncertainty because (unsophisticated) investors cannot distinguish between the two reasons for withholding 
information and, as a result, such investors may over value the firm.
68 The idea that investors differ in terms 
of their sophistication has found general recognition in the empirical literature (Hand, 1990). Usually, 
sophistication is proxied by the proportion of institutional investors. Several papers document how capital 
market reactions differ depending on the composition of the firm’s investor base (Kim et al., 1997, Walther, 
1997, Bartov et al. 2000). Thus, the uncertainty of firms about the way the market will react to their 
disclosures is likely to differ. Not only will this uncertainty affect the optimal disclosure, but it will also 
affect cost-of-capital. Given that investors are uncertain about the nature of non-disclosure they need to be 
compensated in expected return. Therefore, both disclosure and costs of capital are affected by the 
unobservable firm-specific characteristic of the sophistication of investors. 
  Management reputation. Disclosure has been modelled as a device through which managers signal 
their talent (Trueman, 1986, Healy and Palepu, 2001). The reasoning usually is that more talented managers 
will reveal their type through making voluntary disclosures, although Nagar (1999) offers a model in which 
even talented managers may opt for non-disclosure in some cases. This author assumes that managers are 
differently talented and that they are uncertain about the market’s response to the disclosure of their 
performance. Depending on the extent of the penalty the market puts on non-disclosing performance and 
the manager’s discomfort from the uncertainty about the market’s reaction to disclosure, the optimal 
disclosure policy will vary. Regardless of the supposed chain of events, managerial talent or discomfort are 
unobservable sources of firm heterogeneity.    
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
67 We would like to stress that these are indeed examples and many other reasonable theories exist. Agency costs are a 
clear alternative illustration. These costs are unobservable but likely differ among firms. Agency costs are likely to 
affect both the disclosure decision and the cost-of-capital. Yet another alternative is firm (as opposed to management) 
reputation. We do not aim at providing an exhaustive list of firm heterogeneity.  
 
68 See Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) for a model in which pro forma disclosures are used to misdirect the attention of 
investors with limited cognitive abilities. To the extent that cognitive abilities among investors vary we expect 
different optimal levels of disclosure.  
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It seems very likely that a manager’s talent also affects the cost-of-debt capital. For example, more 
talented managers might make more persuasive propositions when seeking debt capital. Investors will 
consider the default risk of firms managed by talented managers to be lower. Their road shows should be 
more interesting to investors and they might attract bigger crowds eager to jump on the bandwagon of a 
talented manager and his or her firm. In sum, both cost-of-debt capital and disclosure are influenced by the 
manager’s talent, and talent is likely to differ between firms but is also relatively constant over time in any 
one firm.  
4.3.2. Joint determinants of disclosure and cost-of-debt capital 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest three categories of variables that will impact on the disclosure 
decision (1) performance variables, (2) structure variables, and (3) offer variables. These categories are 
motivated by theoretical arguments in which disclosing information reduces adverse selection problems 
between investor and firm, decreases transaction costs associated with trading on capital markets and limits 
potential litigation costs caused by withholding information relevant to investors. Each of these variables 
will likely also affect the firm’s cost-of-debt capital. We will briefly discuss each category in turn and 
indicate its effect on disclosure and cost of capital. 
It is well recognized that performance is related to disclosure, albeit that the exact nature of the 
relation between the two is complex (Miller, 2002). Some theoretical models (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983 and 
Lanen and Verrecchia, 1987) suggest that firms will withhold negative news but disclose positive news, a 
concern that is often voiced by regulators as well (see, e.g., Levitt, 1998). The empirical evidence so far is 
not consistent with these contentions, as some authors have shown that bad news is rushed forward to avoid 
legal action (Skinner, 1994, 1997), to warn investors about earnings disappointments (Kasznik and Lev, 
1995) or to improve the conditions surrounding stock option grants (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000). 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that disclosure is associated with performance. 
Firms that perform well are likely to meet more favourable conditions when vying for capital. 
Investors perceive firms with sustained superior performance as less risky or they attribute better prospects 
to these firms. Performance will therefore be negatively associated with the cost-of-debt capital. 
Structure variables refer to the economies of scale in producing information and to the extent of 
information asymmetry between investors and firm. One structural variable is the size of the firm; the idea 
is that larger firms will have comparatively lower (accounting) costs to produce the same amount 
information than smaller firms. Larger firms will thus disclose more information. 
The adverse selection problem between the firm and its investors will be larger when information 
asymmetry between the two parties is greater (Healy and Palepu, 2001, Dye, 2001, Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991). Since disclosure is an instrument to reduce information asymmetry, disclosure will be 
more extensive when information asymmetry (prior to disclosure) is perceived to be substantial. 
As large firms are generally thought to be less risky, size is expected to be negatively associated 
with cost-of-debt capital (Fama and French, 1992, 1993). Similarly, information asymmetry increases the  
95 
(default) risk an investor is exposed to when providing capital to a company (Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986, Easley and O’Hara, 2004). The cost-of-capital is therefore increasing in the extent of information 
asymmetry. 
Finally, the last category of factors that impact on the disclosure decision refers to the offer 
variable. Theory suggests that managers who consider making capital market transactions have incentives 
to disclose information to reduce information asymmetry problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Lang and 
Lundholm (1993, 1996) and Healy et al. (1999) find evidence consistent with this idea for equity and debt 
offerings, respectively and Frankel et al. (1995) for both.
69   
The extent of a firm’s capital market transactions may also affect its cost-of-capital because the 
market may interpret the frequency of these transactions as a signal about the firm’s performance (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). For example, frequent, sizable public debt issues may change the market’s assessment 
of the default risk of the firm. Offerings are therefore likely to be associated with the cost-of-debt. 
  In conclusion, we have described 1) some unobservable firm characteristics (costs of disclosure and 
management reputation) that are correlated with the firm’s disclosure policy and 2) joint determinants that 
are likely to impact on both disclosure and cost-of-capital. When omitted from the analysis of the relation 
between cost-of-capital and disclosure, the results are likely to be misleading. In the following sections, we 
document the severity of the bias in analyses that do not incorporate unobservable firm characteristics or 
joint determinants of disclosure and cost-of-capital and suggest a methodology to mitigate the bias.  
 4.4. Research design and variable definitions  
  We start the analysis by replicating Sengupta’s (1998) results on the relation between disclosure 
and cost-of-debt capital. Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation using Ordinary Least 
Squares: 
(1)                                1 1 it i i it it Control Disclosure Intercept YIELD ε β β + + + = ∑ +  
where  
YIELD  = The effective yield to maturity at the moment of a public bond issue. This is our measure 
of the cost-of-debt capital. Yield to maturity is defined as the discount rate that equates the 
current value of all future interest and principal payments to the capital provided by the 
lender at the moment of the bond issue. 
Disclosure  = Joint label for our four measures of corporate disclosure policy: (1) PCTRNK, the 
percentage rank of overall corporate disclosure policy, (2) PCTREL, the percentage rank of 
                                                   
69 Lang and Lundholm (2000) on the other hand provide evidence that increasing disclosure prior to a seasoned equity 
offering may be interpreted as ‘hyping’ the stock and firms experience continued negative returns subsequent to the 
offering announcement. This effect is probably difficult to witness in our sample since we do not have a continuous 
measure of disclosure policy, but instead rely on annual assessments of disclosure. See also, Jog and McConomy 
(2003) and Mak (1996) 
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investor relations disclosure policy, (3) PCTANL, the percentage rank of disclosure 
through the firm’s annual report and (4) PCTOPB, the percentage rank of quarterly and 
other publications disclosures. Percentage ranks are constructed from the assessment of 
corporate disclosure policy by the AIMR Corporate Information Committee in their Annual 
Reviews of Corporate Reporting Practices.
70 Percentage ranks for each disclosure measure 
are computed by ranking each firm from 1 to N within each industry, such that N is 
assigned to the firm with the highest AIMR disclosure score, etc. Subsequently, each firm’s 
rank is divided by the total number of firms rated within its industry to obtain the 
percentage ranks. 
Control  = These measures include leverage, coverage of interest expense, return-on-sales, the log of 
total assets, volatility of firm performance, the size of the bond issue, the issue’s time to 
maturity, the call option properties of the security, the interest on constant maturity US 
treasury bills, the time-series variation in risk premium over that contained in treasure bills, 
and dummy variables for convertible bonds and subordinate debt. These controls intend to 
take into account firm and issue specific factors as well as macroeconomic circumstances. 
For brevity we refer the reader to Sengupta (1998) for a further justification of their 
inclusion in the analysis. Appendix A provides measurement details. Since it is our purpose 
to replicate Sengupta’s findings and then investigate the potential endogeneity bias in the 
relation between cost-of-debt capital and disclosure, we defer discussion of these control 
variables.  
  The time subscripts are of importance. We measure cost-of-debt capital at t+1, while Disclosure 
and all control variables that are not bond issue specific are measured at t. We can therefore consider these 
right hand side variables as predetermined; although these variables may be contemporaneously (at t) 
determined jointly, with regard to future values (t+1) of cost-of debt capital they may be regarded as having 
already been determined (Greene, 2000). This is a common method to make plausible that innovations in 
the dependent variable are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (i.e., to reduce the likelihood of 
simultaneity bias). Bond-issue specific controls are not predetermined and we cannot exclude the possibility 
that they are endogenous. Moreover, to the extent that autocorrelation is present, we can no longer assume 
that the disturbance term is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Results should be interpreted with 
this possibility in mind. 
Next, we evaluate the importance of the first source of endogeneity bias in the OLS regression of 
Equation (1), i.e., the impact of omitted variables known to be a determinant of both cost-of-debt capital 
and disclosure policy. For this purpose, we augment Equation (1) with variables that intend to capture those 
categories listed in Lang and Lundholm (1993) and summarized above as joint determinants of disclosure 
policy and cost-of-capital. Specifically, we estimate the following equation using OLS:  
                                                   
70 These ratings have been frequently used in earlier disclosure studies and are discussed in some detail elsewhere 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1996, Healy and Palepu, 2001, Core, 2001).  
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(2)                                                                                            
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GROWTH    = Average future growth in sales (item #12) between t+1 and t+3. 
FROS  = Average future return-on-sales (as defined earlier) between t+1 and t+3. 
LOSS  = Dummy variable that is unity for firms with negative current net income (item 
#18), and zero otherwise. 
MTB  = Market-to-book ratio at the end of the year, defined as market value of equity 
(item #24×item #25) divided by the book value of equity (item #60).  
FROS×GROWTH  = Interaction term between future return-on-sales and future growth rate. We 
include this variable to capture the potentially non-linear relation between 
performance and disclosure as suggested in Miller (2002). Before computing the 
interaction between FROS and GROWTH each of the variables is demeaned in 




CAPEXP  = Capital expenditures in the current year (item #128) scaled by total assets (item 
#6). This variable captures information asymmetry about the firm’s strategy and, in 
particular about its investment opportunities. 
MOODRNK  = Moody’s ranking of the firm’s bond. MOODRNK equals 100 if the bond is rated 
A1 by Moody’s and 1 if the bond has rating Caa1. MOODRNK declines linearly 
from 100 to 1. We include MOODRNK as a proxy for amount of information 
asymmetry between the firm and its investors. The idea is that high levels of 
information asymmetry will make the firm’s securities more risky and will prompt 
Moody’s to downgrade the firm’s ranking (see, e.g., Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003, 
Ziebart and Reiter, 1992, Kaplan and Urwitz, 1979, Fisher, 1959).
73 
                                                   
71 Sengupta (1998) includes two variables as control variables in his regression that would otherwise have been 
included into this category. These variables (current income and interest coverage) are therefore part of the 
specification of our Equation 1 as ROS and COVER, respectively.  
 
72 Sengupta (1998) includes the logarithm of total assets as a control variable in his regression. This variable 
(LASSETS) was therefore included as control in our Equation 1. Otherwise, it would have been included in the 
category of structure variables to proxy for the economies of scale in producing information. 
 
73 The inclusion of MOODRNK as a determinant of cost-of-debt capital is contentious. While some prior studies have 
added credit ratings as a control variable (Mansi et al., 2003, Campbell and Taksler, 2003, Bagnani et al., 1994), other 
have not. Sengupta (1998) argues that credit rating agencies consider the quality of disclosure when deciding on a 
firm’s credit rating. Including the rating alongside a measure of disclosure may therefore create multicollinearity 
problems and it might become difficult to separate out the effects of disclosure and of credit ratings. We decided to 




ISSUES  = Number of bond issues by firm i in the current year. 
If omitted variables are a source of endogeneity bias in Equation (1) then including the variables 
described above will reduce the amount of bias and OLS estimation of the augmented equation should be 
consistent (in the absence of firm heterogeneity effects). Therefore we document changes in the coefficient 
estimate on Disclosure in Equations (1) and (2) to evaluate the extent of the endogeneity bias caused by 
omitted variables. 
Finally, we investigate both sources of endogeneity bias simultaneously. We use panel data 
techniques (fixed effects)
 74 to estimate the following equation:  
(3)                                                                                            
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  i α   = Any unobservable firm-specific variable that remains fixed over time, and all other variables are 
as defined above. 
Since the firm-specific variable  i α  is assumed to remain constant, an alternative approach to fixed 
effects estimation is to re-specify Equation (3) in first differences and estimate it with OLS.  Differencing 
provides researchers with an easy to implement solution to the heterogeneity bias (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Taking differences in Equation (3) will cause the firm-specific variable  i α to drop out of the equation. Note 
that differencing requires at least two consecutive years of data for each firm. We use first-differences 
estimation as a robustness check on our fixed effects findings. 
Finally, we provide further evidence on the nature of the correlation, which theory suggests exists 
between Disclosure (as well as other independent variables) and the firm heterogeneity variable  i α using a 
                                                                                                                                                                        
believe it is important to try to establish if the market reacts to disclosure directly or to credit ratings which (indirectly) 
reflect disclosure quality. We have also conducted the empirical analyses without MOODRNK and we report these 
results in footnote 32. If MOODRNK is construed as a proxy for information asymmetry then a more appropriate 
measurement is before the firm discloses its information. Since MOODRNK is an issue-specific rating, it is not 
straightforward to implement this in the regressions. We check the robustness of our results to the timing of the 
measurement of information asymmetry by replacing MOODRNK by S&P long term debt rating (Compustat item 
280), which is available for all firm-years in the sample. We use a lagged (t-1) value of this rating to ensure that it is 
measured before the disclosure at t. We report the results for this specification in footnote 32 as well. 
 
74 In principle, Equation (3) could be estimated using fixed and random effects, respectively. The appropriateness of 
each estimator depends on assumptions about the correlation between αi and the included independent variables. If the 
firm-specific characteristics captured in αi are independent of the regressors, random effects estimation is consistent 
and efficient. However, if the firm-specific characteristics are correlated with any of the regressors this estimation 
procedure is inconsistent and fixed effects is preferred. Since we have strong theoretical reasons to believe that firm-
specific characteristics are correlated with the disclosure variable, our priors are that fixed effects estimation is the 
most appropriate when estimating Equation 3.  In fact, unreported results of a Hausman test of the consistency of 
random and fixed effects estimation support the choice for fixed effects. This is further evidence that firm 
heterogeneity is important in the current setting and should be taken into account (using fixed effects) when estimating 
the relation between disclosure and cost-of-debt capital.  
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procedure suggested by Mundlak (1978).  We provide a brief and informal description of Mundlak’s (1978) 
approach in Appendix B. Combined, the results for Equations 1-3 provide us with evidence on the 
magnitude of endogeneity bias caused by firm-specific heterogeneity and omitted variables. Note that while 
we focus on the effect of endogeneity on the coefficient on Disclosure, any of the RHS variables may 
(potentially) be correlated with the error term in the structural equation, and thus be endogenous. In fact, we 
show below this to be the case for CALL and RISK. To the extent that endogeneity is caused by time-
invariant firm heterogeneity, the fixed effects estimation will alleviate the bias in all RHS variables.  
4.4.1. Caveats.  
The use of panel data techniques (especially, fixed effects or differencing) when multiple 
observations of a firm over time are available has become pervasive practice in the economics and finance 
literatures, although accounting researchers have been somewhat slow to emulate the example. This 
literature strongly demonstrates the importance of controlling for unobservable firm (or economic agent) 
heterogeneity in many settings.
75 Fixed effects estimation will, however, not always be successful in 
mitigating the problem of unobserved firm heterogeneity. Zhou (2001), for example, draws attention to the 
observation that if the relation under study is essentially a cross-sectional phenomenon, fixed effects 
estimation will not be effective. Indeed, since fixed effects estimation removes all cross-sectional (between) 
variation, one of its underlying assumptions is that over-time changes within each firm are driving the 
relation of interest. In the context of our setting, we need to establish that disclosure quality changes 
substantially over time for individual firms and that it is this within variation that impacts on cost-of-debt 
capital. Changes in disclosure should be indicative of substantive changes in disclosure policy. The next 
section provides evidence to underpin the validity of using fixed effects in our context.
76 
4.5. Sample and summary statistics 
  The sample comprises 358 firm-year observations from 100 firms during 1986-1996.
77 To be 
included in the sample, the firm needs to fulfil the following criteria: (1) public debt is issued during the 
                                                   
75 Seminal studies include Mundlak (1961, 1978), Hoch (1962), Ben-Porath (1973), Griliches (1977), Ashenfelter 
(1978), Chamberlain (1978), Hausman (1978), Hausman and Taylor (1981). More recent applications in finance 
include Doidge (2004), Campbell and Taksler (2003), Himmelberg et al. (1999), Ashenfelter and Kruger (1994). In 
accounting, Francis et al. (2004), Hail and Leuz (2004) provide fixed effect results. 
 
76 Zhou (2001), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Griliches and Hausman (1986) note that the fixed effect estimator may 
suffer from bias, which is associated with measurement error. Griliches and Hausman (1986) point out that 
measurement error will have a different impact on the fixed effects estimator and the first-differences estimator. Since 
we report fixed effects and first-differences results that are very close, it is unlikely that measurement error is a major 
issue here.  
 
77 Sengupta’s (1998) sample consists of 103 observations (and as many firms, since he only retains one observations 
per firm). We have, due to our design, multiple observations for each firm, and consequently cannot claim that our 
observations are independent. To ascertain the extent of this problem we have compiled a sample in which each firm 
enters only once, and ran the benchmark model on this sample. Our results remained qualitatively unchanged and we 
conclude that any potential downward bias of the standard errors, due to dependent observations, is likely to be minor.    
100 





Subsample  # firms # of Obs.
AIMR rated companies (1986-1996)  932 4705
i. AIMR companies in COMPUSTAT/CRSP  778
ii. AIMR rated companies that issued debt  508 1604
i. and ii. Companies Merged (by year)  331 892
Net of Non-Industrial companies  237 604
After deletion of missing values  180 438
Companies with more than one observation   100 358
 
PANEL B 
Distribution of the Number of times a given firm appears in the sample 
# of times  # Of Firms # of Obs. %
2 35 70 19.6
3 23 69 19.3
4 17 68 19.0
5 9 45 12.6
6 9 54 15.1
7 5 35 9.8
8 1 8 2.2
9 1 9 2.5
Total: 100 358 100
 
PANEL C 
Number of companies used in the analysis by year 












Total: 358 100.00 
101 
 
Table 1: Continued 
  PANEL D 
Number of companies used in the analysis by Industry 
INDUSTRY  # of Firms # of Obs. % 
Aerospace 2 4 1.12
Airline 4 17 4.75
Apparel 1 7 1.96
Chemical 4 16 4.47
Construction 1 2 0.56
Container and Packaging  2 4 1.12
Diversified Companies  2 4 1.12
Domestic Oil  5 14 3.91
Electrical Equipment  4 11 3.07
Food, Beverage and Tobacco  17 48 13.41
Health Care  9 35 9.78
Independent Oil  2 5 1.40
International Oil  1 5 1.40
Machinery 3 13 3.63
Natural Gas Distributors  2 9 2.51
Natural Gas Pipeline  6 30 8.38
Nonferrous and Mining  2 5 1.40
Paper and Forest Products  12 47 13.13
Precious Metals  1 2 0.56
Publishing and Broadcasting  4 15 4.19
Railroad 3 12 3.35
Retail Trade  11 47 13.13
Specialty Chemicals  1 4 1.12
Textiles 1 2 0.56
Total: 100 358 100 
102 




Table provides summary statistics for the variables used in subsequent analyses. The sample includes 100 
companies, which amount to 358 firm-year observations. In order to avoid double counting we use only 
the first debt issue in a given year to measure YIELD. Bond attributes including YIELD are forwarded 
by one year since regressions use period t+1 debt issues when looking at period t disclosures. Disclosure 
score used to construct percentage rankings (PCTRNK, PCTREL, PCTANL, PCTOPB) are collected 
from AIMR-FAF reports over the period 1986-1996. The firm-level control variables are taken from 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged database; debt issues information is taken from SDC Platinum Database; 
Macroeconomic variables come from FRED II. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Variable Mean  St.  Dev.  75
th pct  Median  25th pct 
YIELD  8.138 1.331 9.125 8.065 7.105 
PCTRNK  0.578 0.284 0.824 0.632 0.375 
PCTREL  0.559 0.271 0.793 0.598 0.360 
PCTANL  0.571 0.278 0.806 0.618 0.375 
PCTOPB  0.548 0.285 0.800 0.585 0.308 
LEV  0.240 0.104 0.313 0.238 0.173 
COVER  4.372 5.340 4.925 2.952 1.868 
ROS  0.173 0.087 0.209 0.159 0.114 
ASSETS 9817  11766  12130  7801  3000 
LASSET  8.747 0.967 9.403 8.962 8.006 
RISK  0.394 0.172 0.458 0.361 0.275 
SIZE  179.2 123.5 225.0 149.8  99.7 
LMATUR  16.293 11.193 30.000 10.000 10.000 
CALL  0.174 0.308 0.300 0.000 0.000 
CONVER 0.036  0.187 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SUBOR  0.034 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TBILL  7.311 1.017 8.110 7.340 6.570 
RISKPR  0.669 0.126 0.760 0.650 0.590 
MOODRNK 72.302  28.236  94.737 84.211 36.842 
GROWTH 1.068 0.089 1.109 1.055 1.017 
FROS  0.170 0.085 0.211 0.158 0.110 
MTB  2.755 2.175 3.148 2.039 1.386 
CAPEXP  0.087 0.049 0.110 0.076 0.054 
FROSXGR 0.000 0.007 0.002 0.000 -0.002 
LOSS  0.056 0.230 0.000 0.000 0.000 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sample period and data on yield-to-maturity and other issue characteristics are available on the SDC 
Platinum Database, (2) the firm’s disclosure policy is rated by the AIMR, (3) accounting data is available 
on the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged Database and (4) future sales and earnings data is available to 
compute FROS and GROWTH. We excluded 80 firms with only one observation in the sample due to the 
requirements of the panel data techniques and we deleted firms in the financial industry. Table 1 documents 
the effect of each of the sample filters and breaks down the sample by year and by industry.  The data 
necessary to compute the variables TBILL and RISKPR are taken from the Federal Reserve Database 
(FREDII). 
  Table 2 contains sample summary statistics. The average (median) value of our cost-of-debt capital 
measure [YIELD] is 8.14 (8.07), which is similar to Sengupta’s (1998) findings. The average percentage 
rank of disclosure is (for all four measures) just above 0.5, indicating that our sample firms disclose more 
information than the average firm in their industry. The standard deviation of each disclosure score is about 
0.27, which indicates that we have substantial disclosure variation in our sample. AIMR’s disclosure ratings 
tend to focus on larger and better known firms. This bias is reflected in our sample since sample firms are 
large (mean (median) of total assets is $9.81($7.80) billion). Our sample is less skewed than Sengupta’s 
who reports a mean (median) value of total assets of $10.1 ($6.02) billion.  
  Table 3 reports Pearson correlations (below the diagonal) and their p-values (above the diagonal). 
YIELD is significantly, negatively associated with three disclosure measures and negatively, but not 
significantly with the measure PCTOPB. The three specific disclosure measures (PCTREL, PCTANL and 
PCTOPB) are positively and significantly associated with the overall measure of disclosure (PCTRNK), 
which suggests that disclosure practices via investor relations, the annual report and other publications are 
complementary.  
  We mentioned in the previous section that substantial over-time variation in each firm’s disclosure 
quality is a precondition for applying fixed effects estimation. We conduct a first analysis of whether our 
sample fulfils this precondition in Table 4. The table contains the year-to-year transition probabilities 
matrix, which shows the probability of a firm moving from decile i in year t (shown in the first column) to 
decile j in year t+1 (shown in the first row). Panel A contains the transition matrix for entire AIMR sample 
(1986-1996). Panel B contains the transition matrix for our final sample.  The findings suggest that the final 
sample is representative of the entire AIMR population. More importantly, the probability of staying in the 
same disclosure quality category from year to year generally does not exceed 25% (diagonal entries in each 
panel). Therefore, about 75% of firms either improve or worsen their disclosure over time. It would seem 
that the within variation is substantial and fixed effects estimation should be appropriate in the current 
setting. We address the requirement of substantial over-time variation in the firm’s disclosure quality 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Benchmark model. Table 5 contains the results from pooled OLS regressions of Equation (1) for each of the 
four measures of Disclosure. These regressions replicate and extend Sengupta’s original analysis. As in 
Sengupta (1998, Table 6)
78, we find a negative and strongly significant association (coefficient=-0.33, 
s.e.=0.12)
79 between the measure of overall disclosure policy (PCTRNK) and cost-of-debt capital. We also 
consistently find negative and significant associations between the three other measures of Disclosure 
(PCTREL, PCTANL and PCTOPB) and cost-of-debt capital.  Note that this finding is somewhat in contrast 
with Botosan and Plumlee (2002) who report that the sign of the relation between disclosure and cost-of-
capital is conditional on the type of disclosure (i.e., through investor relations, the annual report or other 
publications). Although not the focus of our attention, we find that most control variables are significant in 
all four regressions and have the same sign as in Sengupta (1998). Together the independent variables have 
good explanatory power; the adjusted R-squared is about 84%. 
Main findings.  We investigate the endogeneity bias caused by omitted ‘joint determinants’ in Tables 6 
through 8. Recall that our claim is that Sengupta’s model omits several variables theory suggests are 
correlated with both disclosure and cost-of-debt capital. We first evaluate whether these ‘joint 
determinants’ are indeed associated with Disclosure in Table 6 – Panel A. We report on regressions of each 
of our four Disclosure measures on those variables suggested in earlier literature, including Performance, 
Structure and Offer variables. The results show that all joint determinants (except for LOSS, LASSET and 
MTB) are significantly associated with our overall measure of Disclosure, PCTRNK. Although the results 
for the other three measures (PCTREL, PCTANL and PCTOPB) are somewhat mixed, we conclude that the 
complete set of variables has significant explanatory power for each Disclosure measure.
80 Table 5 – Panel 
B shows the results of an ANOVA analysis of the four Disclosure measures. We find that allowing firm-
specific intercepts to explain disclosure accounts for much more of the variation in each of the Disclosure 
measures than our complete set of ‘joint determinants’ (the adjusted R-squared in the ANOVA analysis 
averages about 60% versus 9% in the regressions of Panel A). Our interpretation of this finding is that 
unobserved firm-specific factors are a very important consideration in explaining differences in disclosure 
policy. In addition, these results indicate that augmenting the benchmark model with the joint determinants 
alone may not suffice to eliminate the endogeneity bias in the results, if in fact unobserved firm 
heterogeneity is correlated with cost-of-debt capital.  
  
                                                   
78 Note that the magnitudes of our coefficients are not directly comparable to those in Sengupta (1999) because our 
variable definitions are sometimes different.  
 
79 Standard errors throughout the paper are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent.  
80 The simple correlations in Table 2 between each of the ‘joint determinants’ (and their best linear combination) and 
our disclosure variables are low and there is little reason to be concerned about multicollinearity being an issue in our 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7 contains the results of the OLS estimation of the augmented Sengupta model, Equation (2) for each 
of the four Disclosure measures. These regressions only attempt to mitigate the endogeneity bias caused by 
omitted joint determinants. The Performance, Structure and Offer variables we included based on the extant 
literature are generally associated with cost-of-debt capital. The weakest results are obtained for FROS, the 
interaction FROS*GR, CAPEXP and ISSUES, which do not obtain significance in any of the four 
regressions. However, GROWTH, MTB and MOODRNK (LOSS) are strongly (marginally) associated 
with cost-of-debt capital. An F-test on the incremental explanatory power of all Performance, Structure and 
Offer variables together suggests that these variables are helpful in explaining cost-of-debt capital (in the 
overall disclosure measure regression, PCTRNK, F=10.31, p-value<1%)
81. We find that Disclosure and 
cost-of-debt capital are no longer significantly associated once these ‘joint determinants’ are included in the 
regression. Note that the loss of significance is due to a reduced magnitude of the OLS coefficient on 
Disclosure compared with Equation (1) and not because of an increase in the standard errors and thus lack 
of power.  From comparing these results with those of Equation (1), it would seem that in the latter 
equation Disclosure subsumes part of the effect of the joint determinants on cost-of-debt capital, which 
results in an upward bias of the coefficient on Disclosure in Sengupta’s original model.
82 
Table 8 contains the findings for the fixed effects estimation of the augmented Sengupta model, i.e., 
Equation (3) for each of the Disclosure measures.
83 These regressions attempt to simultaneously control for 
firm-specific heterogeneity bias and for endogeneity caused by omitted variables. The findings are 
consistent throughout the table. Cost-of-debt capital is strongly negatively associated with disclosure policy 
at the level of the individual firm. The coefficient estimates range between -0.22 and -0.40 for each of the 
four  Disclosure  measures.  In particular, we find that the fixed effect coefficient in Equation (3) on 
PCTRNK is -0.40 (s.e.=0.13) compared with the OLS coefficient in Equation (1), which is –0.33. The 
implication is that the cost-of-debt capital benefit from increased disclosure is larger than previously 
reckoned. For a median size debt issue of $149.8 million, an improvement of disclosure score from the 25
th 
to the 75
th percentile, may reduce interest payments by about $10.4 million.
84 
So far, while we have directly documented the effect of omitted ‘joint determinants’, we have only 
indirectly shown that unobservable firm-specific factors exist that are associated with both cost-of-debt 
                                                   
81 The (unreported) results for the other three disclosure measures are similar to those for PCTRNK. 
 
82 We also estimated the model without MOODRNK. Unreported results show that in the augmented OLS regressions 
Disclosure remains significant, but the size of the coefficient is smaller than in a model without any control variables 
included. Replacing MOODRNK by the lagged value of S&P’s long term debt rating did not affect the main findings 
and our conclusions remained unchanged. 
 
83 Random effects estimates for PCTREL, PCTANL and PCTOPB are available from the authors upon request. 
 
84 It should be noted, however, that the incremental explanatory power of the Disclosure variable is small (and below 
1%). This is not unexpected though, since our model already explains almost 90% of the variation in cost-of-debt 
capital. What is more, the incremental explanatory power of Disclosure is of similar magnitude as our leverage 
variable, which is always very significant. Therefore, we believe that adding Disclosure to the model is meaningful 
regardless of its low incremental explanatory power. 
  
114 
capital and disclosure. When these unobservable factors remain unaccounted for, the disclosure variable 
will subsume part of their effect on cost-of-capital. In such case, the reported association between cost-of-
debt capital and disclosure is a mixture of the true association between these variables and a spurious part 
due to not accounting properly for unobservable firm-specific factors. We use Mundlak’s (1978) approach 
to investigate directly how unobservable firm-specific factors are associated with disclosure (or other 
independent variables). Table 9 holds the results of this analysis for all four Disclosure measures. We find 
that our measure of overall disclosure (PCTRNK), disclosure via investor relations (PCTREL), and 
marginally disclosure via annual reports (PCTANL) and other publications (PCTOPB) are positively 
associated with unobservable firm-specific factors.
85 Note that several of the control variables in Sengupta’s 
original model are also related with these firm-specific factors (especially, RISK and CALL), which 
reinforces the need for taking these effects into account when investigating the relation between cost-of-
debt capital and disclosure. 
These results confirm the presence of endogeneity bias and imply that firms with higher cost-of-
capital levels are also the firms that happen to disclose more information. This occurs not because 
disclosure is causally related to cost-of-capital, but because both variables are driven by omitted factors. 
The resulting endogeneity bias works against finding a relation in the cross-sectional OLS regressions we 
report in Table 7. As such, our results offer an explanation why some earlier studies fail to find a relation 
between cost-of-capital and disclosure. 
Based on these findings, we evaluate the bias in Sengupta’s model by comparing the fixed effects 
estimation of the coefficient on disclosure in Equation (3) with the OLS estimation of the same coefficient 
in Equation (1). While the difference between the two estimates is sizable at about 21%, this number does 
not fully convey the magnitude of the bias in Equation (1). Considering our earlier analyses together, the 
biases caused by firm heterogeneity and by omitted variables are of opposite sign, partially cancelling each 
other out in this specific setting.  
Additional Analyses. To show that our results do not depend on the specifics of fixed-effect estimation we 
also use OLS to estimate Equation (3) in first differences. The additional data requirement of two 
consecutive years of data reduces the number of firm-year observations to 258. The results (reported in 
Table 9) show that the coefficient on each of our Disclosure measures is similar in magnitude to the fixed 
effects estimates. We also tested whether our results are sensitive to using unadjusted (‘raw’) AIMR 
disclosure scores and whether the relation between disclosure and cost-of-debt capital is different for firms 
that increase vs. decrease disclosure over time. Our results do not change when using raw disclosure 
scores
86  and we do not find differences for firms with increasing or decreasing over time disclosure.  
                                                   
85 We also used feasible generalized least squares to estimate the relation between unobservable firm-specific factors 
and disclosure and our results (not reported, but available on request) were qualitatively similar and did not change our 
conclusions.  
 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































T a b l e  6 
Substantive Changes in Total Disclosure 
it i l l k k j j i i it it Control Offer Structure e Performanc Disclosure Intercept YIELD ε α β β β β β + + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ + 1 1  
 
Table reports the results of OLS and fixed effects estimation of equation (3), but restricts the sample to 
observations with substantive changes in disclosure. Substantive changes are defined as cases when a firm 
moves between two consecutive observations from disclosure quality decile k to decile k±i , where i is greater 
or equal to two.  Sample consists of 68 firms with 182 observations. Deciles are formed on the entire set of 
companies ranked by AIMR in a given year.   
Estimator:    Sign OLS (αi=0)  WITHIN (FIXED EFFECTS) 
Variable  Coeff. St.Dev    P-value Coeff. St.Dev    P-value 
PCTRNK  -  -0.188 0.181 [.300] -0.324 0.149 [.032] 
Performance          
GROWTH -  -0.997 0.439 [.025] -0.732 0.552 [.188] 
FROS  -  -1.607 1.323 [.226] -1.520 1.747 [.387] 
LOSS  +  0.531 0.286 [.065] 0.177 0.204 [.389] 
MTB  -  -0.041 0.024 [.093] -0.048 0.030 [.115] 
FROSXGR  +/-  -1.281 4.470 [.775] -1.869 8.806 [.832] 
Structure          
CAPEXP  - -0.175 1.130 [.877] -1.156 1.627 [.479] 
MOODRNK -  -0.656 0.001  [.000] -0.973 0.003  [.781] 
O f f e r          
ISSUES  - 0.041 0.032 [.198] 0.040 0.039 [.308] 
Controls          
LEV  +  1.342 0.432 [.002] 1.537 1.162 [.189] 
COVER  - -0.242 0.010 [.804] -0.497 0.020 [.807] 
ROS  - 1.275 1.314 [.333] -3.786 1.804 [.039] 
LASSET  - -0.212 0.070 [.003] -0.218 0.197 [.273] 
SIZE  +  0.001 0.000 [.141] 0.001 0.000 [.051] 
RISK  +  0.395 0.282 [.164] -0.218  0.199 [.277] 
LMATUR +  -0.176  0.004 [.648] 0.001 0.004 [.778] 
CALL  +  0.509 0.177 [.005] 0.137 0.138 [.322] 
CONVER -  -2.806  0.434 [.000] -2.776  0.233 [.000] 
SUBOR  + -0.756 0.407  [.065] -0.434 0.481  [.369] 
TBILL  +  1.046 0.039 [.000] 1.057 0.040 [.000] 
RISKPR  +  0.787 0.379 [.039] 1.198 0.368 [.002] 
C    3.024  1.007  [.003]     
Adj-R2     0.857        0.942        
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Finally, we reported transition probabilities in Table 4 and argued that the amount of within-firm 
variation is sufficient to warrant fixed-effects analysis. At the same time, however, since many firms appear 
to be changing from one disclosure quality decile to another, these changes may not reflect the necessary 
substantial changes in disclosure policy. Theory (e.g., Verrecchia, 2001) emphasizes that cost-of-capital 
effects are mainly expected when a firm commits to a higher standard of disclosure (as opposed to a 
transitory change in disclosure quality in any given year). Any ex-ante commitment to a specific disclosure 
quality will translate into a systematic component of disclosure quality and this component will be 
eliminated in the fixed effects estimation.
87 If we were to take theory literally, we should not find a cost-of-
debt capital effect after removing the systematic component of disclosure via fixed effects estimation. Our 
main findings, however, indicate that the changes in our Disclosure metric are such that they have a cost-
of-debt capital effect. Our metric apparently captures substantial disclosure policy changes. On the other 
hand, since so many firms change disclosure policy (in Table 4), one might ask if this interpretation is 
reasonable. Sceptics may argue that if disclosure policy changes happen this often, ex-ante commitment is a 
rather hollow concept.
88 We therefore consider next disclosure quality changes that are more exceptional 
(than movements to adjacent deciles) and which are more likely to capture disclosure policy changes. We 
conduct the following analyses to provide some evidence on this issue. We create disclosure quality deciles 
based on the sample of all AIMR firms (as in Table 4, Panel A). We then retain only those pairs of 
observations in the sample for which it is more likely that they reflect a change in the firm’s commitment to 
a disclosure policy.  Specifically, we retain two consecutive observations if a firm is grouped in decile k 
first and subsequently is grouped in decile k ± i where i ≥ 2. Thus, the new sample contains only those 
observations where the firm ‘jumps’ over adjacent disclosure quality deciles. This restriction results is a 
final sample of 68 firms with 182 observations. We then run our main analysis again on this sample of 
firms with disclosure policy changes. Table 11 holds the details. As expected, we continue to find that 
disclosure policy affects the cost-of-debt capital. As before, OLS estimation of the augmented model 
produces an insignificant coefficient on Disclosure, but after adjusting for firm heterogeneity this 
coefficient is about twice larger than in the OLS regressions and strongly significant.  We conclude from 
this that our original findings are similar to the findings for a sample of firms for which we can be more 
certain that they changed their disclosure policy. Interpreting the original findings as evidence for what 
                                                   
87 Indeed, this is precisely why we use fixed effects estimation. The decision to commit to a disclosure policy is likely 
to be part of a portfolio of simultaneous firm choices on strategy, business profile, risk and environmental segments, 
compensation, and customer/supplier relates policies (Core, 2001). As such, the systematic component is likely to be 
endogenous and should be eliminated from the analysis.  
 
88 One alternative explanation for our findings could be that our Disclosure measure captures mostly random noise or 
performance-related variation in disclosure quality (either because good performance leads to better disclosure or 
because its leads to better perceived disclosure). Noise will attenuate the regression coefficient, but the performance 
part can induce a negative relation between disclosure and cost-of-debt capital. While the performance control 
variables should control for this, the net effect could still be a negative observed relation between disclosure and cost 




happens if a firm changes its commitment to a certain disclosure policy would, consequently, not seem 
unreasonable.  
4.7. Discussion and conclusion 
  Theory prescribes the following steps to address endogeneity. First, researchers should develop a 
theoretical model for the choice being examined. Next, researchers should determine which variables are 
considered exogenous in the setting under study and a reduced form model should be derived. Given that 
the model is identified, the reduced form can be estimated and the structural parameters can be recovered. 
This prescription appears to be ignored in many empirical studies. In particular, the requirement to 
formulate explicitly the underlying model for the choice being examined is, in our observation, seldom met 
in practice.  Such model does not have to be formal, but should be based on a rigorous survey of what is 
known about the choice under investigation. Only once the underlying model is made explicit can the 
econometric properties of the estimated results be understood. 
We argue that our understanding of the relation between cost-of-capital and disclosure is precarious 
because of the existence of an endogeneity bias in extant work. We investigate two important sources of 
endogeneity bias, (1) unobservable firm heterogeneity and (2) observable omitted variables. Theory 
suggests that firm heterogeneity may arise due to differences in costs of disclosure between firms or 
because management reputation varies among firms. Cost of disclosure as well as management reputation 
impacts on both cost-of-debt capital and disclosure. Neither is directly observable to the researcher and 
when omitted from the empirical analysis causes endogeneity bias. Earlier empirical and theoretical work 
has suggested that variables reflecting firm performance, structure and offerings are related to disclosure 
policy. These variables also affect cost-of-debt capital. Similar as before, when omitting these variables 
from the analysis an endogeneity bias is likely to arise.  
  We investigated how each of these two endogeneity biases affect the estimation of the relation 
between cost-of-debt capital and disclosure and documented substantial effects for both, albeit that firm 
heterogeneity appears to be the more important one. It also appears that in the current setting the two 
sources of bias are of opposite sign, which makes the net effect underestimate the true magnitude of the 
bias. We further investigate firm heterogeneity and show that disclosure is positively and significantly 
associated with unobservable firm-specific factors that cause heterogeneity. This reinforces our claim that 
the association between disclosure and cost-of-debt capital is partially driven by the disclosure variable 
reflecting omitted firm-specific factors. 
We attempt to mitigate endogeneity bias by relying on theory to identify additional variables 
correlated with both disclosure and cost-of-debt capital and by applying fixed effects estimation. Fixed 
effects estimation is only expected to be helpful if the relation of interest between two variables is driven by 
changes over time within the firm. The relation under investigation should not be a cross-sectional 
phenomenon, since between variation is eliminated in the fixed effects approach. Empirically, we show that  
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in our setting over-time changes in firm disclosure are substantial, which speaks to the fact that the relation 
between disclosure and cost-of-debt capital is surely not just a cross-sectional attribute.  This finding is 
substantiated by the results of the fixed effects estimation, which demonstrate that after removal of the 
cross-sectional variation, a strong association exists between disclosure and cost-of debt capital. Implicitly, 
fixed effects estimation assumes that the changes in our disclosure measure are an indication of substantive 
changes in disclosure policy. Some theoretical studies suggest that cost-of-capital effects are expected to be 
most strongly when a firm commits to a certain level of disclosure ex ante. Since such commitment would 
lead to a relatively constant level of disclosure over time for any one firm, its effect would be subsumed by 
the variable  i α  and drop out in the fixed effects estimation. In contrast, we established a strong relation 
between cost-of-debt capital and disclosure in the fixed effects estimation which is consistent with (1) 
changes in our disclosure measure being indicative of substantive changes in (ex ante commitment to) 
disclosure policy – and therefore not subsumed in  i α , or (2) changes in disclosure matter even after 
controlling for a firm’s overall ex ante commitment to a specific level of disclosure.  The latter explanation 
assumes that ex ante commitment to disclosure is not the only way to obtain cost-of-capital effects (see for 
a similar opinion: Dye, 2001). Earlier empirical work seems to concur. Healy et al. (1999) and Lundholm 
and Myers (2002), for example, show that changes in disclosures impact on stock return and stock liquidity. 
While we readily concede that the burden of proof is on the researcher to make sure that fixed effect 
estimation is appropriate in a specific setting to address endogeneity, we also believe that in our setting it 
clearly is a helpful method to mitigate at least some of endogeneity’s confounding effects.  
Based on our findings, we recommend that researchers collect multiple observations for each firm 
in their sample and use either a first-differences specification and OLS or fixed effects estimation to address 
the endogeneity bias in the relation between cost-of-debt capital and disclosure. Without explicitly 
accounting for endogeneity in this relation, any causal inference is likely to be fraught with problems. 
Some may argue that using fixed effects estimation to address endogeneity in this or other settings 
is too simple a solution for a complex problem. Perhaps this is true, but at a minimum researchers should be 
warned that some concern is warranted if they find that OLS results change dramatically after the inclusion 
of fixed-effects. If nothing else, fixed effects may function as a crude diagnostic that the findings need 
additional scrutiny. 
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4.A. Variable definitions. 
YIELD  = The effective yield to maturity at the moment of bond issue. 
PCTRNK  = The percentage rank of overall corporate disclosure policy. 
PCTREL  = The percentage rank of investor relations disclosure policy. 
PCTANL  = The percentage rank of disclosure through the firm’s annual report. 
PCTOPB  = The percentage rank of quarterly and other publications disclosures.  
GROWTH  = Average future growth in sales (item #12) between t+1 and t+3. 
FROS   = Average future return-on-sales (see, below) between t+1 and t+3. 
LOSS  = Dummy variable that is unity for firms with negative current net income (item #18), and 
zero otherwise. 
MTB  = Market-to-book ratio at the end of the year, defined as market value of equity (item 
#24×item #25) divided by the book value of equity (item #60).  
FROS×GROWTH  = Interaction term between future return-on-sales and future growth rate.  
CAPEXP  = Capital expenditures in the current year (item #128) scaled by total assets (item #6).  
MOODRNK  = Moody’s bond rating converted into the linear scale. 
ISSUES  = Number of bond issues by firm i in the current year. 
LEV  = Leverage, defined as long-term debt (Compustat item #9) divided by total assets 
(Compustat item#6). 
COVER  = Coverage of interest expenses, a measure of the firm’s ability to meet its debt service 
requirements, computed as income before extraordinary items and interest expense 
(item#18+item #15) divided by interest expense (item #15). 
ROS  = Return-on-Sales, as a measure of the firm’s operating performance, computed as earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (item #13) divided by sales (item #12). 
ASSET  = Total assets (item #6).  
127 
LASSET  = Log of total assets, to proxy for the size of the firm. Computed as the logarithm of total 
assets (item #6). 
RISK  = Volatility of the firm’s performance, defined as the firm’s highest stock price in year t 
(item #23) minus the firm’s lowest stock price in year t (item #22) divided by the end-of-
year stock price (item #24). 
SIZE  = Size of the bond issue in millions of dollars. This is the amount of capital received by the 
borrower. 
TTM   =  Time  to  maturity. 
CALL  = The callability of the security, ranging between zero and unity. It the bond is callable 
form the moment of issue CALL equals unity. CALL is zero for non-callable securities. 
CALL is computed as the bond’s maturity minus the time from the moment that the bond 
first becomes callable divided by the bond’s time to maturity. 
CONVER  = Bond convertibility. Dummy variable that takes the value of unity if the bond is 
convertible and zero otherwise. 
SUBOR  = Bond subordination. Dummy variable that takes the value of unity for subordinate debt 
and zero otherwise. 
TBILL  = Interest on constant maturity US treasury bonds. These bonds are matched with treasury 
bills by maturity. A time weighted average is computed if the maturity of the bond does not 
match with that of the treasury bill.  
RISKPR  = Measure of the time-series variation in risk premium over that contained in TBILL. 
Defined as the difference between the yield on a Moody’s Aaa bond and a treasury bill 
with 30 years maturity.  
4.B. Mundlak’s (1978) approach 
In the random effects framework, a fundamental assumption is that the firm-specific effects are 
treated as strictly exogenous to present, future and past values of explanatory variables (Hsiao, 2003). 
Mundlak (1978) criticized the random effects specification precisely because there is usually very little 
reason to assume that firm-specific effects αi are uncorrelated with the regressors explicitly controlled for. 
If one neglects such correlation the inferences are incorrect. Mundlak (1978) relaxes the assumption of 
strict exogeneity by allowing the individual effects to depend linearly on the average values of individual-
specific means of the explanatory variables. Specifically: 
] [ ... 1 1 M x x y it i kit k it it ε α β β β + + + + + =  
] [ ... . . 1 1 regression Auxiliary x x i ki k i i ω κ κ α + + + =  
where  . . 1 ,..., ki i x x are average values of regressors for each individual i.   
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The coefficients  k κ κ ,..., 1 capture the extent of the correlation between the explanatory variable and 
the error term  i α . Mundlak demonstrated that the GLS vector of coefficients  ] ,..., [ 1 k κ κ is equal to the 
following difference: 
within between β β ˆ ˆ − , where 
between β ˆ is a vector of slope coefficients from the regression 
where individual specific means in the dependent variable  . i y  are regressed on the individual specific 
means in the independent variables  . . 1 ,..., ki i x x ; and 
within β ˆ is the Fixed Effects estimator. Moreover, 
Mundlak (1978) showed that GLS vector of coefficients in model M given the auxiliary regression equals 
the Fixed Effects estimator. On these grounds he claimed that there is only one correct estimator, which is 
the F.E. estimator.  
Under the null hypothesis of no endogeneity 
between β ˆ  and 
within β ˆ  , are independent and it is easy to 






















Implied Cost of Capital When Future Expected 
Returns Are Stochastic 
5.1. Introduction 
Uncertainty about the future expected (equilibrium) rates of return used to discount future cash flows 
affects the value of equity. Traditional valuation models used to calculate the implied cost of capital (such 
as the dividend discount model, the discounted cash-flows model or the residual income model) do not take 
this into account. Instead these models assume constant discount rates. This study provides both evidence 
that such an assumption may lead to a substantial downward bias in the implied cost of capital estimates, 
and a way to adjust for this bias. The bias is especially pronounced for companies in uncertain 
environments. 
Standard expressions of the present value of expected future cash flows presuppose non-stochastic 
discount rates (Fama, 1977). Such assumption is unlikely to hold in practice however, as the risk profiles of 
many companies are changing. The literature has recognized that equilibrium rates of return are uncertain 
(e.g., Samuelson, 1961, Campbell and Shiller, 1989, Campbell, 1991, Fama and French, 2002, Feltham and 
Ohlson, 1999, Vuolteenaho, 2002). Campbell (1991) finds that 91.6% of aggregate returns variance is due 
to changes in expectations about future returns. Evidence in Vuolteenaho (2002) suggests that changes in 
expected cashflows diversify at the aggregate level but, at the same time, the variance in expected returns 
remains large. 
The time-variation in the expected rates of return which arises from macroeconomic shocks, causes 
changes in risk-free rates and aggregate equity premia, i.e., the price of risk (e.g., Blanchard, 1993, 
Jagannathan, McGratten, and Scherbina, 2001). Besides macroeconomic causes of uncertainty in expected 
returns, firms' individual risk factors and price of risk vary over time. This, for example, happens naturally 
over a firm's life cycle when a company exercises its growth options (and it becomes clearer how the future 
of the firm will evolve), enters new industries, undertakes new investments, experiences shocks to their 
productivity, or develops new growth options. 
While modern finance theory may easily accommodate the assumption of stochastic discount rates, 
the present value models do not represent a convenient and substantially general tool from a theoretical  
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perspective. As a result, little progress has been made to generalize the standard (present value) valuation 
models with respect to the uncertainty about future discount rates (one exception is Ang and Liu 2004).
89 
A vast body of recent empirical literature relies on the estimates of firm-specific implied cost of 
capital (Botosan, 1997, Botosan and Plumlee, 2002, 2005, Brav, Lehavy, and Michaely, 2004, Chen, 
Jorgensen and Yoo, 2004, Easton and Monahan, 2005, Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper, 2004, Gode 
and Mohanram, 2002, Guay, Kothari and Shu, 2004, Hail, 2003, Hail and Leuz, 2004a, 2004b, Lee, Ng and 
Swaminathan, 2004 among others). The benefit of doing so is that the implied cost of capital is based on 
forward looking information and is believed to exhibit less noise than the estimates derived from realized 
returns (e.g., risk factor models) or cash flows.
90 
Studies have documented that the equity premia implied by residual income models are significantly 
lower than those historically realized. Specifically, Claus and Thomas (1998), and Gebhardt, Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000) (hence on CT and GLS) report average implied equity premia of 3.40 and 2.50%, 
respectively, while the corresponding historical risk premium equals, in the CT sample, 7.16%. 
In an efficient market, where risks are appropriately priced, the historical average risk premium 
should yield an unbiased estimate of the equity premium (Claus and Thomas, 2001). Thus, the evidence of 
a gap between the realized average risk premium and the average implied cost of capital is puzzling and the 
question of why it exists remains unsettled. Practitioners, such as Ibbotson Associates, suggests that the 
equity risk premium lies in the region of 7 to 9%, which differs substantially from the documented implied 
equity premia. 
I use three standard valuation models (described in GLS, CT and Easton (2004)) to estimate the 
implied cost of capital. I replicate the findings reported in earlier work before augmenting each of these 
three models with an uncertainty-adjustment factor, which accounts for the stochastic nature of the future 
expected returns. The uncertainty in future expected returns is expected to vary across industries and with 
size and book-to-market proxies. Therefore, I measure the uncertainty in expected returns across 48 Fama-
French industries, as well as across 25 portfolios based on size and book-to-market quintiles. To determine 
the variance of the future expected returns, I build up the work of Campbell (1990) and Vuolteenaho 
(2002).
91 I find substantial differences in the variance of expected returns (across industry, size and book-
to-market portfolios): high-tech industries and smaller firms with lower book-to-market face higher 
uncertainty about expected returns. 
                                                   
89They develop a practitioner-oriented model to value future cash flows when expected returns are stochastic. The 
model provides a rich framework to capture uncertainty in expected returns and incorporates the effect of changing 
market risk premiums, risk-free rates and conditional betas in a context of conditional CAPM. The model however is 
not practical to determine the implied cost of capital as it yields a series of different discount rates which are applied to 
future cash flows, i.e., the term structure of future discount rates. 
 
90For example, Fama and French (1997) demonstrate that expected return estimates are notoriously noisy even at the 
industry level. 
 
91I do not perform a variance decomposition as it captures the capitalized effect of shocks to the interest rate. Instead, I 
estimate the variance of the year to year innovations in expected returns.  
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The results suggest that all three standard valuation models examined here suffer from a bias in the 
implied cost of capital of about 3.5% at the aggregate level. The implied risk premia range between 
5.961% (6.301% ) and 8.91% (9.27%) when the uncertainty in the expected returns is modeled by 
industry (by size and book-to-market ratio). Once adjusted for this bias, the implied cost of capital is close 
to historically realized returns and to practitioners' assessments. 
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, it demonstrates that uncertainty in the future 
expected rates of return, used to discount future expected cash flows, needs to be taken into account when 
inverting a present value model (e.g., DDM, DCF, or RIM) to estimate the implied cost of capital. Ignoring 
this uncertainty in valuation, results in a significant downward bias in the implied cost of capital. The 
degree of the bias correlates with firm specific characteristics (e.g., industry, size and book-to-market) and 
failure to adjust for the bias can easily lead to a correlated omitted variable problem and thus to spurious 
relations between conventional implied cost of capital metrics and their economic determinants. This may 
lead to incorrect inferences and is particularly important in the light of findings in Easton and Monahan 
(2004) that implied cost of capital estimates are highly unreliable. 
The findings can explain several counterintuitive results in prior research. Specifically, GLS find that 
the implied cost of capital is (i) positively associated with book-to-market ratio and (ii) negatively 
associated with the dispersion in analysts' forecasts. A priori one may expect the opposite. Note, however, 
that book-to-market (high forecast dispersion) is negatively (positively) associated with the uncertainty 
about future expected rates of return, which in turn implies that book-to-market (dispersion) is negatively 
(positively) related with the downward bias in the implied cost of capital. Thus, low book-to-market ratio 
(high dispersion) generally means lower cost of capital when the bias is not taken into account. 
Second, I offer an easy to implement way to incorporate uncertainty about future expected returns 
into standard valuation models. The proposed model differs in that it pre-multiplies the present value of 
future expected dividends (cash flows) by a factor increasing in the variance of expected returns. The model 
is of interest because, in addition to abundant empirical evidence that expected returns change over time, 
the study by Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) shows that the inclusion of time-varying discount rates 
is essential to the success of the intrinsic value estimates in the sense of their ability to detect deviations 
from fundamental value.
92 
Third, I offer an explanation for why a number of recent studies that evaluate the performance of 
commonly used valuation models have documented that the predicted firm value is biased downwards (e.g., 
Frankel and Lee, 1998, Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 1999, Lee, Myers and Swaminathan, 1999, Myers, 
1999, Francis, Olsson and Oswald, 2000, Choi, O'Hanlon and Pope, 2006). The downward bias is 
particularly pronounced for companies that went public (Chemmanur and Loutskina, 2005). This evidence 
may be explained by incorporating the uncertainty with respect to future expected returns into the valuation 
model, because this type of uncertainty implies that firm value consists of the present value of future 
                                                   
92The analysis in the study shows that intrinsic value estimates that do not include time-varying interest rates (i) have 
little power in predicting returns and (ii) exhibit the ability to track the fundamental value better.   
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expected cash flows plus an additional term, which will generally be positive. This is consistent with the 
analysis in Ang and Liu (2004) who show that ignoring the stochastic nature of expected returns may result 
in up to 50% undervaluation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides examples that further motivate 
the analysis and develops a model that incorporates the uncertainty in expected returns. Section 3 
implements the model by relying on a variance decomposition approach. Section 4 describes the data used 
to conduct the empirical analysis. Section 5 lays out the empirical findings. Section 6 discusses future work 
related to generalizing the model, and the final section concludes the paper. 
 5.2. Valuation with Stochastic Expected Returns 
 This section begins by providing intuitive examples of how uncertainty in expected returns may 
affect prices. Subsequently it provides a general valuation model that incorporates the uncertainty in the 
expected returns and discusses its implications for computing the cost of capital.  
 5.2.1.Why Does Uncertainty Matter? 
  Uncertainty about future expected rates of return (r ) can be valued because gains from 
unanticipated decreases in discount rate, on average, outweigh losses due to unanticipated increases in r . 
Therefore, uncertainty about future discount rates must be reflected by the stock price. 
Consider the following example. A firm generates constant perpetual dividends d  and thus, 
conditional on r , has value of  r d/ . Further, assume that due to some unforseen economic shock, r  may 































. In percentage terms this means that firm value 















. Clearly, the gains of changes in return outweigh the 
losses and the differences can be substantial. For instance, for  20% = r  and  10% = α , firm value will 
decrease by 33.3% when the discount factor r  goes up, while it will increase by 100% when r  goes down. 
In this simplified example investors benefit, on average, when r  is random and prices will reflect the 
uncertainty in r . 
I show, next, that the implied cost of capital, as it is conventionally computed, cannot be compared 
directly to the expected rate of return that we observe over a long time span. Consider another example and 
for simplicity assume that a firm has constant expected perpetual dividends D independent of discounting. 
Also assume that investor does not know r  but rather has a prior belief about its distribution. In this case 
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 The last inequality follows from the convexity of the function under the expectation operator. In 
order for the price to be equal to the last term in (1), it is necessary to subtract a positive number from the 





− ) ~ (
) (
= 0  (2) 
 where  a r E i − ≡ ) ~ (  is the definition of the internal rate of return or the implied cost of capital. It 
follows that  ) ~ ( < r E i . Note that the parameter a will be proportional to the variance of the required rate of 
return. This, in turn, implies that the degree of bias in the implied cost of capital will vary across firms and 
across industries as the uncertainty in expected returns will differ among them as well. 
 5.2.2. Pricing Equation 
 A fundamental asset pricing equation is written as  
   )) ( ( = 1 1 1 + + + + t t t t t D P m E P  (3) 
 where  t P  is stock price at time t,  1 + t D  is the amount of dividends at  1 + t , and  1 + t m  is a pricing 
kernel. The pricing kernel is a market wide random variable that reflects future state prices and from an 
empirical perspective represents a set of risk factors.
93 It follows from equation (3) that expected return on a 
security is given by the following equation:  
   )) , ( (1 ) ( = ) ( 1 1
1
1 1 + +
−
+ + − t t t t t t t R m Cov m E R E  (4) 
 Since a state independent payoff of unity in  1 + t  should be priced at one over the risk free rate at 
time t (4) can be written as  
   t t
f
t t t r R R E + ≡ + + 1 ) (1 = ) ( 1 λ  (5) 
 where  ) , ( = 1 1 + + − t t t t R m Cov λ  and reflects the price(s) of risk and conditional beta(s) of a security. 
To incorporate uncertainty about the future expected rates of return into a stock valuation model 
consider the following definition of expected return:  













1 1 = 1  (6) 
 Restating (6) in terms of  t P  and iterating it forward once gives  
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E  (8) 
                                                   
93In conditional CAPM, for example, 
m
t t t t R b a m 1 1 = + + + , where 
m
t R 1 +  is the return on the market portfolio.  
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 with the last equality following from the law of iterated expectations. Repeating the iterations and 
assuming the transversality condition to hold the price of a security can be written as  

































Since the future risk-free rates, prices of risk, and the firms' conditional betas are stochastic, equation 
(5) implies that rates  s r  are random for  t s >  and thus we cannot assume them constant and therefore we 
cannot take them out of the expectation in (9). To see the implications for this with respect to valuation 
denote  1 1 = − + s s r R , fix  0 = t , and conduct a second order Taylor series expansion around the 
unconditional mean  ρ ≡ ) ( s R E  (by differentiating with respect to the whole vector 












































































































 where  R E R G ( = 0 − ). 
It follows that the firm value at time t may be written as:  









τ ρ 1 =
 (11) 
Thus the price equals to the usual present value of future dividends discounted using unconditional 
expected return (i.e., long run expected return) plus an additional term  t Q , which is generally positive. Note 
that when the variance in the future expected returns is zero, the equation (11) reduces to the traditional 
valuation formula. The last term Q in (10) and (11) involves a large number of covariances and to obtain a 
closed form solution requires an assumption about expected return generating process. This is developed in 
Section 3. 
As traditional valuation models ignore the term  t Q  in (11), this potentially explains that they value 
estimates that are too low (see references in the Introduction). For the same reason, the difference between 
                                                   
94The second order term in the approximation will have a first order effect on our results since the variance of r  is 
non-zero. The higher order terms in the Taylor series will be of second order importance and should not materially 
affect the results.  
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implied cost of capital (as documented in GLS, CT and others) and historically realized returns can emerge. 
Intuitively, suppose we observe two firms with future expected dividends (or book-value and future 
expected earnings) and expected rates of returns. Also assume that the first firm exhibits uncertainty about 
future expected returns, while the second does not. The price of the first firm must be larger due to a 
positive term  t Q  in (11). Therefore, DMD, DCF or RIM models will result in a lower implied rate of return 
for the first company, since  t Q  is positive and thus we need to increase the implied cost of capital in order 
to satisfy (11). By assumption, the expected rates of returns of both companies are the same, it is the 
uncertainty that differs between two cases. 
5.3. Implementation 
In this section, I evaluate the bias in the implied cost of capital which results from overlooking the 
uncertainty in future expected rates of return. I begin by making a number of assumptions to assess 
empirically the magnitude of  t Q  in equation (11). While some of these assumptions may seem ad hoc, the 
purpose is (not to develop the most comprehensive model, but rather) to propose a simple model that allows 
researchers to assess the importance of the uncertainty about future expected returns when measuring the 
implied cost of capital. Subsequently, I consider the implications of the model on a practical example of 
Jonson&Jonson. I proceed with estimating the variance of the innovations in expected rates of return 
(which is necessary to compute  t Q ) by using the methodology of Campbell (1991). I end this section by 
outlining three commonly used valuation models and how to adjust them for the uncertainty in expected 
returns. 
 5.3.1. Assessment of the bias 
Following Campbell (1990) and others, I assume that future expected returns follow a first order 
autoregressive process  t t t R R ε α ρ α + + − −1 ) (1 =  where  t ε  is i.i.d with mean zero and variance 
2
t ε σ . The 
unconditional expectation and variance of  t R  are  ρ = ) ( t R E ,  ) /(1 = ) (
2 2 α σε −
t t R Var  respectively with 
(0,1) ∈ α .
95 An autoregressive process is appropriate for the following reason. When a company 
undertakes new investments, decides to exercise its growth opportunities, or successfully launches a new 
product its expected return will change. These shock to the expected rate of return are likely to persist over 
a number of periods. For this reason, I expect the α  parameter to be relatively high.
96, 
97 
                                                   
95See also Campbell and Ammer (1993), Vuolteenaho (2004) Callen and Segal (2004) for a similar assumption. 
 
96Campbell (1991) considers α  in the range of 0.5 to 0.9. 
 
97A higher order autoregressive processes may also be used instead of AR(1) process. However, the benefit of doing 
so will not benefit a practitioner substantially because the higher order autoregressive process, which exhibits positive 
decaying auto-correlation structure, should be reasonably well approximated by AR(1) process.  
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For tractability purposes, I also assume that the innovations in future dividends are uncorrelated with 
the innovations in the future expected returns.
98 This avoids the need to make assumptions about a process 
describing the evolution of the dividends, and the model is much easier to solve in a closed form. This 
assumption may be justified by the findings of Campbell (1991) that almost 92% of the variance in 
aggregate returns is due to changes in expected returns and only 7% is due to the covariance between 
changes in expected returns and dividends. With this in mind, the assumption of zero correlation should not 
be harmful for my purposes, at least at the aggregate level (in Section 7, I explicitly model the correlation 
between the innovations in expected dividends and expected returns). Under these assumptions, Appendix 
A demonstrates that  0 Q  in (10) can be expressed as:  
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 and  g  is a growth rate in  t Q . 
When a company operates in a steady state, the growth rate g  equals to zero or to the inflation rate.
99 
Actual growth rates may in fact be higher, however choosing  g  more conservatively works against finding 
any bias in the implied cost of capital. For this reason such assumption is appropriate in order to assess (the 
lower bound of) the bias in the implied cost of capital. 
Equation (12) represents the term necessary to augment the traditional present-value-based models. 
Following equations (11) and (12), firm value can be expressed as follows:  































) (1 =  (14) 
Equation (14) is a simple and intuitively appealing formula. The only difference between equation 
(14) and the traditional valuation model is that the standard model is pre-multiplied by a factor that adjusts 
for uncertainty in the future expected rates of return. 
It is useful to quantify the effect of uncertainty with respect to the implied cost of capital ( ρ ). I do so 
based on data from the numerical example of Johnson and Johnson, described in the appendix to GLS. The 
variance of the yearly innovations in  t r  is set to 0.005, 0.010 and 0.020% respectively. The following 
parameters are used as of November 30th, 1995: price  P =$86.63, book value  0 B =11.08, EPS  3.68 = 1 FY , 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
98E.g. price of risk may change, while expected dividends stay the same. Alternatively, the variance (and thus 
covariances of future cash flows with the market) may change without impacting on their expected value. 
 
99Similar assumptions is made by all traditional valuation models when calculating the expression for terminal value at 
a certain future date.  
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Figure 1: Year t difference between actual and predicted prices for various ρ . Calculations are based on 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) 
First, I consider RIM model as implemented in GLS. 
101 Each curve in the Figure 1 shows the 
difference (valuation error) between the actual price and value predicted by the RI model conditional on  ρ  
varying from 5 to 20%, and on different levels of variance of expected returns  ε σ . The cost of capital is 
determined at the point where each line crosses the zero level on the vertical axis. The first bold line is the 
solution that follows from the RI model of GLS. It yields an implied cost of capital estimate of 7.12% 
which is the same as reported in Appendix of GLS. 
The results are strikingly different once the model incorporates uncertainty about future expected 
returns. The cost of capital increases considerably and ranges between 10 to 13%, depending on the 
variance 
2
t ε σ . This suggests that J&J faces a risk premium that is much larger than suggested by the 
standard RI model.    
                                                   







t R Var . 
101GLS rely on explicit analysts' forecasts of EPS for the first three years and thereafter assume that a firm's ROE 
performance will return to the industry median ROE over the years 4 to 12. Eventually, at time  12 = T , GLS assume 




Figure 2: Year t difference between actual and predicted prices for various ρ . Calculations are based on 
Claus and Thomas (2001). 
Next, I consider the same example but now using the RIM implemented in CT.
102 Figure 2 yields cost 
of capital estimates similar to GLS. As in previous case, the variance in future expected returns 
substantially affects the solution.  Year t difference between actual and predicted prices for various ρ  
based on Claus and Thomas (2001).   
Finally, the J&J data are used to implement the model outlined in Easton (2004).
103 The results based 
on this model are displayed in Figure 3 and are similar to the cases of CT and GLS. Overall, the analysis 
suggests that the bias in the implied cost of capital can be sufficiently large to explain why prior studies 
found relatively low equity premia. 
5.3.2. Variance of the innovations in expected returns 
The model proposed in Section 3.1 requires estimation of the variance of the innovations in expected 
returns. I follow the approach taken in Campbell (1991, see also Vuolteenaho, 2002, Callen and Segal, 
                                                   
102Their model is outlined in detail in the next section. It uses analysts' forecasts to predict the residual income for the 
five years following  0 = t . For the period thereafter, CT determine the terminal value of residual income by assuming 
that residual income grows at the inflation rate. For consistency, the same payout ratio is used as in the GLS example. 
 
103This version of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) [OJ] model uses only two years of analyst forecasts data and 
then assumes that the growth rate in the `economic' income is zero.  
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2004). A vector-autoregressive (VAR) specification is used to decompose stock returns into two  
 
Figure 3: Year t difference between actual and predicted prices for various ρ . Calculations are based on 
Easton (2004) 
components: shocks to expected returns (expected return news) and shocks to expected dividends (cash-
flow news). As before, expected rates of return follow an AR(1) process  




+ + + + + + t t t t t R E R E ε α α  (15) 
where  2 1 1
~
) ( + + + − ≡ t t t t R E E ε  is the innovation in one-period-ahead expected return. 
Firms are assumed to follow a linear information dynamics given by the following VAR system:  
   1 , , 0 1 , = + + + Γ + t i t i t i u z z γ  (16) 
where  t i z ,  is a vector of firm-specific state variables with the first element of firm's realized stock return 
( t i R ,
~
≡ ). Then, we may write  
   ) ( =
~
) ( = 1 , 0 0 1 2 1 1 + + + + Γ + Γ + − t t t t t t u e R E E γ γ ε  (17) 
 
2
1 1 1 ' = ) ( ε σ ε ≡ Γ′ ΓΣ + e e Var t  (18) 
 where  ) ' ( = , , t i t i u u E Σ  and  1 e  is the unit vector, which has the first element equal to one and zeros 
elsewhere.  
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Note that prices (and realized stock returns) will reflect the capitalized effect of the changes in the 
future expected returns and therefore the variance decomposition of returns is not performed. Instead, I 
estimate the parameter 
2
ε σ  given by (18). 
Following Vuolteenaho (2002), I include the following state variables into the vector  t i z , : 
)
~
( = , , t i t i R log r  – natural log of realized (raw) return;  ) / ( = / , , t i t i M B log m b  – log of book-to-market ratio; 
) / (1 = 1 , , , − + t i t i t i B X log roe  – log of return on equity;  t r  – year-industry median  t i r, ;  t m b/  – year-industry 
median  t i m b , / ;  t roe  – year-industry median  t i roe , ;  t f  – risk-free rate measured by the rate of return on a 
T-bill with 10-year maturity.
 104 
Parameters  0 γ , Γ and Σ may not be the same across firms and therefore they are allowed to vary 
depending either on industry or on size and book-to-market quintiles. The vector autoregression in (16) is 
estimated using an iterative SUR procedure.   
 5.3.3. Standard Models and Uncertainty Adjustment 
 In this subsection, I briefly describe three models commonly used in the literature to estimate the 
implied cost of capital and their implementation. 
The model in GLS relies on current book value  0 B , historical payout ratio k  and 12 years ahead 
forecasts of earnings per share (EPS). Actual analysts' forecasts are used for the first three years. To 
forecast the remaining 9 EPS values, it is assumed that return on equity (ROE) decays towards the industry 
median ROE. After year  12 = t  residual income remains constant. Hence, the firm value at time t=0 is 































t  (19) 
 where  t ROE  and  t B
~
 are forecasted return on equity and future book value. 
The model in CT is somewhat different. It relies on analysts' forecasts for five initial years and then 
assumes a constant growth in the residual income, which is set equal to the inflation rate. Since CT 
aggregate data before computing the implied risk premia, their model assumes 50% dividend payout.
105 As 
this need not hold at individual firm level, I use firm-specific historical dividend payout ratios. The 
valuation is given by  
                                                   
104I do not use market adjusted returns or excess returns because the variation in expected returns is in part due to 
market and economy-wide movements. 
 




































t  (20) 
 where  t X
~
 is forecasted future earnings and  ae g  is growth in RI after  5 = t . 
Finally, the OJ model (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005) implemented in Easton (2004) does not 
rely on book values but instead uses EPS forecasts for two consecutive years to determine the economic 
income. From year 2 onwards, the model assumes that economic income remains constant, which yields the 
following valuation model  
  
2
1 2 2 0 )/
~ ~
( = mpeg mpeg r X d r X V − −  (21) 
All three models are used as benchmark when evaluating the cost of capital. Their uncertainty-









1 =  in (14) (at  0 = t ) may be 
restated in the form of  0 V  given by either of (19), (20), and (21) we may write  
   , ) (1 = 0 0 V P θ +  (22) 
 
} , , {
,














 where,  Var( t R ) is the unconditional variance in the expected returns ( ) /(1
2 2 α σ ε − ) and α  is the 
autoregressive parameter. The long-run average expected return or the implied cost of capital is given byρ . 
At this point, it becomes necessary to make an assumption about the autoregressive parameter α . 
Following Campbell (1991), I set α  equal to 0.75, which implies that today's shock (almost entirely) fades 
away over the following 10 years.
106, 
107 When implementing the model empirically, I assume  g  to equal 
the long run inflation rate of 3%. 
I use a grid search procedure in order to solve (22) and determine the implied cost of capital for each 
company. This is done conditional either on restricting θ  to zero (traditional model estimates) or allowing 
for the uncertainty in the expected returns (i.e. non-zero θ ). The search is done over the range between the 
                                                   
106More precisely, if we normalize today's shock to 100% then only 23.7% of this shock will persist over the next 5 
years and only 5.6% will persist over a 10 year horizon. 
 
107Albeit it arbitrary, to model the impact of shock to the equilibrium rate of return to persist for 10 years seems 
descriptive of many firm events. Consider for example the time period involved when a firm launches a new product 




long run inflation rate (assumed 3%) and 50%. Observations that did not converge in this range are left 
out.
108 I censor any negative equity premia at zero.
109 
5.4. Data and Sample Construction 
First, I describe the data used to estimate the variance of the innovations in the future expected rates 
of return. Then I proceed with the data used to estimate the implied equity premia. 
5.4.1. Equilibrium Rates of Return Variance Data 
 The intersection of CRSP monthly stock and COMPUSTAT combined industrial annual datasets for 
the period 1970-2003 represents the population. Further, the following conditions must be met for 
observations to be included in the analysis: (1) December must be the month of the fiscal year end (because 
the aggregate variables are measured over a fixed interval), (2) each firm must have positive book value of 
equity and at least three non-missing observations of book value. 
The monthly stock returns are compounded over a 12 month period starting three months after the 
beginning of the fiscal year. I require all 12 monthly returns to be non-missing. Book-to-market ratio is 
calculated as the ratio of book value of equity (data item 60) to the product of end of year price (data item 
24) and the number of shares outstanding (data item 25). The return on equity is calculated as the ratio of 
net income (data item 172) over the previous year book value. 
Since the log  transformation for returns close to -1 may result in outliers I require that the log of one 
plus compounded return is greater than 
4 10 1
− × . Further, in order to mitigate the influence of outliers I 
winsorize all the variables (after log transformation) at 1% (symmetrically). This leaves me with 80,947 
non-missing firm-year observations. 
The aggregate values of ROE, size and book-to-market are calculated by taking the median for each 
year and each Fama-French industry of a log transformed variable. The risk-free rate is calculated as annual 
average of daily 10-year (constant maturity) treasury rates taken from Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED II). 
Following Fama and French (1993) I use NYSE listed companies in COMPUSTAT in order to 
calculate size (end of year market value) and book-to-market breakpoints. These breakpoints are used to 
classify firms into 25 portfolios based on their average size and book-to-market. For each of these 
portfolios as well as for each Fama-French industry I estimate the variance of the equilibrium rate of return, 
which is subsequently used to calculate the implied cost of capital. 
                                                   
108Note that setting the cost of capital smaller than the rate of growth in dividends or residual income will invalidate 
the valuation equation as the series will not converge. 
 
109Otherwise the price of a firm must be zero as no one will invest in a company offering compensation for risk lower 
than risk-free return.  
143 
5.4.2. Implied Cost of Capital Data 
Next, I describe the data used to implement the model developed in the Section 3.1 and to compute 
the implied cost of capital. I use COMPUSTAT, CRSP and I/B/E/S to retrieve accounting data, prices and 
analyst forecasts, respectively. Based on COMPUSTAT data I measure income before extraordinary items 
–  t X  (data item 18), dividends –  t d  (data item 21), book value of equity –  t B  (data item 60), total assets 
(data item 6), and number of shares (data item 25). 
The I/B/E/S summary data file is used to obtain consensus forecasts as of the middle of each 
month.
110 I retrieve the earnings forecasts for two consecutive years ( 1 FY  and  2 FY ) and the long term 
forecasted growth rate in earnings (LTG). Only the observations with at least two future earnings forecasts 
are included. In order to ensure that information about book value is publicly available, the forecasts and 
the prices are taken three months after the fiscal year end. Specifically, I/B/E/S forecasts are taken as of the 
third week of the fourth month after the fiscal year end. The price is measured at the end of fourth month 
after fiscal year end. I leave out observations with negative current book value of equity and observations 
with negative  2 FY  forecasts. Further I consider observations with forecasted EPS 2  greater or equal than 
forecasted EPS1 as this is required by the model in Easton (2004). Data availability in I/B/E/S limits the 
sample to the period of 1981-2003. 
The clean surplus relation ( t t t t d X B B − + −1 = ) is employed to forecast the future book values. To 
forecast earnings per share more than 2 years ahead, I use the long term growth (LTG). If LTG is missing it 
is interpolated from the trend in one- and two-year EPS forecasts (FY1 and FY2). I use the ratio of average 
dividends to average earnings over the last three years to compute the current dividend payout ratio. If the 
actual earnings are negative the denominator is replaced by 0.06×(Total Assets).
111 Payout ratios are 
restricted to [0, 1] interval and otherwise are censored at the boundary. 
The median return on equity (ROE, used by GLS) is calculated over the 10-year moving window for 
each Fama-French industry. Following GLS, loss firms are excluded. I assume that long term inflation rate 
equals to 3%.
112 The number of observations for the final sample varies from 486 to 2646. 
 5.5. Implied Risk Premia 
Table 1 provides the estimated variances of the innovations in the expected rates of return 
2
ε σ , given 
by (18). The variances are estimated across  5 5×  subsamples created on size and book-to-market ratio. The 
                                                   
110Thursday following the second Friday. 
 
111Such assumption was maintained in GLS who argued that ROA in U.S. is six percent on average 
 
112This assumption is used in CT to capitalize residual income at the terminal date. I also assume that g  (expected 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































evidence suggests that these variances are substantial (ranging between 0.003 and 0.06). Smaller firms with 
lower book-to-market generally exhibit the higher 
2
ε σ  and this variance declines when moving to larger 
size and higher book-to-market portfolios. 
Table 2 reports average implied cost of capital for each year. The three columns in Panel (A) contain 
cost of capital measures based on the traditional valuation models presented in GLS, CT and Easton and 
denoted by  GLS r ,  CT r  and  mpeg r  respectively. Panel (B) provides the uncertainty-adjusted measures based 
on these models. The adjustment factor  ) (  
ff θ θ ≡  is based on 48 industry specific estimates of 
2
ε σ . These 
measures are denoted by 
ff
GLS r , 
ff
CT r , and 
ff
mpeg r , respectively. Panel (C) provides the implied cost of capital 
with adjustment  ) (  
sbm θ θ ≡  based on 
2
ε σ  estimated across  5 5×  size and book-to-market portfolios. They 
are denoted by 
sbm
GLS r , 
sbm
CT r , and 
sbm
mpeg r , respectively. 
The evidence in the table indicates that  GLS r ,  CT r  and  mpeg r  estimates are on average 8.66, 8.98, and 
11.75%, respectively.
113 Their uncertainty-adjusted counterparts are considerably larger: 
ff
GLS r , 
ff
CT r , and 
ff
mpeg r  are 12.63, 12.76, and 15.55%, while 
sbm
GLS r , 
sbm
CT r  and 
sbm
mpeg r  constitute 12.97, 13.14, and 15.91%, 
respectively. This suggests the presence of a substantial downward bias in the implied cost of capital 
estimates from traditional valuation model. 
Table 3 reports the implied equity premia (calculated as a difference between the implied cost of 
capital and the risk-free rate  f r ) and the variance of the innovations in the expected returns 
2
ε σ  by 
industry. Cross-industry differences are substantial. The highest variances belong to Pharmaceutical 
Products (13), Lab Equipment (37), Healthcare (12) and Electronic Equipment (36). 
The evidence in Panel (A) indicates that the three traditional models generate on average equity 
premia of 2.47 (GLS), 2.97 (CT), and 5.40% (Easton). These numbers are comparable to prior findings of 
GLS and CT who report average equity premia of 2.5% and 3.4%, respectively. 
114 
The evidence contained in Panels (B) and (C) reveals substantial differences in equity premia when 
the stochastic nature of expected returns is taken into account. When the variance 
2
ε σ  is estimated at 
industry level, the uncertainty-adjusted equity premia are 5.96, 6.28 and 8.91 for the specifications in GLS, 
CT, and Easton, respectively. The corresponding numbers when 
2
ε σ  is modelled across size and book-to-
market deciles, are 6.30, 6.66 and 9.27. These findings suggest that when the uncertainty in expected 
returns is properly accounted for the implied equity premia are of similar size as those historically realized.
                                                   
113This is consistent with prior findings (Botosan and Plumlee, 2005) that the model in Easton (2004) yields relatively 
higher estimates. 
 
114Equity premium is not reported in Easton (2004); the average implied cost of capital there is 11.9% while the 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































T a b l e 4 
Bias in the Implied Cost of Capital by Fama-French 48 Industry Groups 
      (A) Variance by F-F Industry  (B) Variance by Size and B/M   
     F-F Industry  N 
f f
GLS r  
f f
CT r
  f f
mpeg r
  sbm






ε σ  
 ALL  35977  3.49 3.31 3.50 3.83 3.69 3.87  0.017 
1 Agric  83  5.13 5.20 5.20 4.04 4.09 4.08  0.029 
2 Food  699  1.85 1.68 1.77 3.37 3.17 3.35  0.006 
3 Soda  80  1.45 1.25 1.37 3.73 3.23 3.65  0.004 
4 Alcohol  145  1.31 1.22 1.25 3.77 3.58 3.73  0.004 
5 Tobacco  38  4.77 4.75 4.84 3.45 3.48 3.50  0.019 
6 Toys&Rec  270  3.50 3.20 3.51 3.50 3.28 3.56  0.016 
7 Fun&Entt  443  3.87 3.77 3.90 4.08 4.13 4.24  0.017 
8 Book&Prnt  487  1.99 1.67 1.86 3.54 3.15 3.44  0.007 
9 Hshld  788  2.91 2.66 2.78 4.02 3.85 4.03  0.011 
10 Apparel  545  1.71 1.58 1.58 3.68 3.57 3.66  0.005 
11 Health  604  5.88 6.07 6.43 4.35 4.50 4.66  0.041 
12 MedEq  883  4.89 4.93 5.28 4.81 4.96 5.30  0.030 
13 Drugs  839  6.82 6.59 7.16 4.09 3.95 4.28  0.053 
14 Chemic  933  2.67 2.34 2.42 3.49 3.19 3.31  0.009 
15 Rubb&Plas  251  2.44 2.17 2.21 4.12 3.95 4.02  0.008 
16 Txtls  291  3.02 2.95 2.95 3.35 3.36 3.34  0.011 
17 BldMt  722  3.01 2.84 2.93 3.72 3.63 3.71  0.011 
18 Cnstr  411  5.35 5.38 5.55 3.67 3.60 3.71  0.030 
19 Steel  593  3.69 3.61 3.44 3.12 3.09 2.91  0.014 
20 FabPr  113  3.11 3.17 3.03 4.02 4.17 4.10  0.012 
21 Mach  1251  3.79 3.66 3.70 4.00 3.96 4.03  0.016 
22 ElcEq  450  3.69 3.59 3.60 4.15 4.09 4.14  0.015 
23 Autos  683  4.12 3.99 3.96 3.50 3.48 3.40  0.017 
24 Aero  185  2.48 2.15 2.31 2.58 2.44 2.48  0.009 
25 Ship&Rail  123  2.70 2.32 2.21 3.36 3.01 3.00  0.008 
26 Guns  55  3.88 3.69 3.75 3.98 3.85 3.94  0.016 
27 Gold  76  3.37 2.99 4.94 2.13 2.05 3.58  0.025 
28 Mines  115  3.29 3.07 2.91 3.82 3.62 3.49  0.010 
29 Coal  43  1.36 1.22 1.07 3.82 3.96 3.65  0.003 
30 Oil&Gas  1074  3.19 2.94 3.34 3.09 2.98 3.36  0.014 
31 Util  1486  2.36 1.77 1.89 3.57 2.84 3.03  0.005 
32 Telcm  757  2.59 2.13 2.47 3.22 2.82 3.26  0.009 
33 PerSv  337  5.18 5.19 5.34 4.48 4.57 4.62  0.029 
34 BusSv  3253  4.39 4.20 4.54 4.58 4.48 4.88  0.023 
35 Comps  1597  5.27 5.43 5.76 4.26 4.44 4.65  0.034 
36 Chips  1905  5.76 5.59 6.34 3.86 3.75 4.15  0.041 
37 LabEq  727  5.90 5.72 6.45 4.22 4.11 4.51  0.043 
38 Paper  686  3.00 2.67 2.72 3.49 3.32 3.34  0.011 
39 Boxes  173  2.20 1.94 1.94 3.75 3.65 3.62  0.007 
40 Trans  1000  3.41 3.29 3.25 3.60 3.53 3.55  0.013 
41 Whlsl  1201  3.29 3.19 3.22 3.80 3.77 3.85  0.013 
42 Rtail  2445  4.00 3.82 4.03 3.56 3.43 3.62  0.019  
152 
Table 4. Continued. 
43 Meals  695  3.53 3.45 3.58 4.34 4.37 4.52  0.015 
44 Banks  3659  1.47 1.21 1.23 3.78 3.49 3.52  0.003 
45 Insur  1788  2.00 1.79 1.83 3.23 3.11 3.16  0.006 
46 RlEst  54  2.09 2.12 1.96 4.45 4.63 4.49  0.006 
47 FinTrad  549  1.22 1.06 1.05 4.13 3.92 3.93  0.003 
48 Miscel  392  2.02 1.88 1.93 3.61 3.65 3.76  0.007 
 
This table provides the bias in the implied cost of equity estimates averaged 48 Fama-French (1997) industry groups. Bias is 
defined as the difference between the adjusted implied cost of capital estimate (described below) minus the unadjusted 
(standard) implied cost of capital estimate. The implied cost of capital is computed solving the following model 
) ( )) ( 1 ( r V r P t t θ + =  ,       








g r g r
r
− + − +
−
=  
where Vt(r) is value of the firm as given by either GLS, CT, Easton (2004) (or any other discounted cash flow/dividends) 
models (see section 4 of the paper for more details on each model); r is the implied cost of capital metrics; g is expected 
growth rate in prices set to long run conservative inflation rate of 3%; α is autoregressive parameter in the equilibrium rate 
of return set equal to 0.75.  
    The implied cost of capital form the standard models restrict θ(r) to zero. Subscripts GLS, CT, and rmpeg next to 
r refer GLS, CT and Easton’s models used, respectively, to express Vt(r) in terms of residual (or economic) income instead 
of dividends). In Panel A the adjusted implied cost of capital estimates is calculated when θ(r) varies across Fama-French 48 
industry groups based on within industry variance of the innovations in the equilibrium rate of return ( ' ' 1 1
2 e e ΓΣΓ = ε σ ) (thus 
superscript ff). In Panel B the adjusted implied cost of equity calculated when θ(r) is allowed to vary across 5×5 size and 
book-to-market deciles based on σε
2 estimate (thus superscript sbm).  
    Analysts’ consensus forecasts form I/B/E/S and historical COMPUSTAT data are used to predict future earnings, 
dividends and book values required by the residual income models. Dividend payout rations are calculated based on 3 years 
of historical data. I consider observations with EPS1 forecast greater or equal than EPS2 forecast as required by model in 
Easton (2004); additionally I restrict to positive EPS2 forecast used to interpolate earnings into the future.  
Forecasting future earnings in GLS model assumes future return on equity decays towards the industry median 
ROE over 12 years. I calculate median ROE for each industry and each year using 10 year moving window excluding loss 
firms. Model in CT assumes perpetual growth rate in residual income starting from year 5. This growth is assumed to be the 
expected inflation rate set equal to 3%.  Analysts forecasts are measured in the middle of the fourth month after the fiscal 
year end. Prices are measured at the end of the fourth month after the fiscal year end to make sure the accounting 
information is publicly available. Availability of I/B/E/S data limits the sample to 1981-2003. Cost of equity estimates less 
than 3% (conservative inflation rate estimate) are censored and the observations with cost of capital more than 50% are left 
out form the analysis. Further I restrict the sample to the set on non-missing observations across all the 9 different types of 
cost of capital estimates.    
153 
The bias in the equity premia estimates for 48 Fama-French industries is reported in Table 4. When 
the uncertainty-adjustment θ  is based on within industry variance estimates (i.e., 
ff θ θ = ), the average 
bias ranges from 3.31 to 3.50%. The bias ranges between 3.69 and 3.83 when θ  is based on size and book-
to-market quintiles (i.e., 
btm θ θ = ). Interestingly, all three models yield bias of similar magnitude. As 
suggested by cross-sectional variation in the estimates of 
2
ε σ  discussed above, the highest bias (averaged 
across six different measures), is encountered in Pharmaceutical Products (13), Healthcare (12), Lab 
Equipment (37), Medical Equipment (12), Computers (35), and Electronic Equipment (36). 
Table 5 provides the evidence of how the adjustment factor 
sbm θ  varies across size and book-to-
market quintals. The three panels in the table provide the adjustment factors 
sbm
GLS θ , 
sbm
CT θ , and 
sbm
mpeg θ  for the 
models in GLS, CT, and Easton (2004) respectively. These factors are evaluated at the implied rate of 
return  ρ  that solves the valuation equation. The patterns are generally decreasing with size and book-to-
market, i.e. resemble the patterns in the estimated variance of the innovations in the expected returns. The 
magnitude of the adjustment factors 
sbm
GLS θ , 
sbm
CT θ  and 
sbm
mpeg θ  ranges in 0.33-2.99, 0.51-3.08, and 0.29-2.12, 
respectively. 
This evidence suggests that traditional valuation models ignore a substantial fraction of the value. 
The predicted value of equity of the portfolio of the smallest firms with the highest growth opportunities is 
about 3 times larger than what is predicted by the traditional valuation models. This is consistent with the 
evidence in Chemmanur and Loutskina (2005) that prices of the IPO's exceed the value predicted by the 
residual income model 3 times on average (assuming that these are small/high growth firms). 
The evidence in Table 6 compares the uncertainty-adjusted implied cost of capital estimates with 
their counterparts that ignore the stochastic nature of expected returns. These differences are computed over 
size and book-to-market portfolios. The table indicates that the smallest firms with the highest growth 
opportunities have equity premia that range from 9.55 (for GLS) to 15.97 (for Easton, 2004) which is 
consistent with the assessments of practitioners. 
In addition, consistent with the findings in CT, Panels A1-A3 indicate that the unadjusted cost of 
capital increases with the book-to-market. This is not intuitive as higher book-to-market (greater assets in 
place) suggests less risk. However, when we adjust for uncertainty, the evidence generally reverses. Panels 
(B1-B3) show that firms in the lowest book-to-market quintiles have higher risk premia than firms in the 
highest book-to-market quintiles. It follows from Panels C1-C3 that this is due to firms in the smallest 
book-to-market quintile having the highest θ  while this is not the case for the highest book-to-market 
firms. 
Finally, Table 7 aims to assess the reliability of different cost of capital proxies. The correlations 
among the traditional implied cost of capital proxies range from 0.649 to 0.732 when θ  is set to zero. At 
the same time, the correlation coefficients for the uncertainty-adjusted measures range from 0.718 to 0.783 
(0.722 to 0.812) when θ  is based on 48 industry groups ( 5 5×  size and book-to-market portfolios). This  
154 
T a b l e 5 
Correction factor θ
 : by Size and Book-to-Market 
 
Panel A:  Average Adjustment Factor for model in GLS ( θGLS) 
    Low  B/M      High  B/M 
   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Small   Q1  2.142 1.929 1.462 1.060 0.543 
 Q2  2.992 1.870 1.295 0.716 0.559 
 Q3  2.179 2.114 0.835 0.747 0.953 
 Q4  1.997 1.262 0.556 0.429 0.484 
Large   Q5  1.172 0.917 0.561 0.330 0.472 
 
Panel B:  Average Adjustment Factor for model in CT ( θCT) 
    Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Small   Q1  2.075 2.054 1.663 1.262 0.676 
 Q2  3.086 2.256 1.569 0.895 0.734 
 Q3  2.429 2.448 1.098 0.978 1.022 
 Q4  2.309 1.730 0.830 0.602 0.695 
Large   Q5  1.559 1.468 0.867 0.514 0.732 
 
Panel C:  Average Adjustment Factor for model in Easton (2004) ( θmpeg) 
   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Small   Q1  1.368 1.403 1.141 0.823 0.408 
 Q2  2.141 1.439 1.055 0.589 0.479 
 Q3  1.697 1.712 0.757 0.658 0.812 
 Q4  1.565 1.046 0.496 0.389 0.436 
Large   Q5  0.970 0.821 0.508 0.291 0.433 
Table contains the adjustment factors  








g r g r
r




evaluated at the implied cost of capital that solves the valuation equation  
) ( )) ( 1 ( r V r P t t θ + =  
where Vt(r) is value of the firm as given by either GLS, CT, Easton (2004) models (see section 4 
of the paper for more details on each model); r is the implied cost of capital metrics; g is expected 
growth rate in prices set to long run conservative inflation rate of 3%; α is autoregressive 
parameter in the equilibrium rate of return set equal to 0.75.  
Subscripts GLS, CT, and rmpeg next to r refer GLS, CT and Easton’s models used, respectively, 
to express Vt(r) in terms of residual (or economic) income instead of dividends). The adjusted 
implied cost of equity calculated when θ(r) is varies across 5×5 size and book-to-market quintiles 
based on σε
2 estimate. 
The data is taken form the intersection of I/B/E/S, CRSP and COMPUSTAT. Availability of 
I/B/E/S data limits the sample to 1981-2003. Cost of equity estimates less than 3% (conservative 
inflation rate estimate) are censored and the observations with cost of capital more than 50% are 
left out form the analysis. Further I restrict the sample to the set on non-missing observations 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































implies that adjusting for uncertainty improves the ability of different implied cost of capital metrics to 
capture the underlying construct. 
5.6. Future work 
 In this section, I extend the model by allowing innovations in expected returns to correlate with the 
changes in dividends (or cash flows). An analytically convenient approach is to use continuous 
compounding and to assume normal distribution for changes in expected returns (and dividend growth). In 
this case expected return at time t is given by:  











1 1 = ) (  (24) 
 Assuming the transversally condition is met and iterating the expression (24) yields the following 




















D r exp E P ) ( =
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 In order for the correlation of time varying expected returns and future cash-flows (dividends) to be 
incorporated, it is necessary to assume an evolution  t D  (in addition to assuming a stochastic process for 
t r ). Following Ang and Liu (2004) dividends are assumed to grow at logarithmic growth rate 
) / ( = 1 1 t t t D D ln g + + . Both  t g  and  t r  are assumed to follow Gaussian AR(1) processes:  
    t t t r r ε α ρ α + + − −1 ) (1 =  (26) 
  t t t g g g υ β β + + − −1 ) (1 =  (27) 
 where  ) (0, ~
2
ε σ ε N t ,  ) (0, ~
2
υ σ υ N t  and  ευ σ υ ε = ) , ( t t Cov . 
It can be shown that under these assumptions equation (25) can be rewritten as  
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 As Appendix B shows, calculating the expectation and covariance yields the following expression  
   ) ( } { = 0
1 =
0 t t t
t
D E t t t exp P Ψ − Ω + − ∑
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ρ  (29) 






































                                                   
































 Notice that if  ρ = t r  for any t, i.e. cost of capital is deterministic, above result reduces to standard 
dividend discount formula. This representation has the same form as equation (10) we saw earlier as (29) 
can be written as  
   0 0
1 =




ρ  (32) 
 where  ) ( = 0 t t exp Q t t Ψ − Ω  
Equation (29) can also be stated as  
   TV D E t t t exp P t t t
T
t
+ Ψ − Ω + − ∑ ) ( } { = 0
1 =
0 ρ  (33) 
 where   
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  and  g  is the long run expected dividend growth rate and  t ∆  captures the volatility of dividend 
growth. As time t increases  → ∆ Ψ Ω } , , { t t t   } , , { ∆ Ψ Ω . In this case the terminal value may be calculated 
in a closed form: 
116  
  











2 2 ) /2(1 = α σ ε − Ω ,  ) )(1 /(1 =   β α σευ − − Ψ , 
2 ) /2(1 =   β συ − ∆ . 
5.7. Conclusions 
This paper demonstrated that uncertainty about the future expected returns will be reflected by the 
stock price and needs to be taken into account by the valuation models. A failure to account for this type of 
uncertainty will result into (i) a downward bias in firm value, as yielded by standard valuation models; (ii) a 
downward bias in the implied cost of equity capital. 
The bias in the implied cost of capital is economically significant and is about 3.5% at the economy 
level. In addition, this bias varies with firm-specific characteristics and the investment opportunities set. 
The bias is considerably more pronounced in volatile industries and for small firms with large growth 
                                                   
116Otherwise numerical integration is a more precise alternative.  
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opportunities. The findings suggest an explanation for why prior empirical literature found that the implied 
equity premia are smaller than their historical counterparts. In addition, preliminary evidence suggests that 
the cost of capital measures derived here are more reliable than the measures derived from the standard 
valuation models. 
The implied cost of capital is a widely used summary measure. The model to calculate the implied 
cost of capital proposed here is analogous to the traditional valuation models used in the literature with the 
only difference that it includes an adjustment factor for the uncertainty about future expected returns. This 
model is straightforward to implement and is of interest to practitioners and empirical researchers in 
economics, finance and accounting. 
A straightforward step for future research is to evaluate ability of the model proposed here to predict 
firm's value (or fundamental value) and compare it with other valuation models used in practice.  
5.8. References  
  Blanchard, O., J., 1993, Movements in equity premium, Brooking Papers in Economic Activity 2, 
75-138. 
   Botosan, C., A., 1997, Disclosure Level and the Cost of Capital, The Accounting Review 72 (3), 
323-350. 
   Botosan, C., A., Plumlee, M.A., 2002, A Re-examination of disclosure quality and the expected 
cost of capital, Joournal of Accounting Research 40 (1-3), 21-40. 
   Botosan, C., A., Plumlee, M., 2005, Assessing Alternative Proxies for the Expected Risk Premium, 
The Accounting Review 80 (1), 21-54. 
   Brav, A., Lehavy, R., Michaely, R., 2004 Expected Returns and Asset Pricing, Duke University 
Working Paper. 
      Callen, J., L., Segal, D., 2004, Do accruals drive firm-level stock returns? A variance 
decomposition analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 42 (3), 527-560. 
   Campbell, J., Y., Shiller, R.,J., 1988, The dividend-price ratio and expectations of future dividends 
and discount factors. Review of Financial Studies 1 (3), 195-228. 
   Campbell, J., Y., 1991, A variance decomposition for stock returns. Economic Journal 101, 157-
179. 
      Chemmanur T., J., Loutskina, E., 2005, The role of venture capital backing in initial public 
offerings: Certification, Screening, or Market Power? Boston College working paper. 
   Chen, F., Jorgensen, B., Yong, K., Y., 2004, Implied Cost of Equity Capital in Earnings-based 
Valuation: International Evidence. Accounting and Business Research 34 (4), 323-344. 
      Claus, J., Thomas, J., 2001, Equity premia as low as three percent: Evidence from analysts' 
earnings forecasts for domestic and international stock markets. Journal of Finance 56, 1629-1666. 
   Dechow, P., Hutton, A., Sloan, R., 1999, An empirical assessment of the residual income valuation 
model. Journal of Accounting and Economics 26, 1-34. 
   Easton, P., 2004, PE Ratios, PEG Ratios, and Estimating the Implied Expected Rate of Return on 
Equity Capital. Accounting Review 79 (1), 73-95. 
   Easton, P., Monahan, S., 2005, An Evaluation of Accounting Based Measures of Expected Returns. 
The Accounting Review, forthcoming.  
161 
   Fama, E., F., French, K.,R., 1993, Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 33, 3-56. 
   Fama, E., F., French, K.,R., 1997, Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial Economics, 43, 
153-193. 
   Fama, E., F., French, K.,R., 2002, The equity premium. Journal of Finance, 57, 637-659. 
   Feltham, G., A., Ohlson, J.,A., 1999, Residual earnings valuation with risk and stochastic interest 
rates. Accounting Review 74, 165-183. 
   Francis, J., Olsson P., Oswald, D.,R., 2000, Comparing the accuracy and explainability of dividend, 
free cash flow and abnormal earnings equity valuation models. Journal of Accounting Research 38 (1), 45-
70. 
   Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., M., Schipper, K., 2004, Cost of Equity and Earnings Attributes. 
The Accounting Review 79 (4), 967-1010. 
   Gebhardt, W., R., Lee, C.,M., Swaminathan, B., 2001, Toward an implied cost of capital. Journal of 
Accounting Research  39, 135-176. 
   Gode, D., K., Mohanram, P., S., 2002, Infering the Cost of Capital using the Ohlson-Juettner Model 
Stern School of Business Working Paper. 
   Guay, W., R., Kothari, S.,P., Shu, S., 2004, Properties of Implied Cost of Capital Using Analysts' 
Forecasts. MIT Sloan Working Paper. 
   Hail, L., Leuz, C., 2004a, Cost of Capital and Cash Flow Effects of U.S. Cross-Listings. ECGI - 
Finance Working Paper No. 46/2004. 
      Hail, L., Leuz, C., 2004b, International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal 
Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter? ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 15/2003. 
   Lee, C., M., C., Ng, D., Swaminathan, B., 2003, International Asset Pricing: Evidence from the 
Cross Section of Implied Cost of Capital. 14th Annual Conference on Financial Economics and 
Accounting. 
      Penman S., H., Sougiannis, T., 1998, A comparison of dividend, dash flow, and earnings 
approaches to equity valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research 15 (3), 343-383. 
      Samuelson, P., 1965, Proof that properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly. Industrial 
Management Review 6, 41-49. 
   Vuolteenaho, T., 2002, What drives firm-level stock returns. Journal of Finance 57, 233-264. 
 5.A. Appendix A 
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 where  {.} I  is an indicator function. 
Also, note that  ) ( = ) , ( t
s
s t t R Var R R Cov α +  where the variance is unconditional. Therefore, under 
the assumption that expected returns are uncorrelated with dividends, we may write  
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 where l  is a column of ones. 
From (11) and the law of iterated expectations it follows that we may write  
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1
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Thus  0 Q  is the sum of the elements of the following matrix times one half of the unconditional 
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 Substituting this back into (39) we may obtain the following convenient representation of  0 Q  
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 The value of  t Q  must be proportional to price  t P  as  t Q  is proportional to the stream of future 
expected dividends. This implies that the ratio  t t Q P q / =  is constant and can be replaced by the ratio 
0 0/Q P .   
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Assuming  t Q  grows at rate  g + 1 , we have 
t
t g Q Q ) (1 = 0 +  and thus we may write:  
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 Thus  0 Q  is given by the following formula  






 and firm value is given by  
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 depending on whether we assume  g .  
 5.B. Appendix B 
 By exploiting normal distribution, equation (25) can be expressed as  
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  In order to demonstrate the last equality we need to calculate  ) (
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 and that  
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 thus it follows that  
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 Second, note that  
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  This completes the derivation of equation (46).  
 